Re: MD Undeniable Facts

From: johnny moral (johnnymoral@hotmail.com)
Date: Tue May 06 2003 - 18:28:36 BST

  • Next message: Matt the Enraged Endorphin: "Re: MD Undeniable Facts"

    Hi Phyllis,

    >Couldn't disagree more.

    Uh oh.

    >1. You are committing the fallacy of equivocation in your use of the word
    >morality. You begin by using morality in the sense of moral values (a
    >more
    >global level) and then switch to a set of specific cultural ones (I would
    >say conventional=relative ones, but I've heard you don't recognize that
    >term).

    That these two things are the same is what I hope for everyone to glean from
    Lila. Morality isn't two or three kinds of morality that are in conflict,
    what we do and what people ought to do and what a subset of culture does.
    Using the word to mean what is prudent or the right thing to do when it is
    known to be different from what most people do is just wrong, it has
    hijacked the word from its root of "mores" or customs. As to the fact that
    we are all a part of lots of subsets of cultures within cultures, that is
    very true, however, all people have a culture in common when you go up
    toward the top level of the tree. I am immersed in the Boston rock
    subculture, but I share with the Greenwich Village cross-dressing culture
    the larger American culture, and we both share with the French culture
    Western Culture, and Westerners share with Easterners a global human
    culture. Negotiations between subcultures have to be at the level of the
    shared culture and with respect to the shared culture, using persuation
    culled from the shared culture, or else it is coercion of authoritarianism
    or extortion. You can't just use rationality to morally change another
    culture without basing the rationality on cultural precepts that the other
    subculture agrees with.

    >2. Seems to me the two don't conflict at all. They are two different
    >things. Rationality or reason = logic. The method, language or system of
    >philosophy. One uses reasons to explain/uphold specific morals, which can
    >be seen as rules or acts.

    I'm not sure rationality equals reason. To me, "rationalizing" connotes
    coming up with an excuse for doing or not doing something that you sort of
    know is immoral, whereas reason means acknowledging the determinism of the
    universe and therefore taking responsibility for how actions effect other
    people. They are almost opposite, I can rationalize that it doesn't really
    matter if I am a good citizen or not, because we're all going to die anyhow,
    i'm not my brother's keeper, and there's no law that I have to be a good
    citizen, etc, etc, whereas reason reminds me of the causal chain of being
    and that my actions are a result of motives which are caused by morality and
    my actions in turn effect morality. You actually don't need to use reasons
    to explain or uphold morals, surely as a mother you know that the correct
    answer to "why should I?" is "because you should". You really don't need to
    give a rational reason, morality is the reason. If you get in the habit of
    coming up with a rational reason for every moral precept your kid protests
    against, he will become an equivocator, a rationalizer, disrespectful. (I
    speak generally, I sm sure your kid will be a fine healthy normal kid and
    all, but I am worried for the future of mankind, so I don't fear risking
    offense in the context of this discussion.) Looking for a rational reason
    for moral precepts is what CS Lewis called "holding a gun to the head of the
    Tao" in Abolition of Man (read that one? very relevant today).

    > > Trying to use rationaility to change morality doesn't work,
    >2a)Isn't there a differnce between changing and latching?

    Not that I see.

    >3) Think about the theory of utilitarianism. The Greatest Happiness
    >principle. It is a moral theory that is supported by rational argument.
    >The
    >conflicts, when they occur, of this theory are not if humans should be
    >happy, but which humans, the many or the few or one, Mr. Spock.

    Utilitarianism isn't a moral theory, it makes a wrong assumption about what
    morality is. It should be obvious that the idea of "greatest happiness" is
    a fallacy, unmeasurable first of all, and clueless about what the source or
    meaning of happiness might be. It is the theory that finds it perfectly
    acceptable to turn everyone into Soma-addicted zombies. All it does is
    provide people with a self-righteous rationalization for use of their
    coercive force and power.

    >Rationality needs a foundation of moral precepts
    > 3a)example of a moral precept please

    Well, more or less globally accepted ones are you should not steal, you
    should not commit adultery, you should visit the sick, and within my
    subculture it might be "don't use reverb", though that one is changing as
    more and more cool indie rockers are wanting to sound more like Chicago.

    > >from
    > > which to act rationally, it can't do it on its own.
    >4)You're right here in saying rationality can't do it on its own - a
    >language needs something to talk about, and morals are thought and talked
    >about in language.

    language is thought about in morals, the meaning of a word is a shared like
    morality, morality is what teaches language, how words should be used and
    spelled and pronounced. It's all about a shared culture, and though there
    are many logical lexical laws, at root it is irrational, there is no reason
    why a word means what it means, except for morality.

