From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Mon Sep 12 2005 - 08:55:05 BST
Paul and Scott --
Paul said:
> Firstly, I don't see how an essent that necessarily depends on
> something else can be meaningfully called an essent.
> I thought the whole point of an essent was that it was
> non-relational.
Scott replied:
> It may have been for Plato, but not so, or not so much,
> for Aristotle. I see this as a case where one can shift the
> meaning of 'essence' in a way that keeps a lot of its
> philosophical value, but without maintaining its
> Platonic absolute existence.
Paul is (justifiably) confused:
> I really don't see how the 'essence' of 'something' is necessarily
> 'something else'. Not in anything other than a completely watered-down
> sense anyway.
You're right on the second count, wrong on the first, Paul. Essence cannot
be "something else": it's always "it". I think Scott has muddled the
meaning of Essence, which for all intents and purposes is the same as Kant's
"noumenon". Runes' definition is: "The essence of a thing is its nature
considered independently of its existence. Also, non-existent things and
those which cannot exist at all have a proper essence. ...It is doubtful
whether we can give of any thing a truly essential definition with the one
exception of man: man is a rational animal."
The Greek philosophers believed that the true nature of the universe was
"essentially" perfect, and that man's limited perception accounted for his
observation of imperfections. Plato considered existence as having two
different realities: the "essential" and the "perceived". It was Aristotle
who subsequently defined "essence" as the one common characteristic that all
things belonging to a particular category have in common and without which
they could not be members of that category; hence, the idea of rationality
as the essence of man. The categories and their respective "essences"
became the "universals" of classical (i.e., being-based) philosophy. The
term "essent" didn't arise until Sartre and the existentialists introduced
it in the 20th century.
For the record, my use of Essence is restricted to the (one) primary source,
so the singular form is always used in Essentialism. I do use the word
"essent(s)" to identify the two hypostatic entities resulting from the
negation of Essence, which are relational. I won't get into the details of
my ontology here, but the primary essents are "other" and "not-other" (or
negate) which relate to "objective reality" and "subjective awareness",
respectively. (Since this represents an S/O division, the MoQ lacks the
terminology to label these essents.)
For what the classical philosophers called "discrete particulars" -- e.g.,
men, horses, stoves, trees, computers -- I generally use the word
"existents". Should you intend to use Essence in your discussion of the
MoQ, it would correspond metaphysically to Pirsig's DQ, hence does not
require pluralization. I don't believe Pirsig recognizes either
"universals" or "particulars"; but if he does, the terms "essent" or
"existent" and their plural forms might be useful.
I hope this helps to clarify the terminology. Sorry I can't help you with
the
Derrida interpretations.
Essentially yours,
Ham
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