From: Scott Roberts (jse885@cox.net)
Date: Mon Sep 12 2005 - 18:31:45 BST
Paul, Ham,
Paul said:
> Firstly, I don't see how an essent that necessarily depends on
> something else can be meaningfully called an essent.
> I thought the whole point of an essent was that it was
> non-relational.
Scott replied:
> It may have been for Plato, but not so, or not so much,
> for Aristotle. I see this as a case where one can shift the
> meaning of 'essence' in a way that keeps a lot of its
> philosophical value, but without maintaining its
> Platonic absolute existence.
Paul is (justifiably) confused:
> I really don't see how the 'essence' of 'something' is necessarily
> 'something else'. Not in anything other than a completely watered-down
> sense anyway.
Ham said:
You're right on the second count, wrong on the first, Paul. Essence cannot
be "something else": it's always "it". I think Scott has muddled the
meaning of Essence, which for all intents and purposes is the same as Kant's
"noumenon". Runes' definition is: "The essence of a thing is its nature
considered independently of its existence. Also, non-existent things and
those which cannot exist at all have a proper essence. ...It is doubtful
whether we can give of any thing a truly essential definition with the one
exception of man: man is a rational animal."
Scott:
Ok, I see that you both don't like my muddling the meaning of the word
'essence' -- that to you it makes no sense to speak of an essence as
depending on existents, in that an essence is -- as you see it --
essentially independent. However, that leaves dangling the fact that
existents (particulars) are dependent on something *like* essences. In
language we have the word 'concept'. What do we have for, say, the contents
of sense perception in that we perceive those contents only insofar as they
fulfill some pattern? What do we have for the fact that an animal will react
in the same way in different circumstances, for example fleeing from a lion
and fleeing from a tiger? The usual word for this is instinct. But there is
something in common between a concept and an instinct. In the MOQ these are
both static patterns of value, and that's good. Now the question for the MOQ
is: how do we distinguish between universals and particulars? SPOV fit the
role of universals (concepts/instincts/physical laws) well. Where do
particulars fall, and most importantly, how do the particulars and
universals relate?
- Scott
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