From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Fri Oct 31 2003 - 17:50:31 GMT
Andy
> Hi Paul and Scott,
>
> Paul said to Scott: "The reification of Dynamic Quality is something I
think Pirsig tries to avoid throughout Lila e.g. when he discusses latching
and degeneracy in several contexts."
>
> While reading Antmcwatts thesis, Pirsig says in an email to Mcwatt (2001)
anwering former moq_discuss member John Beasley's criticisms of the MOQ
which are similar to Scott's (as far as I can tell). Beasley said:
>
> "[Pirsig]loses the value of his core term, 'quality', by equating it with
too many other terms, and ultimately reifying it; while at the same time
asserting that quality cannot be defined, and ignoring the paradox."
>
> To which Pirsig replies (to Mcwatt):
>
> "To reify means to regard an abstraction as if it had a concrete or
material existence. You don't lose the value of quality by treating it as
if it had a concrete or material existence. You lose the value of quality
by treating it as if it had only an abstract existence. That is a
fundamental point of the MOQ. Beasley's unease is caused by an inability to
understand this basic assertion of the MOQ. He assumes it is in error
because it contradicts his prejudices but never explains why his prejudices
are superior."
>
> >From the above quote it does NOT seem like the reification of quality is
something Pirsig is trying to avoid. I am not sure how exactly this relates
to your discussion, but I would be interested in your comments on the above
quote. One comment I would make is that Pirsig might have been better
served by using Rorty or Matts terminology for the last sentence. "Begging
the question" seems to be a better phrase than calling another's assumptions
"his prejudices." But, of course, the discussion is always open on whose
assumptions are superior.
My objection to Pirsig's response is his treating "an abstraction" as
somehow inferior to "concrete". This is the nominalism of Pirsig that I
object to. Basically, Pirsig is adopting the basic nominalist orientation
that the more "sense perceptible" something is, the more real it is, in the
style of Dr. Johnson refuting Berkeley by kicking a stone. Now he (Pirsig}
would expand that orientation to argue that "art and morality and even
religious mysticism" belong in the concrete, and hence "more real" (and so
distinguishes the MOQ from materialism), but would deny that to
"abstraction".
You should note that what I am saying is orthogonal to both Pirsig and John
Beasley. In fact, I used to debate John on this matter as well.
- Scott
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