From: skutvik@online.no
Date: Wed Nov 16 2005 - 14:23:25 GMT
Rebecca (Paul & Ham mentioned)
15 Nov. you wrote:
> Hi Paul (Bo mentioned),
> I just finished reading Harry Frankfurt's essay "Rationality and
> the
> Unthinkable". He seems to support the notion that Subject/Object
> logic is not rationality.
Thanks for the "thickness" reminder in another post. That was
quite a goof, but mathematics is not my strong point, hope my
reputation isn't all shot.
Back to the "rationality greater than SOM" issue. In a post today
Ham writes:
> I never could quite figure out what Bo intended by his
> "Subject/Object logic". (Is there any other kind?) However, your
> quote is quite insightful if interpreted using the conventional
> (non-MOQ) understanding of Value:
Different premises can give rise to different conclusion without
logic itself being faulty. I should have used "subject/object
premises" to delineate the intellectual level.
The social level was (still is) based on the "gods behind
everything" premises so from there things are neither subjective
or objective. I hope these simple examples shows the logic from
Quality's premises.
Rebecca writes:
> If Pirsig wants the MOQ to be an expansion of
> rationality based on a balance between Dynamic and Static Quality
> then the following passage might be another way of explaining the
> logic behind that expansion.
To expand logic itself is hardly possible but shifting premises
(that logic uses to arrive at conclusions) is possible, and my - um
- logic is that the different Q-levels can be regarded as different
"premises".
As said (above) the social level's (or Mythos') premises were that
of "gods behind everything", then came the intellectual level with
its S/O premises. These premises can as little be "expanded" as
the biological or inorganic ones.
> SOL is like the 'judgment' that he describes -
> the OLD static pattern of intellect that we're trying to overcome...
> by adding dynamic quality and coming up with a better way of
> reasoning.
Yes you are right, SOL says that S/O is the 4th level's premises,
thus MOQ's DQ/SQ premises is something beyond, and for
goodness sake Rebecca the 4th level is supposed to be STATIC.
The tendency to regard it as a mental compartment where an
endless succession of ideas fights for the top perch is
inconsistent with anything static.
The tragedy of this discussion is that we all are devoted MOQists
but from different premises. I from the Quality Reality beyond
intellect, while "the rest" keep insisting that the 4th level is to be
"expanded" which is plain impossible, lest we are to revert to the
mumbo-jumbo of our village idiot..
> I'm not sure if I'm entirely convinced by the logic of the argument
> that
> I've strung together above, HOWEVER, I have a gut feeling that it's
> right and if someone (Paul!? :) could give me a little help that
> would be nice. (I think I'm having trouble with the 'feelings' bit.)
Nothing wrong with your logic, but IMO inconsistencies occur if
the S/O premises - be they subjective or objective - and the
Quality premises aren't kept apart.
Regarding feelings (I prefer emotions because one feels so many
things; a touch for instance) I see those as the social "expression"
(sensation is biology's and reason is intellect's).
> The following is an abridged quote from the above mentioned essay
> (1987): "It is widely assumed that a person is acting under the
> guidance of reason
> and that he is in control of himself, only when what he does accords
> with his judgement concerning what to do. If his judgment is
> overwhelmed or superseded by his feelings, he is presumed to have
> lost his rational self-control." [snip lengthy example] "
I see this as a description of how (reverting to) social
level is regarded from the intellectual level.
> It seems to me,
> however, that this way of looking at things is wrong. It is a
> fundamental error to regard every surge of emotion against judgment
> as an uprising of the irrational. To be sure, there is a rather
> trivial sense in which feelings are inherently nonrational: They do
> not pertain to the faculty of reason, because they are not
> essentially discursive.
I don't know if this is you or Harry Frankfurter, but anyway this is
from the Quality's meta-level beyond the intellectual level.
> In a more substantial sense, feelings may accord better
> with reason than judgment does.
Yes from the said Q-premises which sees intellect for what it
really is: Just another static level.
> A person's judgment may itself be radically contrary to reason.
Right! When in love or war emotions take over "my country right
or wrong" ...etc. And only the MOQ can explain how murder
suddenly becomes the highest good, and other paradoxes.
Bo
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Nov 16 2005 - 14:30:59 GMT