From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Thu Sep 04 2003 - 00:50:35 BST
Andy,
(I know, you asked David, but I can't resist)
> Hi David,
>
> Since I am having such a difficult time understanding Scott, could you
please
> explain to me how something as obscure as "trying to explain perception
through
> the products of perception" can throw any favorable light on the work of
> SHeldrake over the other conventional "materialist" explanations? If we
are not
> allowed to explain experience through what we experience, then what are we
left
> with?
Nothing. Mu. Consciousness is self-contradictory, so the only logic for
talking about consciousness is the logic of contradictory identity. So the
more sensible thing is to assume consciousness as a given, and not something
that could have evolved out of non-conscious processes. This is, of course,
the same move that Pirsig made with Quality.
> How does Sheldrake avoid this cunumdrum?
That I don't know, but from what I've understood he doesn't need to explain
consciousness. Only materialists do, or the whole Darwinist world view falls
apart.
- Scott
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