From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Sun Nov 02 2003 - 17:10:07 GMT
David,
You're missing my point here. Yes the me/not-me distinction needs a LOT of
unpacking, but first it has to be acknowledged, and it is that initial
acknowledgment that I see Pirsig as avoiding in his eagerness to unpack SOM,
and so throwing a contradictory baby out with the bathwater.
- Scott
----- Original Message -----
From: "David MOREY" <us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2003 2:13 PM
Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness
> Hi Scott
>
> This is interesting because unusually I disagree with you.
>
> Scott: By "inside" and "outside" I am referring to the fact that in sense
> > perception I experience things that seem to be not me, while in thinking
> I
> > experience things that seem to be me. Pirsig does not pay attention to
the
> > existence of those two very different kinds of seeming, in effect
assuming
> > that one (sense perception) is basic, and the other an illusion (note
that
> I
> > am referring to the *seeming* as illusory, not the actual thinking).
Hence
> > my accusation of nominalism, and that by ignoring the two types of
seeming
> > he is not being empirical.
>
> David M: I think this me/not-me distinction needs unpacking. There is
> certainly
> a distinction between what I can will to respond/have agency with all the
> time,
> i.e. my body, but my car can also start to feel like a body when I drive
it
> so much.
> People with artificial limbs controlled by brain waves have certainly
> reported feeling
> like they became part of their body, and in a way we can gain agency over
> anything
> in our environment with the necessary energy/tools. Sure you can lay cliam
> to your thoughts
> but I often feel like they are something that flow through me and are
> connected in ways
> that I cannot entirely account for in terms of any sort of progression. It
> seems hard to say that
> we cause thinking or if thinking just happens to us, is thinking ours or
is
> it a gift from out
> of nothing/transcendence? I certainly see thinking/perception as entirely
> enmeshed, do you
> really think Pirsig gives priority to perception?
> Quality=reality=expereience. And this is as much stuff-in-the-
> world as it is stuff-in-your-head. Head-experience-world are pretty
> inseperable I suggest.
> Sure, Pirsig has a go about thinking as reasoning, becuase a lot of what
we
> experience is very
> spontaneous and has little to do with deliberating-thinking. But I think
the
> whole of perception/the body
> exhibit vast amounts of intelligence, otherwise of course you would not
see
> a thing. Merleau-Ponty is
> very very good on this. I think your argument with Pirsig is because
> sometimes he is using a narrow
> sense of thinking as theory-deliberate-thinking and you want to talk about
> the broader intelligence-perception-
> thinking. Surely primitive man has onlt the one type of
> particpatory-seeming, and this is what Pirsig is getting
> at when he says quality, quality begins with primordial non-distinguished
> reality, pretty hard for any of us
> to get with thse days, deep meditation seems the best way, dropping all
your
> presuppositions is very hard,
> Heidegger, for me, pushes hardest in this direction.
>
> regards
> David M
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
> To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 5:51 PM
> Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness
>
>
> > David,
> >
> >
> > > Scott (I think):Nevertheless, this attitude seems to me to more than a
> > > little
> > > nominalist, since it looks to that which comes from the outside as
> > > privileged over that which comes from the inside.
> > >
> > > What is this outside/inside distinction, reality=quality=experience
> > > we experience, there is no inside or outside, it is outsideless.
> > > We can create a theoretical cosmic story but we can not
> > > experience anything outside of experience, I suggest, pretty
> > > obvious really.
> >
> > By "inside" and "outside" I am referring to the fact that in sense
> > perception I experience things that seem to be not me, while in thinking
> I
> > experience things that seem to be me. Pirsig does not pay attention to
the
> > existence of those two very different kinds of seeming, in effect
assuming
> > that one (sense perception) is basic, and the other an illusion (note
that
> I
> > am referring to the *seeming* as illusory, not the actual thinking).
Hence
> > my accusation of nominalism, and that by ignoring the two types of
seeming
> > he is not being empirical.
> >
> > - Scott
> >
> >
> >
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>
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