From: skutvik@online.no
Date: Thu Oct 13 2005 - 07:32:36 BST
Scott.
10 Oct. you wrote:
> ?? It looks to me like what I said is that DQ/SQ is *not* new. It is
> just different from SOM.
"Not new just different" Hmmm? You mean that Aristotle's
metaphysics was dualist - like the MOQ is - only a different one?
I (still) agree with that, but the difference is enormous. The
appearances (that Substance spawned) were all "objects" and is
why Pirsig saw the birth of modernity with Aristotle. DQ on the
other hand has the very substance/appearance distinction as one
of its static levels. Later to become the subject/object distinction.
Do we agree now? Fat chance ;-)
> Scott:
> The difference should be clear. In Lila, Pirsig says that the MOQ's
> third and fourth levels replaces the word 'subject', and the first and
> second replaces the word 'object'. This does not account for the fact
> that we also use the word 'object' to mean *any* thing thought about,
> including items from the social and intellectual levels. This second
> meaning is what I call S/O[2].
Now that you have spoon-fed me I see and you are right, this
transformation procedure is no good.
> Descartes' SOM divided everything into S/O[1]. But the value of the
> S/O divide that you are referring to as SOL must be S/O[2]. Otherwise
> one cannot speak of valuing the ability to stand back from our own
> thoughts and critique them, for example. The mind/matter distinction
> (S/O[1]) is of no particular significance in characterizing the fourth
> level (no more than any other high-level distinction, e.g.,
> matter/form, living/non-living, rational/irrational, etc.). But the
> S/O[2] distinction is. Hence you are simply wrong to say that the
> fourth level is SOM,
Take a break dear Scott. My "mission" is to show that Pirsig's
work adds up to the intellectual=SOM conclusion If I am wrong so
is Pirsigs. Can't we concentrate on that?
> if Descartes's SOM (S/O[1]) is taken as being
> typical, since there are other philosophies that do not make that
> distinction, or do not make it absolute (indeed, Descartes is about
> the only one). But you are partially right in characterizing the
> fourth level with the S/O[2] distinction, since it is the ability of
> the subject[2] to detach itself from *any* object[2], including its
> own thoughts, that make intellect possible. (And, of course, I say
> partially, because intellect also includes non-S/O[2] operations, like
> mathematics, and because the whole business is questioned by the
> ability to objectify the S/O[2] distinction itself).
OK I spotted some agreement about the said "SOM-MOQ
transformation procedure". That's enough for now.
Bo
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