From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Wed Nov 16 2005 - 01:36:47 GMT
Hi there, Rebecca (Bo, Platt mentioned) --
> I just finished reading Harry Frankfurt's essay
> "Rationality and the Unthinkable". He seems to
> support the notion that Subject/Object logic is not
> rationality.
I never could quite figure out what Bo intended by his "Subject/Object
logic". (Is there any other kind?) However, your quote is quite insightful
if interpreted using the conventional (non-MOQ) understanding of Value:
"It is widely assumed that a person is acting under the guidance of reason
and that he is in control of himself, only when what he does accords with
his judgement concerning what to do. If his judgment is overwhelmed or
superseded by his feelings, he is presumed to have lost his rational
self-control.
[snip]
"In a more substantial sense, feelings may accord better with reason than
judgment does. A person's judgment may itself be radically contrary to
reason. Therefore, the fact that his judgment guides his conduct hardly
means in itself that he is acting rationally. Indeed, it may well be that a
failure of his will to accord with his judgment is precisely what saves him
from irrationality."
The title of Frankfurt's book "The Importance of What we Care About" speaks
for itself. What the author is saying is that a valuistic judgment may be
considered just as rational, if not more so, than a judgment based on reason
alone. This says nothing about SOM (SOL?) logic, but it does suggest that
our response to values is based on FEELINGS (psycho-emotional sensibility),
and that our decision to act on these feelings is a significant part of our
participation in the relational world.
The reason you see this statement as problematic is precisely that you've
been persuaded by Pirsig's philosophy to reject the "old static patterns of
intellect" -- including value judgments -- which originate with the
individual and not from some extra-corporeal qualitative dimension. Of what
use is Value if it cannot be realized and appreciated by the autonomous
individual?
In a separate thread, my friend Platt is going through much the same
distress with a series of assertions made by Paul that Quality (DQ) produces
"ideas" as well as "value judgments".
> Here we seem to be back to "DQ produces value
> judgments" although "indeterminate value" suggest
> no value judgments (quality decisions) have occurred.
> "Contextualization into any static patterns" seems to be
> a fancy way of saying intellectual patterns, but I'm not sure.
>
> So from my point of view, rather than clarifying differences
> between ZMM and Lila, I'm more confused.
Small wonder!
So long as you and the MoQers continue to regard intellect and value as
attributes of the Quality mythos, rather than innate in man, you not only
demean human existence, you fail to understand that man is the free agent
and decision-maker of the universe. It is the values of this relational
world, configured by each of us to our own unique perspective, that give
meaning to our life experience.
Indeed, Value is the very essence of man.
Essentially yours,
Ham
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