From: Scott Roberts (jse885@cox.net)
Date: Tue Aug 09 2005 - 21:41:07 BST
Paul, DMB,
>Scott prev:
>If the terms 'divided' and 'undivided' are one such pair, then why do
>you blithely talk about "realizing the undivided reality behind those
>conceptual pairs of opposites."? Doing so raises the undivided above
>the divided, and that is a mistake.
Paul said:
I think the apprehension of undivided DQ, the emptying out of static
patterned divisions, is only privileged to the extent that it allows new and
better static patterns to emerge. I don't think Pirsig thinks it is the
ultimate goal or the terminus of Zen discipline or art or any other
activity.
"In [the "Gateless Gate"] analogy, as one approaches the gate, it seems to
be a goal, but after one has passed through and looks back he sees there
never was any gate. Translating back into the MOQ, one can say that Dynamic
Quality is a goal from a static point of view, but is the origin of all
things from a Dynamic understanding." [LILA'S CHILD Annotation 69]
As such, I don't think Dynamic Quality is considered by Pirsig to be a fixed
'centre' - although maybe it is seen as a temporary one. I think the idea
is that Dynamic Quality, being Dynamic, is in need of continual rediscovery.
This is in accordance with Zen Buddhism which says the path *is* the
destination. I would say that the perception of Dynamic Quality always
gives way to new patterns and the trick is to not think that these patterns
are some kind of stable state of enlightenment to attach oneself to but to
continually 'regain' the 'beginner's mind' through which all beautiful,
astonishing and valuable things are achieved.
Scott:
The phrase "[DQ] is the origin of all things from a Dynamic understanding"
is centric. From a differential point of view, there is no origin, that both
"seeings" (from the static point of view and from the dynamic) are wrong.
The problem with the MOQ is that it based on the dynamic "seeing:". And so
what you say does not address the final point in the post you are responding
to:
"I do not give it a rest because your/Pirsig's form of philosophical
mysticism (what Magliola calls "centric Zen") is the basis from which Pirsig
deals with intellect. Intellect divides, which according to your view is
taken to lead one away from the center. But if the divided is understood to
be in contradictory identity with the undivided, then one can appreciate
that intellect creates, that it is DQ as well as SQ, that there is no
"center", that the aesthetic requires division, and is not "beyond" it."
That is, the metaphysics portrayed in Lila is worked out *as if* DQ is an
undivided center. This is why Pirsig capitalizes DQ but not SQ. This is why
intellect is seen as leading one away from DQ, as just SQ and not in itself
DQ. This is why Pirsig talks of something "pre-intellectual" which intellect
covers up.
Now you do not agree with me that intellect is DQ. So what I am trying to
point out is that the basis of our disagreement lies with the language that
Pirsig uses to discuss DQ in Lila. I do not accept that language, preferring
the language of contradictory identity, which is also applicable (necessary,
IMO) to discussing intellect and the individual (the self). Because Pirsig
uses the language of centric Zen in Lila, the self is seen as just SQ. I see
it as a locus of contradictory identity of DQ and SQ. So the point I am
making is that the difference in my metaphysics from Pirsig's is a
consequence of the difference in our language used to discuss mystical
reality. So who is right? Or is it just a matter of both of us starting from
a different faith? (I note in passing that this difference cannot be settled
empirically, so it is nonsense to describe the MOQ as empirical).
Of course, I think I am right, and to back that up I gave the Magliola
quote -- though it takes reading the whole book to drive it home. But Sam's
response to DMB in the "Tat Tvam Asi, Campbell and Theosis" thread is also
applicable. The source of the anti-intellectual language of Pirsig stems, I
believe, from the Romantic reaction to Modernism, which is to say, it is
itself Modernist, dependent on a SOM view of intellect (as a mirror of
nature, and hence separate from nature). So when Zen came to the West, its
anti-intellectual form was emphasized. Watts is probably the main person
responsible for this, though Northrop also falls into this trap.
Let me leave you with this question: I said that the aesthetic requires
division. Do you agree? If so, does it make any sense at all to speak of an
undifferentiated aesthetic continuum? If not, can you explain how one can
have an aesthetic experience (or experience simpliciter) without division?
- Scott
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