From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Tue Jul 26 2005 - 17:13:23 BST
Ham,
>I think the Neanderthals had the capacity to reason, as demonstrated by the
>development of their frontal lobes, and by evidence found of hunting
>implements fashioned from stones, cave paintings, and garments made from
>animal skins. They weren't about to discover the principles of astronomy
>or
>energy conversion because their lives didn't depend on it. But their
>migration habits have been shown to follow the routes most favorable for
>food supply and they established a tribal culture which was most likely
>enhanced by primitive vocal communication. All of these activities
>required
>a level of reasoning beyond that of the primates. The fact that
>anthropologists have noted cultural progress over successive generations
>establishes further proof of the Neanderthals' reasoning capacity.
Paul: Well, not according to the MOQ. These things can all be accommodated
as social patterns. And migration patterns are observed in many species of
animal so I would think these would be classified as biological patterns,
although if the communication was sophisticated enough that we would
recognise it as language, that would be classified as social.
>Let's start with what kind of thought you consider to be "primary". Is
>self-consciousness primary enough? A cognizant animal that decorates
>itself
>or its habitat in a creative way is displaying something of itself that
>can't be explained by simple animal instinct. To me such creativity
>reveals
>a sense of selfness that I would consider self-consciousness.
Paul: Decorating could easily be described as a biological pattern of
displaying sexual prowess. Does this really involve self-conscious
introspection?
>[Paul]
>> New intellectual patterns are created by the response of the existing
>> static patterns of an individual human being to DQ. That is how cultures
>> advance intellectually. Or as Pirsig puts it in SODV ("Conceptually
>> Unknown" is a word he suggests as another term for DQ)
>
>Here you begin to lose me. What is the difference between forming original
>concepts based on personal experience and responding to existing patterns
>in
>a new way? And what does the "Conceptually Unknown" have to do with such
>concepts? Is Pirsig saying that the observer's ability to form subjective
>impressions (proprietary cognizance) in his investigations of the physical
>world an "unknown quantity"? Or is he simply adopting the "positivists"
>position that scientific data must not be tainted by the bias of
>subjectivity?
Paul: "Conceptually Unknown" here refers to what is primary in experience
and is supposed to prevent one from endowing it with conceptualised
properties, usually physical, which, being a deduction from, or product of
experience cannot be said to constitute it.
Pirsig introduces this argument in ZMM:
"Now, to take that which has caused us to create the world, and include it
within the world we have created, is clearly impossible. That is why
Quality cannot be defined. If we do define it we are defining something
less than Quality itself." [ZMM p.257]
I don't know whether you agree with this statement.
Regards
Paul
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