Re: MD Structuralism in Pirsig

From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Tue May 27 2003 - 08:00:13 BST

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    Dear Steve (and Sam and Johnny),

    On your request (26 May 2003 14:37:45 -0400) a short reply, even though I
    try to concentrate my limited time on 'grilling Sam' on his idea of
    'eudaimonia' as characterizing level 4 at the moment. (-:

    You were describing only 3 levels when you wrote:
    'If a person's sense of self is not yet differentiated from the physical
    world (does not see it's body as self and the pillow as not self) it is not
    inorganically aware (Piaget's sensory motor level). If a person's sense of
    self is not differentiated from emotions and physical sensations (e.g. the
    universe is not pain itself right now, only my self is feeling pain) then
    that person has not developed biological awareness. If a person's identity
    is not differentiated from a social role, then this person has not yet
    developed intellectual awareness (or so my child development hypothesis
    goes).'

    If you agree that there are 4 levels, the logic of what you wrote demands
    that you substitute 'social awareness' for 'intellectual awareness' in the
    last sentence. Which leaves to be described a person who has developed
    social but not intellectual awareness...

    I agree with you that 'identifying one's thinking with a larger group'
    doesn't qualify one as [only] 'functioning at the social level' (as Sam
    wrote). In my scheme of things we cannot speak of 'thinking' and of
    'identifying' in the way we usually understand them when people function
    only at the social level, i.e. if the highest patterns of value they
    participate in are patterns of (unthinking) behavior copied from others.
    So I don't think that 'identifying with [a group's] thinking' qualifies one
    as [only] operating at the social level (as you wrote) either.
    People functioning only at the social level as defined by me (who must be
    either very young or mentally handicapped) have only a sense of 'belonging'.
    They behave according to roles and they show recognition of different roles,
    but they don't 'identify' with a role (nor with a group). They recognize
    different individuals in their group (and themselves if they would see their
    own reflection) by superficial characteristics and different patterns of
    behavior (as a chimp does), but they don't experience themselves, let alone
    others, as 'subjects' who 'choose'. They can (unlike most animals)
    dissociate themselves from their emotions and physical sensations. So for
    instance it is not (only) anger or aggression that makes a male face a
    predator that threatens his family group, but his sense of belonging that
    makes him overcome his fear. People functioning only at the social level can
    build, maintain and pass on material culture (e.g. elaborate ways of making
    the artifacts they need for survival) and thus 'society', unlike most
    animals. They do not create 'myths' or any other stories, but when they have
    passed the threshold of creating and participating in intellectual patterns
    of value, the myths and stories they DO create describe (at first) only life
    at the social level. So mythology IS a way to get a better understanding of
    the social level (as David B. has been trying to impress upon us for ages).

    Levels of awareness/consciousness/thinking etc. (like Wilber's ones) are
    (very useful) subcategories of level 4. When we speak about 'awareness' of
    the physical world, of sensations/emotions etc. in people (or even in
    elementary particles) functioning only at lower than fourth levels, we are
    only 'projecting down' an intellectual pattern of value. We are talking
    about our (projected) experience, not about theirs.

    So yes, Johnny, I do object to the word 'choice' in 'value choices made by
    atoms and molecules' (as you supposed 15 May 2003 19:06:18 +0000). Static
    patterns of value describe determination rather than free choice (as Dynamic
    Quality does). We'd better think and describe them in terms of mechanisms
    maintaining patterns that embody value.

    With friendly greetings,

    Wim

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