From: Michael Hamilton (thethemichael@gmail.com)
Date: Mon Oct 03 2005 - 15:13:28 BST
Hi Case, Bo,
I couldn't stop myself from inserting some responses to Case. I hope
you don't see this as stealing your thunder, Bo!
> >> [Case]
> >> Are you actaully saying the bilogical complexity "creates" the the
> >> inner mental world or do you mean that the complexity of the inner
> >> world is a function of biological complexity?
> [Bo]
> > My "creating an inner mental world" naturally means that the
> > outer non-mental world was created simultaneously, they go
> > together. But my point is that this wasn't perceived as any S/O by
> > animals or the social reality humans.
>
> [Case]
> I could go with something like: during the act of perception we create an
> inner representation of the outer world. But to suggest that our thought
> processes bring the physical world into being... I don't think so.
MH replies:
How do you suppose that the distinction between an "inner
representation" and an "outer world" or "physical world" was arrived
at, unless it was arrived at by thinking? Once this objective world is
postulated, it exists independently of our thought-processes, and
independantly of our postulation of it, by definition. We can't think
of it in any other way, and so it is a struggle to see that,
historically speaking, it is brought into being by thinking (bearing
in mind that by "being", I mean Quality or experience).
Case continued:
> The only evidence I can think of regarding subject/object distinctions in
> animals was done by Gordan Gallup. He places a dot of rouge on a chimps
> forehead and showed the ape a mirror. The chimps would look in the mirror
> and then touch the dot of rouge. This suggests that the chimps were aware
> themselves and that the image in the mirror was them.
MH replies:
Interesting, but I don't think it's relevant to the subject/object
distinction. The chimp shows awareness of itself, but this is not
necessarily dependent on any postulation by the chimp of an objective,
physical reality that is independent of experience (Quality).
Case continued:
> I am not altogether sure what you mean by social reality humans but there
> have been extensive studies of tribal peoples all over the world and they
> have not been found to be fundenmentally different from regular folks.
MH:
Hopefully I've explained what I consider to be the fundamental
difference, although obviously I can't speak for Bo.
> >> [Bo]
> >> >> But note, even if I called it a mental or inner word - indicating
> >> >> SOM - the biological level knew/know no such distinction, nor did
> >> >> the social level early man. When he heard voices, they were not in
> >> >> his head but gods speaking to him. Even present-day social value
> >> >> humankind applies (what intellect calls) supernatural explanation
> >> >> when confronted with (what intellect calls) natural events.
> >
> >> [Case]
> >> The idea the early man took the voices in his head to be the voices of
> >> gods was propounded by Julian Jaynes in "The Origin of Consciousness
> >> in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" but I never thought anyone
> >> took it seriously.
> [Bo]
> > You will be surprised what is taken seriously around here ;-).
> [Case]
> Roger that.
>
> [Bo]
> Of course I know it's Jaynes. And what do we know about mankind's
> > world of, say, 50 000 years ago? I find it highly probable that their
> > "social" reality was totally different from our intellectual - S/O -
> > one. At least the said inner/outer capability weren't recognized as
> > SOM - dreams weren't perceived as "subjective" - but as
> > visitations from forebears, gods, whatever as real as reality
> > comes.
> [Case]
> We have little reason to think that prehistoric man was in any way different
> from historic man.
MH:
We have still less reason to think that prehistoric man conceived of
sensation as "inner representation of an outer world".
<snip>
> [Case]
> I think MoQ presents a solution, not the only one BTW, to some of the
> problems of SOM. I think it shows that static and dynamic values operate
> internally and externally. But I do not think Pirsig says that SOM is to be
> thrown out. Rather he points to a better way of understanding it.
> Beyond that I think the separation between inner and outer is literal and
> unbridgable. We are separated from the physical world by space and time. We
> can do nothing more than preceive it with our senses and reshape it in our
> heads.
MH:
All true. Fortunately, we don't have to worry about the postulated,
non-empirical "physical world". We have something infinitely more real
and more interesting to work with - Quality. Don't misinterpret me -
I'm not espousing solipsism or nihilism here. I'm not calling
scientific practice invalid, but I do think it needs "redescribing"
(as Matt would say) in such a way that its validity does not depend on
SOM.
> >>[Case]
> >> The outer is known to the extent that it is, because people decided to
> >> quit arguing over inner ideals, about which we have no basis for
> >> agreeing, and focused on those things that we can come to
> >> intersubjective agreement about. I find it curious that a system with
> >> the unknown at its heart and an avowed preferance for the dynamic can
> >> be to so bogged down in a static heirarchy.
> >[Bo]
> > Thank you Case for taking an interest in these things (David M.
> > backed out). This last paragraph of yours escapes me.
>
> [Case]
> I am saying that civilation has made striking advancements over the past 700
> years because, starting with the rediscovery of Greek literature during the
> crusades, Eupopeans began to concentrate on measureing and manipulating the
> external world. Discussions about our internal private worlds are not very
> productive because we have no basis for agreeing or disagreeing. If my wife
> tells me she has a headache I can suspect she is just trying to get me to
> leave her alone but I can hardly call her a liar. The same holds for any
> discussion of consciousness and internal private events.
> We make progress in the accumulation of knowledge by talking about those
> things we do have some basis for agreeing on. The speed of light, the rate
> of plant growth, crop yields, mathematics, etc are intersubjective in that
> each of us in our own little worlds can find something in common to agree
> about.
MH:
Yes, as recent history clearly demonstrates, the "outer world" is an
extremely useful postulation. However, I think it's totally possible
to redescribe the kind of scientific practice you're talking about, in
a Quality-centric way, so that it does not depend on reducing our idea
of "reality" to an inaccessable, independent, outer world. This
deserves a new topic, and some writing time that I don't have right
now!
Case continued:
> Finally I think the MoQ as expressed by most here, is totally bogged down in
> this static hierarchical levels business, which as I have stated several
> times in various places I find to be counterproductive. At the heart of the
> MoQ is the undefined center, Quality. I take the meanings of Static and
> Dynamic quite literally to mean Order and Chaos, Stabilty and Flux. Most
> conflate DQ and Quality. This makes no sense to me at all.
MH:
I think I agree with you here. For some reason, Pirsig's evolutionary
hierarchy, an extremely useful analytical tool, is causing no end of
problems. One problem, I think, is the sheer weight of philosophical
baggage carried by the word "intellect". A convenient label, but a
problematic one.
I'm only willing to equate DQ with Quality if DQ is defined (!) as
including (but obviously not limited to) SQ. Otherwise, it looks like
saying that DQ is "real" while SQ is "unreal". I wonder if any DQ=Q
people can tell us whether or not this what they are doing? Any
takers?
Regards,
Mike
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon Oct 03 2005 - 17:08:26 BST