From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Wed Aug 10 2005 - 11:22:07 BST
Scott, DMB,
>Now you do not agree with me that intellect is DQ. So what I am trying to
>point out is that the basis of our disagreement lies with the language that
>Pirsig uses to discuss DQ in Lila. I do not accept that language,
>preferring
>the language of contradictory identity, which is also applicable
>(necessary,
>IMO) to discussing intellect and the individual (the self). Because Pirsig
>uses the language of centric Zen in Lila, the self is seen as just SQ. I
>see
>it as a locus of contradictory identity of DQ and SQ. So the point I am
>making is that the difference in my metaphysics from Pirsig's is a
>consequence of the difference in our language used to discuss mystical
>reality. So who is right? Or is it just a matter of both of us starting
>from
>a different faith?
>Of course, I think I am right, and to back that up I gave the Magliola
>quote -- though it takes reading the whole book to drive it home.
Paul: I have the book. I'll be reading it shortly. I'm genuinely
interested in understanding it so I'll probably stay off the forum until
I've digested it. And if you don't mind, I'll wait until I've read it
before responding to your claims. The first question I have to answer for
myself is - why should Magliola be taken as more of an authority on 'real'
Zen Buddhism than, say, D.T.Suzuki? The second is - why should Yogacaric
Zen necessarily be seen as 'incorrect' and Madhyamaka as 'correct', and how
does Magliola know this?
When I'm more informed about Magliola, I think we can have a better debate.
I'll be interested in working out what the MOQ would look like if it was to
conform to 'differential Zen'.
I've made some brief responses to the rest of your post in the meantime.
But Sam's
>response to DMB in the "Tat Tvam Asi, Campbell and Theosis" thread is also
>applicable. The source of the anti-intellectual language of Pirsig stems, I
>believe, from the Romantic reaction to Modernism, which is to say, it is
>itself Modernist, dependent on a SOM view of intellect (as a mirror of
>nature, and hence separate from nature).
Paul: Naturally, I disagree with this recurring claim. The MOQ views
intellect* as one set of value patterns within a larger context of patterns
existing in an evolutionary relationship. If we extend 'nature' to mean all
values then intellect is nature. If nature is limited to inorganic and
biological patterns then, to the extent that the levels are independent from
one another, intellect is "separate from nature" i.e. it is part of culture.
Either way, I don't think it's true that Pirsig thinks that intellect is
only a "mirror of nature." It is this idea - subjective correspondence to
objective reality - that the MOQ is trying to debunk. In the MOQ
intellectual patterns are produced by Quality, not inorganic/biological
patterns, and their 'reality' isn't dependent on their 'adequate
representation' of either, but on their value.
(*I think an ongoing problem is that you see intellect as something that
rocks share with humans. When I talk about intellect I am talking about
maths, philosophy, physics etc. which rocks presumably don't do. I think
there is too much equivocation of 'intellect' going on in your metaphysics
for it to be useful.)
>Let me leave you with this question: I said that the aesthetic requires
>division. Do you agree?
Paul: Where 'aesthetic experience' is synonymous with 'an awareness of
value', no, I don't agree that an awareness of value requires division. I
think division requires an awareness of value.
If so, does it make any sense at all to speak of an
>undifferentiated aesthetic continuum? If not, can you explain how one can
>have an aesthetic experience (or experience simpliciter) without division?
Paul: To use one of your retorts - one cannot and need not explain
something which is considered primary.
Regards
Paul
P.S. You said:
>(I note in passing that this difference cannot be
>settled
>empirically, so it is nonsense to describe the MOQ as empirical).
Paul: As I understand it, the MOQ says that values are empirical, not the
MOQ. The only thing empirical about the MOQ is the observation of its
intellectual quality. But as the pragmatists tell us, this is the only
thing verified about any thesis or proposition i.e. its value in a given
context. The statement - "It is nonsense to describe the MOQ as empirical"
- is a result of the "observation" of low (intellectual) quality.
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Aug 10 2005 - 11:28:27 BST