From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Fri May 06 2005 - 01:31:13 BST
Hi Platt --
> I'd like to ask some questions about your Creation hypothesis:
You're always welcome to ask, Platt; but it will be difficult to satisfy you
in an e-mail message. Like Horse and those who manage MD, I always ask that
the questioner have some familiarity with the concept. (My thesis is the
"Mechanical Garden" section of The Essentialists' Forum.)
> Who or what denied Essence? And why?
Essence is immutable. That is the cardinal principle of Essentialism and
the beginning point of creation. Eckhart spoke of the Creator as the
"negation of negations". Essence alone creates by negating; it is, in
effect, the negational source of everything. In the metaphysical sense,
negation is denial. Again, Eckhart says: "He [God or Essence] is the One
who denies of every other that he is anything except himself". These
intuitive insights, together with some concepts of Plotinus and Nicholas de
Cusa, strongly influenced the development of my hypothesis.
> By "Creation," do you mean creation of the physical world?
As I said above, Essence is the negational source of everything.
> How can nothing divide or do anything?
Nothing doesn't "do" anything; it is not an active agent, nor is Essence.
In the physical world (which I suppose an MoQer might call "intellectual
reality", while Hegel and others call it "appearances") every thing is
separated from every other thing by nothingness. So, in that sense,
nothingness is accountable for the differentiation of all that exists.
> Isn't "proprietary awareness" also "beingness," i.e., doesn't it also
> exist?
In the Essence ontology, Being is that which is sensed as occupying time and
space.
I use the term "existent" to refer to anything that exists, and "essent" to
connote the primary existents -- "other" and "not other". Other is the
essent that is denied awareness, and not-other is the essent that is denied
Being. The two primary essents are antithetical with respect to each other
and, like everything else in existence, are divided by nothingness.
Ham (previously):
> > The denied Value of
> > these essents is reclaimed in the process of experience.
> How?
> Why?
This demands a more comprehensive answer than present space permits.
Suffice it to say that the Value of an essent is realized by its
antithetical essent in the process of experience. That is to say, the value
of Being is realized by the not-other (awareness), while the value of
awareness is "realized" or gained by the other (Being). As to the "why" of
this ontology, one can only assume that Essence is constantly being
"refreshed" in some way by the valuistic predilections of its autonomous
agents; this scenario allows a certain reciprocity between the Source and
its negated other.
> Was "the process of experience" created with the denial of Essence?
Yes. But the "specificity" of experience, and its relative value to the
cognizant creature is autonomous. In other words, the individual is free to
choose his values and exercise free will in all transactions.
> By "valuistic" do you mean some things are better than others? If not,
> what do you mean?
I'm using value in the ordinary everyday sense. Man's connection with
Essence is a value transaction. His existential reality is valuistic as
opposed to materialistic.
> I've tried to get the answers by reading your paper, but I need help, if
> you have the time and patience.
Your interest is appreciated, although I don't want to hog the MD by
peddling my own thesis. (Perhaps personal correspondence would be more
appropriate?)
Ham (previously):
> > Again, your assertion presupposes a "universal" Quality which has not
> > adequately been defined by MoQ's author. You yourself denied that
Pirsig
> > ever meant that Quality could exist independently of the observing
subject,
> > but that he equated it with "direct experience". That's my hangup,
Platt.
> Did I deny that Quality could exist independently of an observing subject?
You said:
> [Pirsig] says Quality is experience,
> meaning that valuistic judgment are intrinsic to experience,
>
> What Pirsig asserts is that experience is prior to your intellectual
> conception of a subject with its companion star, object.
> Think of it this way: like spirit, experience was around long before
> you or I or other "biological organism" became it's vessel.
I took this to mean that experience is prior to the subject of experience,
which would make it non-proprietary and universal. I do believe experience
to be contingent on an observer and an object, as do most other non-MoQers.
I also believe Quality to be a valuistic assessment of experience, (ditto
non-MoQers).
> Why do you find it necessary to call the MOQ a "cultist belief system?"
> That seems to be a gratuitous put down to some rather intelligent people.
I'm sorry if it seems gratuitous, but everything I've seen relating to the
MoQ and its followers strongly suggests that it is a cult movement. It
leans heavily to the liberal left (with a Harley as its rebel trademark),
caters to the secularist elite, and is supported by a cadre of RMP-quoting
loyalists who see that their reclusive leader's pronouncements are the last
word on every subject.
I certainly don't question anyone's intelligence; in fact, I've been awed by
the analytical brilliance and philosophical knowledge exhibited by this
group. One would wish, however, that some of this brainpower might be
applied to original ideas outside of the MoQ domain, rather than trying to
force-fit them into its rigid framework.
Thanks for the interest, Platt. And feel free to continue this discussion
by personal e-mail.
Essentially yours,
Ham
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