From: Kevin (kevin@xap.com)
Date: Mon Mar 03 2003 - 19:42:53 GMT
Matt S:
It's a lot more than just changing the terms from "substance" to "stable
pattern of value". Without addressing what that pattern is, it pretty
much
leaves it exactly as it was before. We still seem to have a thing "out
there" that is exactly the same as substance, but now we call it a
pattern
of value.
Kevin:
Exactly. Herein lies the nexus of Pirsig's position as a pomo &
metaphysician which seems to spin many readers in circles.
The pomo Pirsig simply takes a linguistic turn and changes "substance"
into "pattern of value" for the sake of solving other Metaphysical
problems. However, he still hasn't offered a true ontological solution.
He has just recontextualized, rediscripted the problem to dissolve it.
(isn't this what Matt EE is always trying to do and constantly taking
flack for?) He doesn't say what the mystery of "substance" is, he just
calls it something else because it becomes more meaningful and useful to
do so.
But Metaphysician Pirsig is creating a structured system of describing
Reality.
But the ontological question persists. What is the fundamental nature of
reality? Quality. What is Quality? It's undefined. Is this really an
ontological solution? Is this really Metaphysics? Or is it, more
broadly, philosophy (showing how things, in the broadest sense, hang
together, in the broadest sense)?
And what about Epistemology? I'm not sure Pirsig offers anything
definitive or formal here either (I happen to think that's a good thing,
not a bad thing). But again, is it really Metaphysics if you don't offer
a concrete epistemology?
It's a semantic puzzle and I think it's not that important, ultimately.
Depends on agreed terms and whatnot.
I do think it's important to find a solution to the puzzle of whether or
not Pirsig is a pomo or if he's in opposition to that movement. It's the
same old puzzle that has been floating around here since Matt EE's
Confessions essay.
In a recent browse through ZMM I came across something that I think
really gets to heart of this reoccuring question. Pirsig has just
introduced the analytical knife as Phaedrus' tool. He has just disected
the motorcylce using the analytic knife and offers this caveat.
Pirsig (ZMM):
"It is important to see this knife for what it is and not to be fooled
into thiking that mortorcylces or anything else are the way they are
just because the knife happened to cut it up that way. It is important
to concentrate on the knife itself. Later I will want to show how an
ability to use this knife creatively and effectively can result in
solutions to the classic and romantic split."
For me, this is the key to the whole problem. Right in the beginning of
the project, Pirsig lays down the rules for his project. He offers the
Legend, if you will, the Key to understanding what he is about to embark
on. He reminds us that just because we decide to organize reality in a
certain way to make it easier to cope with
(metaphysically/philosophically), doesn't mean that our exercise
constitutes what "really is" any more than another description. Here is
the difference.
Pirsig is saying, in effect, let's think this way because it solves a
lot of problems for us, but don't mistakenly assume that just because
this way of thinking works very well (perhaps works Best), doesn't make
it any more "real" than any other way of thinking, just more useful.
Just Better for solving problem. Just more elegant and empowering.
I'm reminded of Hegel. He said philosophy was our "our time in thought"
but then mistakenly forgot to recognize that even this idea was merely
his "time in thought". Wasn't it Nietzche who recognized this fallacy
and commented that if Hegel had only included that disclaimer, he would
have been the greatest philosopher ever, instead of a fool?
Pirsig uses his knife to create the MOQ, but reminds us not to
mistakenly assume that things really are that way just because it's
exceptionally useful and empowering for us to think of them that way.
In fact, I've always felt that Pirsig would rather us NOT worry about
what things "really are" outside of our descriptions of them. He's more
interested in establishing the most useful, best possible descriptions.
Why deduce Quality as the Ultimate Reality, but refuse to define it?
Because you feel that the definition is a)unimportant for our purposes
(pragmatist), b)counter-productive and destructive because once you
define it, it becomes something else (post-modernist).
But Pirsig is committed to foundations. He's committed to offering a
firm context for operating. A context that includes a vast scope of
human history and is insightful enough that we can imagine this
foundation supplanting SOM and sustaining thought for the unforseeable
future. I think this is why he calls it Metaphysics rather than just
philosophy. Sure, it's another rediscription for our purposes only. But
it's such a fundamental and important redescription that it deserves
more weight and consideration. Perhaps calling it Metaphysics is a
matter of packaging and marketing?
I think the argument breaks along these lines quite often. Those who
feel that Metaphysics is dead (Reality isn't beyond what we call it) and
find Pirsig's use of the term counter to the movement away from
realizing what Hegel should have realized. And those who feel that not
calling it Metaphysics would somehow cheapen it or reduce it to
something less definitive and revolutionary.
Politics of philosophy again?
-Kevin
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon Mar 03 2003 - 19:43:23 GMT