From: Scott Roberts (jse885@cox.net)
Date: Wed Aug 31 2005 - 19:38:46 BST
Paul,
>Scott said:
>You have brought in something very like 'essences' when you mention
>'relationship to other values'. I agree that there is nothing
>non-relational, but that is true of concepts as well. A completely
>isolatable concept or SPOV doesn't happen, but the question is whether an
>SPOV is a universal form or a particular. Since 'pattern' is just another
>word for 'form', it sure looks to me like a form, albeit impermanent and
>not
>isolatable.
Paul said: I think that's stretching the philosophical meaning of 'essence'
too
far.
Maybe patterns are neither particular nor not-particular (i.e. essential).
I know the fourth lemma 'prevents' this but it also 'holds' as far as a
pragmatic conclusion of an argument is concerned. "...an adversary's
argument is steered through the transformations of the first, second, and
third lemmas, and is dispatched as impossible at each level, but the fourth
lemma "holds" in that it applies to the argument: the subject term X is
neither Y nor not-Y" [Magliola, Derrida on the Mend p105]
Scott:
I don't see any way that a pattern can be a particular (though it may be a
particular in relation to a higher order pattern). A particular is unique,
while a pattern, to be recognized as such, must be repeatable. If one holds
the fourth horn in this case, then one simply cannot discuss language, for
starters.
>Paul said:
>In the MOQ 'things' are defined as "enormously
>complex correlation[s] of sensations and boundaries and desires." [LILA
>p137] Does this make the MOQ nominalist? Well, as I have said previously,
>the question of whether one is nominalist or not depends on a prior
>assumption that either individual objects or universal forms must have
>metaphysical primacy over the other. Since, as far as I can tell, the MOQ
>makes no such assumption (as both universal forms and individual objects
>are
>static) I still think this is a false dilemma.
>
>Scott:
>Then the MOQ includes essences (that which is established by
>'correlations'
>and 'boundaries') -- impermanent ones, to be sure -- in its ontology.
Paul said: I think we should see those correlations and boundaries as
pragmatic
ones, i.e. *valuable* ones, but not essential.
Scott:
I think you are adding a connotation to the word "essential" that I am not.
That connotation is something like "absolutely defined". All I mean by
essence is "concept" or "universal", or "pattern" that makes it possible for
some existent (particular) to be valued.
>Paul said:
>It is not because it follows static patterns but rather because it
>*is* a bunch of static patterns that we can predict its behaviour. 'It' is
>not separate from the patterns.
>
>Scott said:
>True, but doesn't this sound essentialist? This horse in this instant
>consists of one bunch of static patterns, while that horse in that instant
>consists of a somewhat different set. The commonality is the essence, and
>remove it and you've got the accidents relative to that commonality (though
>the accidents do follow/are other patterns).
Paul said: Perhaps the commonality is just a pattern being valued over time
for
human purposes.
Scott:
Why just human. Don't horses consistently follow patterns based on signals,
and don't particles value certain preconditions? And why "just" a pattern.
The word "just" in this context is most always a sign of a nominalist.
Paul said:
Well, I don't think you've 'proved' that values are necessarily
concepts just yet.
Scott:
Well, strictly speaking I am saying that concepts are necessary to value,
and therefore real at all levels. But of course, this is not 'proven', but
then the MOQ isn't 'proven' either. So let me repeat here what I said to
David M:
What I am trying to point out is that language depends on essences, that is,
universals, the meanings of words. The universalist/nominalist debates of
the Middle Ages were about whether essences were real beyond their usage in
human language. So what I am first saying is the obvious point that value
(meaning) in human language clearly depends on essences, though in this
context, essences are usually called concepts. In this context, the value of
a word depends on its manifesting a concept, and the value of a concept
depends on its being manifested by a word. Thus the existent (a particular
speech act) depends on the essent (more accurately, a network of essences),
and the value of the essent requires the existent. As I say, within human
language, this is obvious.
So what I am claiming is that this same situation applies at all levels,
that value arises in an existent only because it manifests an essent (a
SPOV). A materialist does not need to accept this, because the materialist
can deny that there is value except in the human subject. But that is not
the case for the MOQ, because the MOQ claims that there is value at all
levels. And value, or so I claim, requires this essent/existent interaction,
and the name for that interaction is semiosis.
- Scott
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