From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Fri Nov 11 2005 - 06:46:12 GMT
Scott and Case --
I've been following this dialectical discussion with increasing interest as
Case has dragged out Scott's epistemology limb by limb. It has led,
exhaustingly, to what I believe is a stalemate, but we'll see if and where
it can go from here.
Scott will be surprised that I not only understand much of what he is
saying, but (for a pleasant change) find myself generally in agreement with
his conclusions. This, despite the fact that I've sided with Case most of
the way because I don't subscribe to the Peirce/Barfield theories that have
infected Scott with a case of severe semiosis :-)
If you gentlemen will indulge me time out for a little analysis, I'd like to
'Monday morning quarterback' the dialogue, scoring the rounds picked up in
Scott's 11/10 post based on my own position.
[Scott]:
> Including the evidence that people experienced thinking as coming from
> outside themselves as opposed to now when we think of thinking as coming
> from within? I would say this goes beyond 'paradigm shift' as usually
> understood.
[Case]:
> Our brains are capable of distinctly different ways of working.
> If you are simply saying that as cultures become more complex
> it becomes a better survival strategy to develop on the verbal
> mode. Then evidence of this verbal mode will show up more
> often. But that this does not imply that the other mode is not
> still available. It is a matter of probability distribution of the
> traits. But really could use some kind of idea what this shift
> is supposed to be and what is the evidence for it's occurrence.
[Scott]:
> The evidence is in Barfield's "Saving the Appearances",
> gleaned from etymology, literature, art, and the history of ideas.
Case got off to a great start and wins this round hands down. To argue for
something that goes against common sense on the evidence of a controversial
philosophy is begging the question.
[Scott]:
> Are you saying you want to restrict the word 'sign' to words
> and sentences of a human language like English? Anyway,
> I am arguing that where there is consciousness there is
> semiotics. So now we're at the 'tis/'taint stage, so
> to argue one needs to go at a deeper level, as below.
[Case]:
> So they co-exist?
[Scott]:
> If by "they" you mean consciousness and semiotics, I am saying
> that they are two ways of considering the same (non-)thing.
> Quality is another way.
Why does Scott repeatedly refer to consciousness as a (non-)thing? We all
know that consciousness is not a thing, so the reference can only be
derisive. But, while Scott does not hold consciousness in high regard,
unfortunately Quality does not pass muster as "another way" to define it.
--[Snip 3]--
[Scott]:
> There is no explanation of perception from the products
> of perception that I am aware of. And, of course, I am saying
> there can't be one.
[Case]:
> I see no connection between quantum physics and perception
> in what you have said other than that you say they are connected.
> I do see that by our nature we access our senses sequentially
> and memory only fudges the problem by allowing us to randomly
> access the past sequentially. The fact that we experience things
> sequentially does not make them sequential.
Right on, Case! That's a critical observation.
[Scott]:
> So we agree that there is non-spatio-temporal reality "behind"
> the spatio-temporal that we sense? So I am asking:
> why attempt to explain sensing in terms of the products of
> sensing? Or memory (that is, why attempt to explain it
> as spatio-temporal neural activity)?
[Case]:
> Because any explaination that we come up with must refer to
> something that two or more of us can agree upon. This places
> a number of restrictions on what it is possible for us to use
> fruitfully. In this case brain matter is it. Whatever is happening
> cosmologically we can see it manifesting itself in brain activity.
This is mostly about Hoyle's rules of gamesmanship, but I like your
conclusion. But here's where the debate really gets interesting.
[Scott]:
> What we don't see manifesting itself in brain activity is
> consciousness of brain activity (or anything else). If you're
> going to restrict yourself to scientific evidence, you've got
> no way to back up the view that the brain produces
> consciousness. No such evidence can distinguish between
> the producing and regulating positions.
While I would prefer "awareness" to consciousness here (because I think the
latter includes some objective elements), this is definitely Scott's round.
And the fight is now Scott's to lose.
