From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Sat Nov 19 2005 - 04:16:29 GMT
Bo,
> Bo said:
> Different premises can give rise to different conclusion without
> logic itself being faulty. I should have used "subject/object
> premises" to delineate the intellectual level.
> Scott:
> This would make all philosophers (except Descartes)
> non-intellectual, since philosophers are those who question
> premises.
Bo said:
I know your different S/Os, but I stick to the SOM that emerged
as described in ZMM to which Descartes added its last twist; the
mind/matter one.
Scott:
That doesn't reply to what I said. If a philosopher does not subscribe to
the S/O[1] premise, and most don't, are we wrong to think that they are
engaging in intellectual activity?
(Scott)
> I think you have a
> valid point that most people most of the time act as if S/O[1] were
> true, that that is their premise (what philosophers call the
> "natural attitude"). There is also a valid point (shared with
> Barfield) that intellect and S/O[1] dualism arose together (that S/O
> makes intellect possible in human development).
Bo said:
Good! "Making intellect possible in human development" is jus a
complicated way of saying that intellect=SOM.
Scott:
No it isn't. Intellect in humans started thanks to the S/O[1] divide. But it
quickly moved past that, to S/O[2], and to mathematics, which has no divide.
The S/O[1] divide is just the fact that we have two broad types of
experience, thinking and sense perception (also feelings, which we also
ascribe to S[1]). Intellect can take this fact as just another one to be
considered, and thus moves beyond the S/O[1] divide (by turning it into an
object[2]).
(Scott)
> But it is also the intellect that can
> question the natural S/O attitude, and has, and has proposed
> different premises, and can lead us out of the natural S/O attitude.
Bo said:
I agree. It's a Quality tenet that all levels evolved to a point
when one of its patterns "took off on a purpose of its own" to a
new level, thus it necessarily had to the be an intellectual
pattern that initially "proposed different premises" and in my
opinion the MOQ began as an intellectual - SOM-based -
theory, but got out of intellect's control and is now forming a
meta-reality wherein SOM is its top static level - and
where its own "empty shell" resides.
Scott:
This "taking off" happened at the time of Pythagoras, so it seems strange to
credit the MOQ with this ability.
Bo said:
NB!
It looks like the "intellectual level" existed before the MOQ, but it
is of course only in a MOQ retrospect this context is established.
The Quality Idea of Phaedrus in the late fifties did neither
challenge Intellect nor SOM, it challenged REASON itself.
Scott:
I don't know how to distinguish intellect from reason, so I don't know what
this means. Of course, reason has also been challenged (that is, questioned
and expanded) for 2500 years.
(Scott)
> The MOQ is
> only a recent example of this questioning and attempt at
> replacement. Thus I think you could justifiably say that the S/O[1]
> premises are the basis of the fourth level, but it is silly to call
> it the intellectual level. Intellect has the capability of
> transcending all levels (all premises).
Bo said:
I don't know what taboo is attached to the term "intellect" in the
English/American language? I have repeatedly referred to my
dictionary, and will test it on you. It says:
"The power of mind to reason, contrasted with feelings
and instinct"
The "power of mind" we may drop for what is not power of mind?
Left is "REASON pitted against EMOTIONS" and as the latter is
the very essence of subjectivity and reason is the
essence of objectivity ..... Ipso facto.
Scott:
This definition is not false, just limited and so irrelevant. In the first
place, according to the MOQ, reason/intellect is subjective (but of course
that is just Pirsig being careless in his use of 'subjective'). Second, what
I said about intellect having the capability to transcend all levels was in
reponse to your saying that each level was based on a certain premise, and
intellect can examine any premise. Third, this definition leaves out other
things one can say about intellect. For example, that it has a dynamic as
well as a static aspect, that anything, including itself can be an object[2]
of intellect, that intellect examines premises, and so on. Fourth, feelings
and emotions are part of S[1], so how does contrasting intellect (also S[1])
to feelings and emotions say anything about intellect being the value of the
S/O[1] divide? In short, total confusion results in trying to say intellect
*is* S/O, this confusion exacerbated by not distinguishing between S/O[1]
and [2].
> Bo said (to Rebecca):
> Yes you are right, SOL says that S/O is the 4th level's premises,
> thus MOQ's DQ/SQ premises is something beyond, and for goodness sake
> Rebecca the 4th level is supposed to be STATIC. The tendency to
> regard it as a mental compartment where an endless succession of
> ideas fights for the top perch is inconsistent with anything static.
> Scott:
> Isn't the word for "fighting for ideas", which is anything but
> static, intellect?
Bo said:
I'll have to understand this first before answering.
Scott:
You said the fourth level is supposed to be static. Then you say that "an
endless succession of ideas fights for the top perch is inconsistent with
anything static". I am pointing out that we call that fighting 'intellect'.
Therefore intellect is not static, therefore, intellect cannot be the fourth
level. So if SOM is the fourth level, intellect cannot be SOM.
> Bo said:
> Yes from the said Q-premises which sees intellect for what it
> really is: Just another static level.
> Scott:
> So do you claim that Pirsig used something other than intellect to
> come up with the MOQ? Or must we treat the MOQ as revelation?
Bo said:
As said before, even if the MOQ is no level it shows some
level traits in it relationship with intellect. So your question
pertains to the general mystery what makes ANY level escape its
parent level? "Objectively" (intellectually) seen it's plain
impossible, but as reality shows (levels or not) life made it out of
matter so Pirsig merely postulates a relentless dynamic tug.
Phaedrus' first quality notion was an all-intellectual pattern, but it
was caught by the dynamic tug and carried forward. So Pirsig
definitely used something more than intellect or - better -
something more used Pirsig.
Scott:
Assuming one wants to go this route (I don't, at least not completely), but
if so, why not call that "something more" non-human Intellect? It leaves new
intellectual patterns in its wake, which is what we think of human intellect
as doing.
- Scott
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