From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Thu Mar 17 2005 - 18:59:44 GMT
To concretize what I’ve been talking about I’d like to focus on the nature,
function, and evolution of the discussion group. This, of course, receives
special notice in our scrutiny of antiprofessionalism in Pirsig because the
MD and its participants are the heir apparents of Pirsig’s philosophy. It
is my contention that whenever a discussion moves from a lax conversation to
a motivated inquiry into a problem that a “profession” develops. By
“profession” I mean simply a group of people who achieve authority over a
problem based on their extended critical attention to a problem. The MD, in
its first incarnation as the Lila Squad, was never a lackadaisical,
Oprah-style book discussion group. It was a group of people motivated by
the inquiry into philosophy and its problems, specifically Pirsig’s
philosophy and his problems. As _soon_ as the Lila Squad began in 1997,
Pirsig’s philosophy began to be institutionalized and professionalized
because as soon as a discussion about Pirsig’s books moves from a simple
conversation _about_ some object to an _inquiry into_ that object, the marks
of a profession emerge, specifically that of authority (naturally there is
range here).
When Pirsig remarked in the introduction to Lila’s Child that “personalities
emerge” in the course of the discussion, what he failed to mention was that,
concurrently with personality styles and traits, came differing degrees of
authority that were created and shaped by the discussion as it went. In a
new conversation, nobody really comes in with any more authority than
anybody else, but as the conversation moves authority is created and
conferred and flexed. As the conversation moves forward, authority can be
increased, but it can also be decreased as it is challenged.
The authority that a profession develops, and particular individuals within
the profession attain, isn’t something that should deplored (nor, really,
could it be). The authority that is developing is the authority that
accrues to lines of argument and interpretation. When an argument is
forwarded it is critically evaluated by the rest of the profession. The
more an argument is accepted as being a good argument, the more
authoritative power is given to the argument (it is a _successful_
argument). This also confers authority upon the creator of the argument,
upon his argumentative skills and practice. The more an interpretation is
accepted as being a good interpretation, the more authoritative power is
given to the interpretation, and thereby, again, also to its creator. These
lines of successful arguments and interpretations create the power grid
according to which competing arguments and interpretations are judged. A
competitor is forwarded to _dislodge_ the authoritative power of the old
argument or interpretation in order to set itself up as the new authority.
The push and pull of arguments and interpretations, the sway of various
authorities, is what marks the competitive dynamic of inquiry.
The difficulty in the MD, though, is that, because of Pirsig’s
antiprofessionalism, _nobody is supposed to have any authority_. And
Pirsig’s dutiful heirs have absorbed that sentiment (if not explicitly that
doctrine). Pirsig’s own professional class has been emerging for the last
eight years, yet rarely is it acknowledged. There is one particular
instance of this antiprofessionalism in the MD that I would like to
highlight: the problem of “jargon.” Jargon words are specialized words used
by a profession to help in their inquiry. It has often been remarked that
there is too much jargonizing, that the spirit of Pirsig requires us to be
“clear and plain spoken.” It is unclear, however, how we can be free of
jargon when we are doing philosophy. Most people don’t do philosophy and so
have no idea what is meant by the words “metaphysics” or “epistemology” or
“empiricism,” let alone words specific to Pirsig, terms that have their own
very, very special meaning like “Quality,” “Dynamic Quality,” or
“pre-intellectual cutting edge of reality.”
The problem of jargon is simply one of unfamiliarity. Jargon in a
profession helps create a special language for the profession to help its
inquiry into its special problems. Ideally, one would be able to identify
somebody as a participant in a profession if they understood the jargon
being thrown around. But as a profession is growing and changing (as a
profession always should be) its jargon grows and changes. And the way into
new jargon is simply becoming familiar with it. To resist new jargon is to
resist new tools for inquiry and it is not always apparent if something new
is useless or not until it is used. To simply dismiss a new word out of
hand as “jargonistic” is a reactionary move without much justification
because the only way to accrue justification is to become familiar with the
new jargon, which means being able to understand it and use it.
Attacks towards others as being jargonistic obscurantists are clearly of a
piece with Pirsig’s antiprofessionalism. Concurrently with this
antiprofessionalist move (along with other moves, especially the shunning of
the history of philosophy and/or contemporary philosophy) is the flexing of
professional authority. When participants are feeling lazy towards a critic
there are two easy responses at their disposal: 1) they take advantage of
the prevailing antiprofessional mood and launch a curt diatribe of that ilk
or 2) they flex their authority and claim, with equal curtness and as only a
professional could, that the critic “misunderstands” Pirsig. The problem is
that both replies stop the conversation, stop the inquiry. Understanding
only arises out of the conversation.
Antiprofessionalism is, of course, the most destructive because it
completely precludes continuance of the conversation (because the
conversation is the profession), but the curt demand to follow the current
power grid also precludes conversation because the critic has been told that
they are simply wrong. Authority, however, within a profession isn’t flexed
responsibly like this. Critics are rightly contesting the prevailing
authorities and the current establishment is rightly defending itself, but
the only way for the standoff to resolve itself is through the conversation,
through the marshaling of arguments, interpretations, and evidence. So
while antiprofessionalism is always unresponsible, the response that a
participant “misunderstands” is almost always (except under very basic,
delimited, and narrow respects, respects that rarely attain between long
standing conversants in a long standing argument) an empty gesture because
“understanding” is the crown that is awarded to the winner at the end of an
extended engagement (with “misunderstanding” being conferred to the loser).
And winners, of course, are notoriously difficult to determine during an
ongoing inquiry and will always be continually contested in a healthy
inquiry.
The fact is, this quasi-professional mimicing that is natural of inquiry at
moq.org shouldn't be deplored (because it can't be) but encouraged. Because
it is only if we more consciously develop this professional attitude that
inquiry concerning Pirsig will move forward (in whatever direction that may
be). Part of the problem is not only the attitude of individuals, but
structural and institutional. The MD just isn't any good at displaying the
well-worn grooves that have developed over the years, the lines of argument
that have developed and become popular and received authority and those that
died and/or were debunked. Because of the way the MD works there is no
obvious account of the main line of Pirsigian philosophy. This makes
establishing and referring to interpretive authority (let alone bucking
interpretive authority) all the more difficult and problematic because there
is no reference point with which we can stop and point to. Its not that its
bad that there are as many versions of the MoQ as there are participants,
but it makes getting a bead on the well-worn grooves, and allowing people to
buck them or be persuaded by them, extraordinarily difficult.
This is why I've been trying to pressure people into writing essays for the
Forum. The interruptery style preferred by most participants in the MD
doesn’t allow the room needed for many of the subtle arguments that need to
be forwarded, let alone the simple space restrictions of a post. The essays
would then allow extended presentations of people’s various views about
various topics and allow the conversation to move forward, rather than being
rehashed over and over and over again. It’s not that rehashing is
inherently bad. Whenever a new inquirer, a new potential professional,
enters the fold it’s important that they become acclimated to the
environment, which means seeing what’s persuaded people over the years.
Then they can voice their own opinions with much more precision as over and
against certain views. But when a new participant is howled down for
“misunderstanding” Pirsig simply because they don’t have their footing in an
established argumentative battlefield, it discourages new people from
participating because the inquiry looks dead and exclusive, when really it’s
just that contentious.
Matt
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