Re: MD Self-consciousness

From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Thu Sep 04 2003 - 19:14:43 BST

  • Next message: David MOREY: "Re: MD Self-consciousness"

    I completely agree with Scott here.

    David Morey
    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2003 12:50 AM
    Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness

    > Andy,
    >
    > (this is also a reply to your earlier post)
    >
    > It might help if I explain that my whole thinking on this arose from the
    > time I was a grad student of computers/cognitive science. I was especially
    > interested in computer models of language use. So I would do thought
    > experiments on how people used language. This means that my interest in
    > explanations was considerably greater than just "explaining how we cope".
    I
    > needed a reductionist theory.
    >
    > It is no particular problem to come up with simple models for parsing
    > simple sentences, but digging deeper, it becomes clear that a tremendous
    > amount of semantic and pragmatic knowledge is involved. But even that is
    not
    > what I finally saw as the real problem. It was: how does one get a
    computer
    > to *see* anything as simple as a word, or even a dot on the page? That is,
    > how can one imagine a machine scanning the letters t-i-g-e-r, and
    producing
    > a mental picture of a tiger. It is no problem programming a computer to
    scan
    > letters and produce appropriate output, but that inner picture, what
    > philosophers call qualia, is a puzzle.
    >
    > The reason, I finally realized, that these thought experiments failed is
    > that a computer is a perfectly spatio-temporal mechanism. Every bit is
    > separated from every other bit. We can read off bit configurations as
    words,
    > but the computer cannot. All that happens is that some bit gets set to 1
    (or
    > 0) and some machine instruction reads that single bit to go into a routine
    > to print out "I see a tiger". But nothing in a computer can grasp a
    million
    > bits as a gestalt. So a computer can never be conscious.
    >
    > However, the same reasoning applies to the brain *considered as a
    > spatio-temporal mechanism*. There have to be other things going on that
    are
    > not spatio-temporal. But once admit that, and materialism goes out the
    > window, and Sheldrake and others start to make sense.
    >
    > So I agree that we have internal models, but what I am saying is that no
    > spatio-temporal mechanism can process one as a whole. Your responses are
    > like Rorty's, for example when he says that our inability to identify
    mental
    > states by viewing neural activity is "no more mysterious" than our
    inability
    > to read a language we don't know. My response to this is that our ability
    to
    > read a language is a complete and unfathomable mystery. So is our ability
    to
    > see a dot on a page. It transcends space and time. A computer can be
    > programmed to print "I see a dot" when a video camera is set up, etc.,
    etc.,
    > but it doesn't see it, and it can't see it because every bit is separated
    in
    > space and/or time from every other bit, so every communication is only one
    > bit being turned on or off. There is no way to amalgamate those one-bit
    > "experiences".
    >
    > Now the "there's something about consciousness that I just don't see a
    > computer having it" argument has been made many times. What I have tried
    to
    > do here is pinpoint what that something is. It is that normal, everyday
    > consciousness does not play by spatio-temporal rules. Given that electrons
    > don't either, this shouldn't be all that hard to take in.
    >
    > - Scott
    >
    > ----- Original Message -----
    > From: <abahn@comcast.net>
    > To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    > Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2003 6:43 AM
    > Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness
    >
    >
    > > Scott,
    > >
    > > I had another thought while taking the dog for a morning walk pertaining
    > to:
    > >
    > > "And, again, why is consciousness, self- or otherwise, seen as something
    > that
    > > needs to be explained, in material terms or otherwise? "
    > >
    > > I might admit that explaining consciousness is hopeless and completely
    > absurd
    > > (but that doesn't mean we should quit trying) but self-consciousness is
    > another
    > > beast. Consciousness is a state of being alive. It is at the root of
    > purpose
    > > in the sense of a system being able to predict future events. For
    > instance, a
    > > frog notices a fly on a leave in front of it facing to the east. It can
    > predict
    > > with some probability what direction the fly is going to go next. This
    > ability
    > > increases its chance for survival. Well, offering a satisfactory
    > explanation
    > > for this ability, especially by insisting on a reductive one, is almost
    > > impossible. It is like trying to decide what is life. Where is the
    line
    > > EXACTLY separating the inorganic from the biological. We will never
    know.
    > >
    > > But self-consciousness or I would prefer "reflective consciousness" is a
    > term we
    > > can use to distinguish humans from all other biological organisms.
    > Explaining
    > > this then is relatively easy compared to consciousness. What is it that
    > makes
    > > humans different from other species? Without having to go into the
    > mechanics of
    > > brain activity, photons and nerve cells and such, we can offer
    > satisfactory
    > > explanations that help us "cope" in our environment. The one I was
    > offering is
    > > simply that reflective (self-) consciousness is a property of language.
    > Easy!
    > > No spatio-temporal universe to worry about. We can use whatever
    universe
    > you
    > > wish to propose. We exist and we use language. From our experience we
    > can
    > > distinguish that humans have some properties other species do not. One
    of
    > these
    > > is language and another one of these is self-consciousness. All I did
    was
    > > connect the dots.
    > >
    > > Thanks,
    > > Andy
    > >
    > >
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    >
    >
    >
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