Re: MD FW: The intellectual level and rationality

From: Rebecca Temmer (ratemmer.lists@gmail.com)
Date: Tue Nov 15 2005 - 16:08:51 GMT

  • Next message: Rebecca Temmer: "Re: MD FW: The intellectual level and rationality"

    Hi Paul (Bo mentioned),
     I just finished reading Harry Frankfurt's essay "Rationality and the
    Unthinkable". He seems to support the notion that Subject/Object logic is
    not rationality. If Pirsig wants the MOQ to be an expansion of rationality
    based on a balance between Dynamic and Static Quality then the following
    passage might be another way of explaining the logic behind that expansion.
    SOL is like the 'judgment' that he describes - the OLD static pattern of
    intellect that we're trying to overcome... by adding dynamic quality and
    coming up with a better way of reasoning.
     I'm not sure if I'm entirely convinced by the logic of the argument that
    I've strung together above, HOWEVER, I have a gut feeling that it's right
    and if someone (Paul!? :) could give me a little help that would be nice. (I
    think I'm having trouble with the 'feelings' bit.)
     The following is an abridged quote from the above mentioned essay (1987):
     "It is widely assumed that a person is acting under the guidance of reason
    and that he is in control of himself, only when what he does accords with
    his judgement concerning what to do. If his judgment is overwhelmed or
    superseded by his feelings, he is presumed to have lost his rational
    self-control." [snip lengthy example] "It seems to me, however, that this
    way of looking at things is wrong. It is a fundamental error to regard every
    surge of emotion against judgment as an uprising of the irrational. To be
    sure, there is a rather trivial sense in which feelings are inherently
    nonrational: They do not pertain to the faculty of reason, because they are
    not essentially discursive. In a more substantial sense, feelings may accord
    better with reason than judgment does. A person's judgment may itself be
    radically contrary to reason. Therefore, the fact that his judgment guides
    his conduct hardly means in itself that he is acting rationally. Indeed, it
    may well be that a failure of his will to accord with his judgment is
    precisely what saves him from irrationality."
     [Frankfurt, Harry G; The Importance of What we Care About, "Rationality and
    the Unthinkable"; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988]
     Still thinking...
    Rebecca

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