From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Sun Aug 07 2005 - 18:43:32 BST
Dear Sam,
You wrote 7 Aug 15:28 +0100:
"I see 'symbol' as a social level phenomenon. There is no such thing as a
private language. So I agree with what you say about symbols, I just think
it refers to the social level, not the fourth level."
So according to you a pattern of value should be private to belong to the
4th level? And you reject Pirsig's definition of the 4th level in 'Lila's
child'?
That suggests to me that you define the levels as follows:
1st level: patterns of value that are shared by all what exists
2nd level: patterns of value that are shared by a whole species (or category
of species)
3rd level: patterns of value that are shared by a group
4th level: patterns of value that are private and characterize an individual
or rather its personality
Do you agree?
Doesn't seem the most useful way of defining the levels to me, but (apart
from contradicting Pirsig) not invalid as MoQ either.
If that really is how you define the 4th level, then 'natural selection' at
that level might be seen as a matter of 'natural selection' of
'personalities' or 'personality traits'. The strongest personality or
personality trait survives and ... is copied by others. But isn't that a
social mechanism again? Or alternatively as a matter of 'natural selection'
of ideas or memes. But again survival requires copying to (convincing of)
others and a social mechanism.
In short, I'm running into problems with your statement that a 'symbol'
can't be the smallest unit of 'patternedness' at the 4th level because it
can't be private. Personality traits or ideas/memes are not private either
once they survive the individual (or the group...) where they originated.
When you are just referring to certain ways of behaving becoming 'latched'
in an individual, becoming part of its character or personality, I fail to
see much relevance of such a 4th level for the type of (political)
discussion in which it is applied on this list and in 'Lila'.
Truth (or truthfulness?) being latched as a valuable idea (respectively a va
luable personality trait?) "because it satisfies the individual's spectrum
of values" (your 26 July quote from Platt which you judged "pretty much spot
on") doesn't satisfy me. Isn't 'truth' (respectively 'truthful') simply one
of those values in that individual's spectrum of values? Truth being latched
because it satisfies 'truth', doesn't explain much, does it? And -again-
isn't this way of talking about 'values' referring only to SOMical values,
the type that is attributed to an object by a subject?
Aren't the 'patterns of value' that constitute reality according to a MoQ
quite different from the 'value' we attribute to ideas, personality traits
or whatever?
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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