From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Tue Jul 05 2005 - 06:00:00 BST
Reinier --
Concerning the second half of your response ...
> Well the only difference that I see is that in 'your' theory
> the divine not-other can exist in the same universe as all
> X's and not-X's. And 'it' will be all of them.
> They don't rule each other out. Whereas in 'mine' theory
> 'unity' ceases to exist the moment 1 value rears 'it's ugly head'.
> Because you cannot introduce a value, without acknowledging
> that the value is not true for something or sometime.
> Well.... in truth, it becomes more complicated then that...
OK, I think I see how you are making "value" the differentiator. And it's
apparent that you've borrowed the idea from our friend Pirsig, using an
argument worded very much as he would. Particular things don't exist until
their values are experienced. Conversely, if a particular set of values is
not experienced the referent things don't exist. So he says.
The problem I have with this concept is that values are not sensed in the
way that things are sensed. For example, the value that Pirsig uses as his
prototype is "pain". When one sits on a hot stove, it's the "pain in his
ass" that gets to him first. But pain is a proprioceptive response to nerve
trauma, not a physical attribute that defines a "thing". Pirsig goes on to
call this a "low quality" experience, blithely assuming that his readers
will now understand what he means by Quality. If the truth be told, the
author in his elegant simplicity has avoided defining either quality or
value in an epistemologically useful way.
The breaking down of pure otherness into discrete phenomena is an
intellectual process [intellection] that is universally communicable . The
weighing of values involves esthetic sensibility, which is proprietary to
the self and non-universal. Equating cognizance of "universals" with the
sensation of value (or quality) is not a valid epistemology and doesn't hold
up empirically. It's not a question of which comes first, or where value
resides -- the perennial debates going on here. Rather, it's the fact that
Value and Quality are two distinct types of experience.
> We call something a chair which means we value it
> as a chair, rather then as a pile of wood.
> Somebody in need for a fire to keep his house warm
> may actually value it as a pile of wood.
> But as we value the chair, we choose to value it
> separate from it's surrounding. We choose to value it
> as an object. We do that with everything on every level.
If I was a newly arrived Martian observing an assembly of fitted wooden
pieces resting on the floor, I might be inclined to ask: "What's that gadget
for?" But once I had seen someone sitting on it, I would henceforth know
its purpose. What does the utility of a chair have to do with values?
Epistemologically, I recognize a chair by drawing on my memory of similar
objects and how they are used. In other words, cognizance of phenomena
depends upon one's capacity to identify particular shapes or structures
(intellection), one's memory of comparable experiences, and a rudimentary
ability to associate names (labels) with specific objects perceived. These
experiential functions can all be roughly categorized as "cerebral".
Now, unless I'm apprising the monetary value of the chair (really a variant
of the above which involves quantititive or empirical data), I would
typically judge its "value" by how esthetically pleasing it is to my
sensibility. Of course, I would have to go through the cerebral process of
"objectivizing" the chair first; but rating its value is a decidedly
proprietary appraisal involving my personal desires, style and design
preferences, sense of quality, and general "feeling" about the chair.
Apperception of Value is more of a "psychical" response than a cerebral one.
At least, that's the way I see it. (Metaphysically, of course, Value
connotes something very special, as you'll see from my thesis.)
Therefore, unless you can convince me that I turn a pile of wood into a
chair by "valuing" it, I'm sorry to say I can't -- at this juncture
anyway -- accept your thesis that "choosing to value it separates it from
its surrounding".
Meantime, perhaps you'll explain the concept you were trying to communicate
in this extraordinary assertion:
< If in a universe there's an 'A', but nowhere in that
> universe at no time there's a 'not A' then people
> will not be able to experience A.
You have me intrigued.
Essentially yours,
Ham
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