[Scott]:
> Well, we know that the perceptual dimensions do not exist
> "outside" of perception, since relativity and QM shows that
> they break down at the extremes (very fast and very small).
> The only reason for thinking that they do is by ignoring the
> Munchhausen fallacy.
I presume QM stands for quantum mechanics and Munchhausen's fallacy was
pulling himself up by his hair (among other boasts we needn't mention).
Investigating the extremes of finitude does reveal the limits of man's
cognizant perception. Case doesn't want to buy into this theory, but picks
the wrong argument to attack it.
[Case]:
> I was not aware that physicists had settled on the number of
> dimensions so I don't see how any of this is relevant.
[Scott]:
> I was distinguishing between perceptual dimensions
> (3 of space, 1 of time, and 1 of mass) which QM has shown
> are insufficient for accounting for subatomic wave/particles.
> Physicists' dimensions are mathematical ones, where the
> number and type no longer need to be the 5 of perception,
> now that physics has overcome the Munchhausen fallacy.
> The strange thing is that people who want to explain
> perception in terms of spatio-temporal neural activity
> still haven't.
Another blow to the heart of materialistic reality!
But Case counters with a left punch.
[Case]:
> But all of that aside for a second, are you or Barfield
> suggesting that human consciousness is not dependant
> on brain activity of any kind?
[Scott]:
> Yes and no. The difference between me and the materialist
> is on the question of whether normal waking human
> consciousness is produced by brain activity or whether it is
> regulated by brain activity. I go with the latter, that the
> brain's role in human consciousness is to keep the senses
> aligned with each other and with thinking in order to operate
> in a spatiotemporal manner.
I go with "regulated", too. The brain is an 'instrument' of conscious
awareness, not its source.
[Case]:
> So you have advanced a theory that brain activity is regulated
> not produced in the brain. But if is not produced in the brain
> where is it produced?
That got me to the edge of my seat. How will Scott respond?
Well...frankly, he's a bit coy with his answer.
[Scott]:
> Umm. I advance a theory that *consciousness* is regulated
> not produced in the brain, not brain activity. Consciousness
> is not produced anywhere. It produces everything else.
Umm...could we not say, Scott, that conscious (awareness) is subjective, and
that its perceived "objects" are subjective, too? Wouldn't this be the
answer Case is looking for? Indeed, wouldn't this resolve the abominable
mind/matter duality?
[Scott continues]:
> Though here again, one must understand that the brain that
> we see (and study), like everything else, is just the spatio-temporal
> sign of a complex set of non-spatio-temporal SPOV.
> It is possible (that is, I see no reason to reject the possibility)
> that human consciousness could operate in other modes,
> without a brain, which is to say, it could survive death (though
> whether one wants to call that 'human' or not is up in the air).
> I don't know that it does, I just see no metaphysical reason
> to reject the possibility.
Well, you're going out on a limb now, Scott, although I respect your candor.
This is one of those absolutes that the intellect can only speculate upon.
I believe there are metaphysical reasons why "human consciousness" does not
survive death, but that involves Value which is beyond the scope of this
epistemological debate.
[Case]:
> Unless there is something that three or more gathered
> in his name can agree upon that would help guide us to a
> firm decision in this matter I go back to tossing coins.
A point for Case. Your opponent sums it up nicely.
[Scott]:
> Everything that you are saying is just as speculative as
> what I am saying. We are battling metaphysics here,
> which is to say, interpretations of the scientific evidence,
> not the evidence itself.
Absolutely right. You're hypothesizing. It's called an ontology. And it's
the only way we can resolve the major metaphysical issues (for ourselves, at
least.)
I'll skip the remainder of this dialogue which concerns amoebic behavior,
AI, and rule sets, none of which can match the significance of what you've
asserted above. A good clean fight, gentlemen -- and well articulated. For
me, Case has demonstrated that we don't need semiotics to explain
existential awareness, while Scott, perhaps unwittingly, has revealed the
essentialistic core in his philosophy. It has been most illuminating.
Thank you both for allowing me to make a few observations from the
sidelines.
Essentially yours,
Ham
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