Re: MD Untitled Matt asking Case questions

From: Case (Case@iSpots.com)
Date: Thu Oct 06 2005 - 14:54:23 BST

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    Matt:
    Well, I don't know. I can understand the desire to say that Pirsig
    illuminated, not eliminated, SOM. Usually that desire is fulfilled by
    saying that Pirsig attacks reductionism, the idea that _everything_ had to
    be reduced to a subject-object terminology. For instance, that's _not_ how
    Bo fulfills that desire. I may be stating the obvious (but since I haven't
    been following the conversation I have to), you seem to be saying something
    analogous to him. That we have to start from a subject-object distinction.
    [Case]
    I may be saying that as an sentient being I have to start with a subject
    object distinction in the same way that as a mammal I started with breast
    milk. But I don't take that to mean anything special about the ultimate
    nature of reality.

    Matt:
    For instance, this hard/soft distinction we've been using lately. The way I
    take "hard distinctions" are to be distinctions that get something _right_
    about reality, whereas "soft distinctions" are just used to make our way
    about it. If this is the case about how you mean "hard," then that means
    you think that something about reality _makes_ us use the subject/object
    distinction, something about reality tells us that this is the right way to
    carve it up.
    [Case]
    I was a bit hazy on the distinction taxonomy but I can work with that.
    Although I would point out that hard distinctions can only be revealed
    through the use of language which is inherently soft in this sense.

    [Matt]
    I don't think this is the case judging from what else you've written. For
    one, you say the value you find in the MoQ "is in the way it is able to
    resolve dualism into monism and show how dualistic poles function." That
    doesn't sound like somebody into "hard" distinctions as defined above.
    [Case]
    The existance of grey does not negate the hard distinction between black and
    white. Rather it reveals the range of possiblity in the relationship.

    [Matt]
    For two, your doubts about ever finding criteria outside of behavior for
    determining somebody's inner states. Anybody who holds those doubts should
    also doubt our ability to ever find criteria (outside of behavior) for
    determining what kinds of distinctions reality _makes_ us use. So if you
    don't mean "hard" that way, how do you mean it?
    [Case]
    Anyone who is not plagued by doubt has not been paying attention.
    Uncertainty lies at the heart of physics and math. Doubt and the belief that
    we can at least prove things to be false is what science is all about. The
    only way I could know the inner condition of another would be telepathy. As
    the sage Clint Eastwood put it, "A man's gotta know his limitations."

    [Matt]
    Further, I think you've stated SOM right, as having only _one_ subject, the
    ego, but it leaves me a little uneasy with your stating that you take S/O to
    be a hard distinction and Pirsig to have "illuminated not eliminated" SOM.
    I think SOM so thought of is coextensive with Cartesianism (which I think is
    bad). I think your further claim that "any SOM that includes a plural for
    subject is way off base" is right, too. The dialectic of modern philosophy
    from Descartes to now is just that example of how Cartesianism will fall
    apart with more than one subject. The flight from the solitary ego to allow
    for more egos has shown (so people like me think) how the Cartesian
    problematic deconstructs itself once you start allowing for other people.
    And the _flight_ (which was good) began because of internal problems from
    the lack of criteria and the external problem of counter-intuitiveness
    ("Wait, you're telling me that other people don't exist?"). So that piece
    of evidence makes me think you _do_ want "hard" in the bad way outlined
    above, but again, your doubts about criteria leaves me thinking you must be
    taking it be something else. If you do take SOM and "hard" in the bad ways,
    it makes me wonder what happened to all that great stuff about
    intersubjective agreement you were writing earlier?

    [Case]
    As you point out western philosophy has been tap dancing around Decartes for
    four hundred or so years. Even Decartes tap danced around Decartes. So
    rather than breaking out my boogy shoes I deal with the problem in the only
    way that makes sense to me. I accept the existance of others. I accept the
    existance of the material would. I believe that that I can infer things
    about other subjects through referance to my own internal states.
    I accept these things on Faith.
    This lets me get about my business and the lingering shred of doubt keeps me
    honest.

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