From: david buchanan (dmbuchanan@hotmail.com)
Date: Sat Aug 20 2005 - 22:47:32 BST
Paul, Matt and all MOQers:
Paul said:
I think assimilating mysticism into pragmatist terms could be achieved, or
at least started, by reading a typical mystic assertion that 'reality is
undivided' as saying something like 'reality isn't inherently divided and
related in any particular way' and therefore that 'reality can be divided
and related in every possible way'. This is in accordance with e.g. the
Buddhist conception of 'no-self' which states that nothing has inherent
self-existence but is dependently originated.
dmb says:
Excellent.
Paul continued:
The pragmatist idea that reality is divided in such a way as to best cope
with it doesn't contradict anything here as far as I can tell. Nor does it
contradict the MOQ idea that something is only distinguished from something
else if it is valued.
dmb says:
OK. This is where I start to become suspicious. I'm thinking of Pirsig's
objection to the pragmatism of William James and, oddly perhaps, about his
objection to the Darwinistic idea of survival of the fittest. Although I
can't quite articulate it very well at all yet, I've a strong hunch that
there is a similar mechanistic amorality in asserting that reality is
divided as a way to cope with it. Same thing goes for the idea that "reality
can be divided and related in every possible
way", come to think of it. Its not that I disagree, exactly. The objection
here would be leaving out the idea that we choose one hypothesis out of an
infinite number on the basis of Quality. And unlike coping, survival, and
personal satisfaction, this Quality decision is more immediate and not so
calculating. You see what I mean here? There is a desperation and a nihilism
in the word "cope".
Paul quoted from Rorty's "A World without Substances or Essences":
>
>"We antiessentialists would like to convince you that it also does not pay
>to be essentialist about tables, stars, electrons, human beings, academic
>disciplines, social institutions, or anything else. We suggest that you
>think of all such objects as resembling numbers in the following respect:
>there is nothing to be known about them except an initially large, and
>forever expandable, web of relations to other objects. Everything that can
>serve as the term of a relation can be dissolved into another set of
>relations, and so on for ever."
Paul commented on this quote:
In these terms, enlightenment isn't about seeing 'the way the world really
is' e.g. "it really is an undivided whole," but is more about being aware
that 'the world really isn't configured in any way in particular'. I think
mysticism differs from pragmatism in that it promotes an experience in which
all 'sets of relations' are temporarily 'dissolved'. But I think the
philosophical consequences of both are very similar. (This is what I was
trying to say in Liverpool, David.)
dmb reples:
I memory serves, in Liverpool you told me that there is about a 90% overlap
between Pirsig and Rorty. I'll go along with that but I'll also insist that
the remaining 910% is crucial. :-)
It seems to me, at least from the way Rorty has generally been presented in
this forum (Dave turns and glares at Matt), he very much wants to insist
that there is no way to make any moral judgements about any of these set of
relations. I can see that Rorty and Pirsig are both rejecting substances and
essences, but I don't see how Rorty avoids that paralyzing nihlism. Rorty's
opposition to cruelty, for example, is something I can easily go along with,
but in his pragmatic hands this oppostion carries no more weight than did
the "soup of sentiments" espoused by the "liberal intellectuals" that Pirsig
partied with and complained about. And in case its not already painfully
obvious, this is only an extention of my main complaint. Nihilism doesn't
square with the MOQ's emphasis on values and morality.
Paul said:
In terms of Zen practice, it is aimed at experientially showing the lack of
inherent self-existence and this can be quite a traumatic, overwhelming and
profound experience which may lead to people referring to the experience
itself as enlightenment. Of course, it *is*, but I think the returning to
'divided reality' with this awareness should also be considered
enlightenment and is the actual benefit of mysticism. ...Hope this helps.
dmb says:
Yes, it does help. But here comes another version of my main objection. Even
if Buddhists and Pragmatists will agree on the world's "lack of inherent
self-existence", the latter has come to this view by way of a linguistic
turn on the road of Western philosophy while the former has come to this
view by seeing it directly. Its way, way cool that they should agree on
anything at all, but still. Coming to this view by way of Western scientific
materialism is a whole different deal, isn't it? Isn't that how Pragmatists
end up leaving the values and morals out? Isn't that what lead to nihilism
and paralysis? I very much agree with the idea that the actual benefit of
mysticism is in the enlightened one's return to our 'divided reality'. (This
is where I really start to run out of clear ideas.) But that's because I
think an enlightened person is liberated by this "lack of inherent
self-existence" whereas a Pragmatist will drown in it. Or something like
that.
Thanks.
dmb
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