Re: MD Self-consciousness

From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sun Nov 02 2003 - 22:36:19 GMT

  • Next message: David MOREY: "Re: MD What makes an idea dangerous?"

    dmb says:
    The outside is privileged in the MOQ? Again, I think this is exactly what
    Pirsig is NOT saying. The traditional empiricism that Pirsig describes above
    is yer standard SOM position and pretty much defines what objectivity is.
    This is the kind of empiricism that priviledges the outside. This is one of
    the main problems with SOM, especially the dominant variety: scientific
    materialism. Pirsig's expanded empiricism seeks to overcome this problem.
    Not only does he add a sense of value, there is also the insistence that
    legitimate intellectual knowledge not only comes through, is mediated by,
    our biological senses, but also that it should be mediated through the
    social level, that we shouldn't even pretend our ideas are produced by
    biological brains and nothing more. And unlike SOM it treats the "inside" as
    real as the "outside", if you will.

    The above is right. Rorty would agree with most of this I think-by the way.
    It is well accepted now in scientific epistemology that science is just one
    approach to reality,
    one that is a partial selection of what is important, and that there is no
    truth free from values
    or societal concerns. The MOQ offers a non-quantifying approach to static
    patterns
    that allows us to do some MOQing in a broader language, where we can look at
    non-material
    organisation/systems, such as society that is so structured by
    ideas/language.

    regards
    David M

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "David Buchanan" < >
    To: < >
    Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2003 6:17 PM
    Subject: RE: MD Self-consciousness

    > Scott and all thread followers:
    >
    > Scott said:
    > My objection to Pirsig's response is his treating "an abstraction" as
    > somehow inferior to "concrete". This is the nominalism of Pirsig that I
    > object to. Basically, Pirsig is adopting the basic nominalist orientation
    > that the more "sense perceptible" something is, the more real it is, in
    the
    > style of Dr. Johnson refuting Berkeley by kicking a stone. Now he (Pirsig}
    > would expand that orientation to argue that "art and morality and even
    > religious mysticism" belong in the concrete, and hence "more real" (and so
    > distinguishes the MOQ from materialism), but would deny that to
    > "abstraction".
    >
    > dmb says:
    > As I understand it, nominalism is the denial of the existence of
    universals.
    > It says things like truth and beauty do not exist excepts as an abstract
    > feature of all true and beautiful things, apart from the particular forms
    of
    > the natural world. I think this is exactly what Pirsig is NOT saying. He
    > saying we ought not treat them as abstractions, but as real things. He's
    not
    > even coming close to saying they are material things, only that they are
    no
    > less real. And of course, he's only how we ought to TREAT them, that we
    > should act AS IF they were real.
    >
    > On Wednesday, Scott said:
    > I think you're correct on this, though Pirsig first defines empiricism as
    > "[empiricism] claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the
    > senses or by thinking about what the senses provide." [Ch. 8], though he
    > goes on to include art and morality and "even religious mysticism" as
    > "verifiable". Nevertheless, this attitude seems to me to more than a
    little
    > nominalist, since it looks to that which comes from the outside as
    > privileged over that which comes from the inside.
    >
    > dmb says:
    > The outside is privileged in the MOQ? Again, I think this is exactly what
    > Pirsig is NOT saying. The traditional empiricism that Pirsig describes
    above
    > is yer standard SOM position and pretty much defines what objectivity is.
    > This is the kind of empiricism that priviledges the outside. This is one
    of
    > the main problems with SOM, especially the dominant variety: scientific
    > materialism. Pirsig's expanded empiricism seeks to overcome this problem.
    > Not only does he add a sense of value, there is also the insistence that
    > legitimate intellectual knowledge not only comes through, is mediated by,
    > our biological senses, but also that it should be mediated through the
    > social level, that we shouldn't even pretend our ideas are produced by
    > biological brains and nothing more. And unlike SOM it treats the "inside"
    as
    > real as the "outside", if you will.
    >
    > Thanks,
    > dmb
    >
    >
    >
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