From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Thu Apr 24 2003 - 15:01:42 BST
Dear Wim:
> I had the hope that we agreed on the need for both absolutes and relativity
> in the MoQ, but my hope was diminished again by your requirement 22 Apr
> 2003 07:54:04 -0400 that I agree with [the MoQ being] 'absolute in its
> inner integrity' and your explanation 23 Apr 2003 08:07:12 -0400 that this
> would imply agreeing that Pirsig's statements in 'Lila' are logically
> consistent with each other and with the overall framework of the MoQ. For
> me Pirsig is only a fallible human. (In 'Lila's Child' he also admits that
> he would have wanted to have written some things in 'Lila' different in
> hindsight.) Logical consistency of texts depends at least partly on the
> context in which the reader reads it. (Pirsig doesn't define everything, so
> readers have to depend on their own definitions and experiences to give
> some of it meaning. These will be different from Pirsig's at some points
> and sometimes make the text inconsistent.) Last but not least the MoQ for
> me (as you know by now) is not to be found in Pirsig's words only. It is an
> intellectual pattern of value that to an increasing extent is to be found
> in texts of others, predominantly on this list (and hardly outside) I fear.
Well, others have tried to point out logical inconsistencies in the MOQ.
Perhaps there are some. But the point I was trying to get across was
that taken as a whole, the MOQ stands solid as a rock. And while we
can all pick around at the edges, the fundamental Genie Pirsig has
unleashed cannot be put back in the lamp.
> I leave it to you to tell what you mean with the MoQ being an "absolute
> metaphysics" (if you feel the need). You introduced the statement 21 Apr
> 2003 10:28:55 -0400: 'Perhaps we can agree that Pirsig presents an absolute
> metaphysics wherein relativity is allowed free reign.'
>
> This statement seemed plausible enough for me even without explanation. I
> just had a hunch that the need for both absolutes and relativity could also
> be expressed in another way (a relative metaphysics which values absolute
> statements). It must have to do something with Goedel's theorem, which
> Jonathan reminded us of 15 Apr 2003 09:24:16 +0300. In my understanding:
> whatever you understand as absolute in a symbolic representation of
> something else, you will always have to leave something out that becomes
> more relative because of the stress you lay on absolute truth of your
> representation. The very difference of representation and represented
> precludes absolute consistency between the two.
This seems plausible to me. :-) In making statements, we all tend to
leave out the person making the statement. A ringing bell and the
hearing of it are two names for one indivisible fact.
Platt
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