Re: MD Self-consciousness

From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sun Nov 02 2003 - 22:26:45 GMT

  • Next message: David MOREY: "Re: MD Self-consciousness"

    Scott

    You're missing mine. I want you to unpack the distinction because
    I cannot see how you can justify it. But maybe we are using terms
    differently, if you unpack it, maybe I can understand what you are
    doing wrong, or understand what I have got wrong.

    regards
    David M
    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
    To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2003 5:10 PM
    Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness

    > David,
    >
    > You're missing my point here. Yes the me/not-me distinction needs a LOT of
    > unpacking, but first it has to be acknowledged, and it is that initial
    > acknowledgment that I see Pirsig as avoiding in his eagerness to unpack
    SOM,
    > and so throwing a contradictory baby out with the bathwater.
    >
    > - Scott
    >
    > ----- Original Message -----
    > From: "David MOREY" <us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk>
    > To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    > Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2003 2:13 PM
    > Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness
    >
    >
    > > Hi Scott
    > >
    > > This is interesting because unusually I disagree with you.
    > >
    > > Scott: By "inside" and "outside" I am referring to the fact that in
    sense
    > > > perception I experience things that seem to be not me, while in
    thinking
    > > I
    > > > experience things that seem to be me. Pirsig does not pay attention to
    > the
    > > > existence of those two very different kinds of seeming, in effect
    > assuming
    > > > that one (sense perception) is basic, and the other an illusion (note
    > that
    > > I
    > > > am referring to the *seeming* as illusory, not the actual thinking).
    > Hence
    > > > my accusation of nominalism, and that by ignoring the two types of
    > seeming
    > > > he is not being empirical.
    > >
    > > David M: I think this me/not-me distinction needs unpacking. There is
    > > certainly
    > > a distinction between what I can will to respond/have agency with all
    the
    > > time,
    > > i.e. my body, but my car can also start to feel like a body when I drive
    > it
    > > so much.
    > > People with artificial limbs controlled by brain waves have certainly
    > > reported feeling
    > > like they became part of their body, and in a way we can gain agency
    over
    > > anything
    > > in our environment with the necessary energy/tools. Sure you can lay
    cliam
    > > to your thoughts
    > > but I often feel like they are something that flow through me and are
    > > connected in ways
    > > that I cannot entirely account for in terms of any sort of progression.
    It
    > > seems hard to say that
    > > we cause thinking or if thinking just happens to us, is thinking ours or
    > is
    > > it a gift from out
    > > of nothing/transcendence? I certainly see thinking/perception as
    entirely
    > > enmeshed, do you
    > > really think Pirsig gives priority to perception?
    > > Quality=reality=expereience. And this is as much stuff-in-the-
    > > world as it is stuff-in-your-head. Head-experience-world are pretty
    > > inseperable I suggest.
    > > Sure, Pirsig has a go about thinking as reasoning, becuase a lot of what
    > we
    > > experience is very
    > > spontaneous and has little to do with deliberating-thinking. But I think
    > the
    > > whole of perception/the body
    > > exhibit vast amounts of intelligence, otherwise of course you would not
    > see
    > > a thing. Merleau-Ponty is
    > > very very good on this. I think your argument with Pirsig is because
    > > sometimes he is using a narrow
    > > sense of thinking as theory-deliberate-thinking and you want to talk
    about
    > > the broader intelligence-perception-
    > > thinking. Surely primitive man has onlt the one type of
    > > particpatory-seeming, and this is what Pirsig is getting
    > > at when he says quality, quality begins with primordial
    non-distinguished
    > > reality, pretty hard for any of us
    > > to get with thse days, deep meditation seems the best way, dropping all
    > your
    > > presuppositions is very hard,
    > > Heidegger, for me, pushes hardest in this direction.
    > >
    > > regards
    > > David M
    > >
    > >
    > > ----- Original Message -----
    > > From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
    > > To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
    > > Sent: Friday, October 31, 2003 5:51 PM
    > > Subject: Re: MD Self-consciousness
    > >
    > >
    > > > David,
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > > Scott (I think):Nevertheless, this attitude seems to me to more than
    a
    > > > > little
    > > > > nominalist, since it looks to that which comes from the outside as
    > > > > privileged over that which comes from the inside.
    > > > >
    > > > > What is this outside/inside distinction, reality=quality=experience
    > > > > we experience, there is no inside or outside, it is outsideless.
    > > > > We can create a theoretical cosmic story but we can not
    > > > > experience anything outside of experience, I suggest, pretty
    > > > > obvious really.
    > > >
    > > > By "inside" and "outside" I am referring to the fact that in sense
    > > > perception I experience things that seem to be not me, while in
    thinking
    > > I
    > > > experience things that seem to be me. Pirsig does not pay attention to
    > the
    > > > existence of those two very different kinds of seeming, in effect
    > assuming
    > > > that one (sense perception) is basic, and the other an illusion (note
    > that
    > > I
    > > > am referring to the *seeming* as illusory, not the actual thinking).
    > Hence
    > > > my accusation of nominalism, and that by ignoring the two types of
    > seeming
    > > > he is not being empirical.
    > > >
    > > > - Scott
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
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