    > Trying to impose change
    > > on morality without respecting morality as its own motive for change,
    > 5)don't understand this statement

    You have to find a moral reason for changing morality.

    >. using
    > > rationality against morality, becomes something like authoritarianism,
    >with
    > > whoever is most powerful imposing their idea of what is rational.
    >6) Nope, because if all humans are capable of being rational, then you
    >can't
    >impose something on someone if they agree with it, and if its a sound
    >argument, they will (See Habermas). If they don't, one can try to persuade
    >them through reason. The only time rationality is authoritarian, is when
    >it
    >happens to be accompanied by power, you can't conflate the two - My
    >four-year old would agree with you, my husband would not, even if I'm using
    >the same rational argument to get them to pick up their socks (only an
    >example ;-).

    The only times rationality ever achieves change without respecting morality
    is when it is coercive. You are right, if people agree with it, you dont
    aren't imposing it. But the only way anyone will agree with a rational
    argument is if the moral precepts at the foundation of the argument are
    shared (or, if different moral precepts merely intersect in mutually
    beneficial ways, which is usually a form of mutual coercion, a quid pro quo,
    and should be seen as ugly and harmful to morality)

    > > Rationality is in the eye of the beholder (though we usually agree about
    > > it),exactly, see 6.
    > whereas morality, properly understood, is shared by the entire culture.
    >8) Ok Johnny, you define culture. It's a myth. There never was any single
    >homogenous culture, and its even more the case today. And no person
    >belongs
    >to only one culture. From the moment we are born, we are immediately part
    >of a culture(s) and a subculture (s). I'm American and female and
    >midwestern and middle class, , of x religion or none, of y ethnicity, a
    >baby
    >boomer or a gen x'er or y'er, etc. Since, as far as I know these
    >"cultures"
    >don't agree on many questions of morality, what is right?
    >Reason can tell us, morality, if by that you mean a specific set of morals,
    >can't.

    Reason can't really tell us without appealing to the shared morality, at
    whatever level it can be found at. We should always be looking to our
    common morality when we interact with people.

    >That said, I do agree with you that some moral theories, based only on
    >reason seem pretty cold. Kant's been accused of that for years, as has
    >utilitarianism.

    Kant has? I thought his theory is based on an "a priori" catagorical
    imperative, which I understand to mean, a pre-existing shared set of
    patterns or morality. He doesn't imply that morality can be explained with
    out appealing to an a priori morality.

    >However, modern psychology and sociology can be added to,
    >not replace, traditional theories of deontology and utilitarianism. I try
    >to do this in the form of narrative and care theory, but I think they must
    >be only in addition to, not replacement of the others.

    I had to look up Deontology - it seems like an unnecessary field of study,
    moral obligation is because it is, case closed. Opening it up to study
    denies the very existence of moral obligation.

    >This is why I find Pirsig so interesting. I do think intellect should
    >trump
    >society. While individuals can be wrong, as a group they can be more wrong
    >and more hostile to change and more powerful.

    What change? People can be wrong as a group intellectually also,
    intellectual ideas are often not very complete or well-understood, yet they
    are often shared by powerful people who use false and mishapen arguments to
    trump society's initial hostility.

    >Intellect corrects this. But
    >when he leaves that fifth level open, this is where I see the ability to
    >incorporate something before intellect has time to analyze it. X is good
    >or I like X even if right now I can't tell you why.

    Fifth level you probably mean the "DQ" pre-intellectual level? I don't
    think that's considered a level, though it is all a house of cards of
    conventions and circular definitions anyhow.

    >And since I like concrete examples, let me share one. I have a horse, Ben.
    >Ben has arthritis in one elbow, though the joint should fuse and be
    >painless
    >eventually, he'll never be rideable again. If I were to use reason alone,
    >seeing him as livestock, the solution would be to send him to the killers
    >for the per pound $. Duty theory + utilitarianism
    >
    >However, I have feelings for the horse. Does he have a right to live, do I
    >have a relationship with him which should be cared for? you bet.
    >
    >I could just as easily say that I have a duty to a faithful pet, or the
    >consequences of killing him would cause me so much psychological harm that
    >no amount of $ would make me happy, etc.
    >
    >I think DQ is what allows me to respond no even before I think all that out
    >when someone says he should be put down.

    The moral thing to do is what most people would do. If you aren't sure
    which "subculture" to look at to know what most people would do, look at the
    subculture of the people who will be judging you and whose opinion you wish
    to respect. Don't confuse yourself by looking at the subculture of some
    distant culture, the culture to look at should be the one you are immersed
    in.

    Johnny (ps, I'm glad you are letting him grow old and dignified, I hope his
    pain goes away soon, and everyone picks up their socks.)

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