From: skutvik@online.no
Date: Wed Nov 23 2005 - 18:00:23 GMT
Scott
20 Nov. you wrote:
> That depends on what you mean by S/O. If by "subject" one includes
> feelings and emotions, then it does not. If by "subject" one excludes
> feelings and emotions, then it does. These are two different meanings
> of "subject". Of course, you would like to think that there is only
> one meaning, because recognizing that there are two would undercut
> your theory. Well, too bad for your theory.
No, it does not depend. From Quality's meta-premise the social
level is neither subjective nor objective, it was the 4th level that
brought this distinction into existence. From its premises all social
patterns - included emotions - are subjective while itself is
objectivity. And the 4th. level has since refined its basic pattern to
ever greater complexities, so no wonder both subjective and
objective have many meanings.
> Scott:
> I said something about intellect in response to your "premises" point.
> You respond by asking what did I think of the dictionary's definition.
> I responded that it was limited, that, for example, it doesn't provide
> any input to the question about premises, so I didn't see how the
> dictionary's definition was relevant to the discussion.
The dictionary edtitors would probably disagree with you, as 4th
level goes it's good enough.
> Scott:
> Where did I mention "mind"? And why should I not talk about the things
> that lead me to critique your theory?
No, you take care not to mention the four-letter word, but it is
written all over your deliberations intellect means just that.
> Bo said:
> The social level (where emotions belongs) is neither subjective
> nor objective, it was with intellect that this distinction came to be.
> Scott:
> But I'm talking about what is meant by S[1], what people ordinarily
> think of themselves, which is that we say "my thinking" and "my
> emotions", but not "my body". That's what the S/O[1] distinction is:
> mind and body. Yes, it came into being with the fourth level, but all
> I am pointing out is that the distinction made by the dictionary's
> definition does not distinguish between S[1] and O[1]. It
> distinguishes between two parts of S[1].
Let me try again: The dictionary defines "intellect" from within the
4th level, and predictably sees it as REASON divided from
EMOTION. From Quality's meta position the perspective opens
up and the 4th level becomes the S/O distinction itself
(emotion=subjective/reason=objective)
Please stop this S/O grading. As of above, seen from the 4th
level REASON is a mental faculty and just as subjective as
EMOTION, but from Quality's meta-view the S/O divide is
abolished as a metaphysics and cannot be spread across the
levels only be one level - the 4th! All S/Os are just different 4th
level patterns, some primitive and left behind, some new and still
useful.
You say that the mind/body form came to be with the 4th level,
that's not all correct, but let's not be petty, this level grew in
complexity like the other levels and spawned ever more
complicated S/O patterns, the mind/body a rather late one. I think
we begin to agree.
> Scott:
> What is clear is that you wish to define intellect in one way, and I
> in another. So it is hopeless to convince me of the value of SOL
> without addressing the way I think of intellect.
Let's drop the word "intellect" if that is your stumbling stone.
> Here you say
> "intellect...believes itself to be mind out of matter". It does?
Yes, the 4th level does. Before it became a Q-level it regarded
existence as a mind/matter-ish, itself as mind and the rest of
existence as matter in various forms.
> don't think it does. Hegel didn't think so either,
Hegel is post-Kant and inherited his premises and Kant is the
most refined SOMist there are. He was shocked by the
empiricists who had proved beyond doubt that there is nothing
whatsoever "out there", all is created by our senses, Kant's
"critique" of this was supposed to show that senses weren't the
creators, we have some (categories I believe?) built in:
Time,space, causation. Maybe he disproved the empiricists'
extreme variety of SOM, but his more subtle kind cemented it
forever.
The MOQ makes short thrift of the whole Kantian and Hegelian
mess by relegating it all - wholesalely - to the 4th level.
> nor did a lot of
> others. Why should we accept your definition?
This is my interpretation of the MOQ as presented in Pirsig's
books, that some later "annotations" messes it up and needs
Pauli "theses" to align them is a fact..
> Scott:
> When did I say that MOQ is "contrasting intellect to emotions"?
No you didn't, but you obviously believed that to be what I meant.
The 18th. you wrote:
so how does contrasting intellect (also S[1]) to feelings
and emotions say anything about intellect ...
> I
> agree that intellect has done such contrasting. It can also go beyond
> that contrast, however. For example, it may think that a higher level
> of intellect is reached when feeling and intellect coincide.
Good, that's the very point, the 4th level had grown to a
complexity that enabled the Quality idea "take off on a purpose of
his own" from the 4th level. However, emotions will never
coincide with the intellectual level - that's different levels - but by
taking the 4th down from its mind position the two comes (more)
on equal terms.
Bo
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