Re: MD Contradictions

From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Thu Mar 24 2005 - 05:51:08 GMT

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    Scott:

    By using the term "second-hand" in reference to Merrell-Wolff's mystical
    experience, I meant to imply that it would be second-hand for anyone else
    attempting to construct an ontology based on it. I have not read enough of
    Wolff to know what his ontology is, if he has one. Most mystics tend to
    speak in metaphors anyway, which is why I've steered away from Eastern
    philosophy. I do think the Eastern mystics have a more intuitive sense of
    the Oneness of reality, but it's not a concept that is easily explained in
    logical dialectic. Do you remember Chin's Buddhistic ramblings last year?
    (Whatever happened to Chin, by the way?) That kind of "literary
    boilerplate" on philosophy, as currently exemplified in Matt's postings, is
    what I believe Mr. Pirsig meant by Philosophology -- the practice of writing
    about philosophy without actually participating in it. Like the
    musicologists who write about music without creating it. (Deems Taylor was
    an exception.)

    Ham said:
    > You seem to be using "contradictory identity" as a metaphor for the
    polarity
    > of differentiated existence. (If there's more to your concept, you'll
    have
    > to enlighten me.)

    Scott:
    > I use it for that polarity (N.b., Coleridge used "polarity" more or less
    the
    > same way that I use "contradictory identity"), but also, and I think more
    > importantly, for the polarity between the undifferentiated and the
    > differentiated. And I don't see it as especially metaphorical.

    Contradictory (i.e. contrarity) may not be metaphorical, but it does suggest
    that the essence of reality is in constant conflict with itself. I prefer
    the more rational concept of "difference" which, like the Chinese Yin and
    Yang, begins with the duality of "self" and "other" and extends to the
    multi-differentiated processes of finitude.

     Scott:
    > If I deny that the former (process) is derived from the latter
    > (absolute/static reality) (or vice versa) does that make mine a different
    > ontology, or no longer an ontology?

    What makes it an ontology is starting with a primary source. For Aristotle
    it was "the science of the essence of things". Prior to Kant, ontology was
    the theory of "being" AS being. Following Kant's ontological argument for
    God -- "the greater than which nothing can be thought" -- it tended to be
    theistic. But the concept of an a priori source has always been implicit in
    ontology and is what distinguishes it from epistemology, which is usually
    considered to be the theory of the acquisition of knowledge.

    Now here's where you and I may part company, so tread carefully. If your
    theory denies that process and multiplicity derive from constancy and
    oneness, then either you must have a "prior cause" in mind or [IMO] you have
    no ontology. In that case, you will lose me but retain the company of MoQ
    which likewise has no ontology and leaves its epistemology to the
    speculation of its followers.

    > Scott said:
    > That option [unification] is rejected in the third horn
    > of the tetralemma ("not essence and existence").
    > --snip--
    > First horn: not essence
    > Second horn: not existence
    > Third horn: not essence and existence
    > Fourth horn: not neither essence nor existence

    That rules out just about anything, doesn't it? Or, does it imply that the
    inverse is true? Suppose we invert your truth table as follows:
        First horn: essence
        Second horn: existence
        Third horn: essence and existence
        Fourth horn: not essence nor existence

    What are we trying to prove here -- that reality is essentially everything
    and nothing at the same time? I'm holding out for the more rational thesis,
    based on Cusa's concept, that existence is not Essence but 'is not anything
    other than' Essence. (Mayhaps you and I are positing the same essence, but
    I don't know that yet.)

    Unless you are rejecting a primary source, I don't follow your meaning of "a
    Somewhat" here:
    > I just think
    > one can turn the screw one more time and not assume a Somewhat (in your
    > case, Essence, in the MOQ, DQ, or the "undifferentiated aesthetic
    continuum"
    > of Northrop) prior to its negation.
    >
    > So you are presupposing an undifferentiated source (like the MOQ does).
    > This is one place I differ from the MOQ, in that I think the
    > undifferentiated/differentiated to be a contradictory identity, and hence
    > one should not be privileged over the other.

    But are you rejecting a primary source? That is the real question. (And
    please don't tell me it's Quality.)

    > I hold that "Finite intellection" is
    > a concept to be eliminated. All intellect is a contradictory identity of
    the
    > finite and the infinite, and as such is creation.

    I don't know how you define intellect as anything but finite, unless of
    course you have bought into the Pirsigian idea of a universal "organic"
    Intellect as a "mode" of Quality.

    > For me, purpose is not something that can have a rationale.

    Do you mean that purpose is not something we can rationalize, or that
    purpose is something we can not know?

    > It is, instead,
    > yet another of the long list of names for the same (non-)thing, like
    value,
    > consciousness, and intellect. Everything else's rationale needs explaining
    > in terms of purpose (and the rest). That is, it is primal.

    You've lost me completely here. Apparently something along this line of
    thought has you agitated. Can you state what it is with a bit more clarity?

    > See Owen Barfield's "Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry" for an
    > interesting inquiry into idolatry.

    I'll check it out.

    > The function of the logic of contradictory
    > identity is to deconstruct any such concept, even one which "Man cannot
    > experience ... directly", or maybe especially such. Not because "to be
    > experienced" is the mark of the real, but because the unexperienced is in
    > contradictory identity to the experienced.

    Is the "unexperienced" then your reality? And, if so, what is its nature or
    essence?

    > And, of course, I see you as still a bit in the grip of idolatry, "but
    > almost there", and I am not sure if having an ontology isn't a mark
    thereof.

    Nothing is sure at this juncture -- that's for sure! And I wish you would
    explain what is idolatrous about my philosophy. (It sounds as if I've been
    living in sin.)

    But I'm optimistic enough to think you and I are metaphysically on the same
    page.

    Thanks, Scott
    Ham

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