From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Mon Oct 03 2005 - 16:33:01 BST
Ham,
Ham said:
So you're a Wittgensteinian. It figures. He's the one philosopher I never
could fathom, and whose prodigious logical equations (if that's what they
were) were beyond my comprehension. I decided early on that whatever he was
trying to say was not important enough (to me at least) to try to understand
it.
Matt:
Fair enough. However, you were talking about the Wittgenstein of the
Tractatus. This is the early Wittgenstein (who is actually a bit closer to
your Essentialism then I am). The Wittgenstein that Sam and I favor is the
later Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations.
Ham said:
As an alternative, maybe you could demonstrate (by quotes or you own
analysis) in what way you believe Wittgensteinianism "is at the least
implicit in Pirsig." It could explain why I'm having trouble understanding
him, too.
Matt:
When I said that, I was referring to the fact that you seem to make a
concept/word distinction, that our concepts are different from the words
used to express them. Wittgenstein teaches us that there isn't anything
more to our concepts than words. One can't point to or express a concept in
anything but words, so it is quite unclear how one could cash in on the
distinction between them.
I find this implicit in Pirsig with his idea of static intellectual
patterns. Language, for Pirsig, are static patterns of usage. They form a
web that produces meaning. There's no distinction in Pirsig between
conceptual patterns and language patterns in Pirsig, all we have are
intellectual patterns. If this is the case, then having a certain
conceptual structure is a matter of learning or being educated in a certain
web, or static pattern, of use, rather than, as in you, a matter of
discovering the single set of concepts behind learned language (whatever
language it might be).
Ham said:
But if you can provide an explanation for the above [Tractatus selections]
that makes any sense to me, I may gain some insight as to where you're
coming from and, possibly, how to frame my statements in a way that you can
better understand me.
Matt:
No, Ham, you still don't get it. I understand your statements very well. I
understand the conceptual moves you are making. Its just that I happen to
_reject_ them. And the thing I continually see you doing is seeing the
moves I'm making and thinking that they're analogous to the ones you make.
They aren't, though. Its is more like we are playing two different games.
You finally say, "I don't think it's possible that I can discuss philosophy
with someone of your mindset." That's what I've been trying to tell you.
If you take the extent of philosophy to be the game _you're_ playing, then
indeed it will impossible for us to talk about philosophy. But there are
connection points between our two "games." The reason for this is because
one usually only comes to be playing the kind of game I play by way of
rejecting the game you play. So learning why I've "latched on to a
mathematician/psychologist who claims there can be no such thing as a
theory" would indeed be to learn why I've rejected the game you play, it
would be to learn the reasons and arguments for leaving that game behind.
Those reasons are everywhere in all of my posts to you. Every time I engage
you I'm giving you reasons for rejecting the whole game you're playing. I
do that because that's the _only_ way for me to engage you. And that's why
I mainly stay out of your way, so you can just play your game and not have
someone over your shoulder constantly telling you why you shouldn't play the
game.
Matt
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