From: Elizaphanian (elizaphanian@tiscali.co.uk)
Date: Tue Jun 10 2003 - 14:32:35 BST
Hi Paul,
Firstly - I enjoy your contributions to the forum. Good to hear you here.
More comments on your comments.
> Yes, reasoning, when dialectical, is the use of logic.
> But understanding and thinking are not limited to
> logic or dialectic at all. <snip>
> The problem of definition may be more in the social
> level and its evaluation and non-approval of illogical
> thinking?
I'm very comfortable with the idea that understanding and thinking are not limited to logic and
dialectic, and in so far as 'intellect is simply thinking' as Pirsig put it, all well and good. I
just don't see that as being a criterion for a discrete level in the MoQ. If a monkey perceives a
pattern of yellow between various gaps in the leaves, puts them together and perceives a lion, at
what point is that distinguishable from thinking or understanding? Does the monkey not understand
that there is a lion there? Is saying that the monkey *thinks* there is a lion there an illegitimate
anthropomorphism?
I like the idea that definitions (in dictionaries) function at the social level. It's when you start
saying that the dictionary has made a mistake that you're functioning at level 4 ;-)
> Taste is a value judgement, do you agree? Every static
> pattern is a value judgement, even intellectual
> patterns. I think a problem is in the definition of
> taste. It really refers to a biological pattern of
> value, but has come to mean a general aesthetic
> judgement by analogy.
Yet I think a concept can grow out of analogical beginnings. Consider the word 'muscle' - seems
pretty clear? Yet it began as the Latin for 'little mouse' due to the resemblance between the bicep
and said creature. So to say that taste 'really refers to a biological pattern of value' is I think
misleading. Words can begin in one place, but migrate and change according to the forms of life in
which they make sense. (The meaning of a word is its use in the language - Wittgenstein). I agree
(broadly) about static patterns, but I would add in a temporal modifier, ie: every static pattern is
the record of a past value judgement. That's what makes it static. If it is a value judgement de
novo, then it is DQ.
> It is definitely valid to speak of static patterns as
> that is all there is to talk about. At level 4, the
> autonomous individual is defined by ideas and
> intuitions, or a repertoire of static responses. That
> defines a unique personality, yes. Is that what you
> are saying?
I think I would want to emphasise virtues more than anything else in the definition of a unique
autonomous individual. Virtues are built up cumulatively by the individual's response to DQ, and
thus the uniqueness of the individual at level 4 is analogous to that of a snowflake at level 1.
> In Lila's Child Note 57, he is talking about primary
> concepts such as time and he speculates that 'change'
> is the first concept to emerge from undivided
> experience. Best you read it, as it's part of a
> dialogue.
I'll have a look, sounds plausible.
> I find the idea that the first concept to form is of
> 'self' a little cartesian.
Well I'm not a cartesian (Heavens!!). I'm not sure 'concept' only functions at level 4, so you might
have concepts (mythologies?) before you have self-awareness. Yet I think self-awareness is a (if not
the) threshold between 3 and 4.
> I think arete is about all levels.
Could you expand on that? I might agree with you.
> One of us is, or maybe both. Either way, your thoughts
> and responses are of high quality and eudaimonia is
> clearly a worthy goal. I think eudaimonia fits
> comfortably in the MOQ as I find it, that's the
> difference.
That's fine. It may well be that I am misconstruing Pirsig's presentation in Lila and LC (although
if that is so, I'm not the only one) and it would be gratifying if that were the case, ie, that
there is no significant change from ZMM to Lila. Yet I persist in thinking that there is. Just look
at how Socrates is treated differently from the one to the other, that's a good 'proxy' for what I
object to.
Cheers
Sam
"Phaedrus is fascinated too by the description of the motive of 'duty toward self' which is an
almost exact translation of the Sanskrit word 'dharma', sometimes described as the 'one' of the
Hindus. Can the 'dharma' of the Hindus and the 'virtue' of the Ancient Greeks be identical?" - The
Eudaimonic MoQ says yes. "Lightning hits!"
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