From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sun Nov 02 2003 - 22:28:51 GMT
Andy:Andy Responds to DMB (today): Sorry, but Pirsig is talking about
quality here and not truth. Two different discussions. I am probably a
little dense for not recognizing that quality has a concrete and material
existence, but Pirsig never says this about truth. In the Mcwatt thesis, he
makes the point that Pirsig subscribes to a pragmatic theory of truth. This
is what I meant when I said that you wish to make truth a primary reality
with quality. I think this is a mistake.
DM: Exactly, DMB you just don't agree with Pirsig on truth, and Rorty does!
He does, he does, he does.
----- Original Message -----
From: <abahn@comcast.net>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Sunday, November 02, 2003 5:31 PM
Subject: Re: MD Two theories of truth
> DMB and anyone else interested,
>
> Andy asked McWatt (10/27/2003):
> "Well, this may be so, but isn't Pirsig on shaky ground here. You don't
give
> this much more discussion, but seem content to dismiss Beasley with
Pirsigs
> brush-off. WHat does Pirsig mean when he says, "You don't lose the value
of
> quality by treating it as if it had a concrete or material existence."
> Quality has a concrete and a material existence? And this is a
"fundamental
> point of the MOQ?" Uh-oh, I have just missed something here. What is it?
> I don't know what quality is, but I don't think it has a "concrete or
> material existence." If it does, could someone help me see why this is
so."
>
> dmb chimes in(11/01/01):
> As real as rocks and trees. This is what I've been trying to get at in the
> other thread, where I tried to show those two theories of truth as
> incompatible. In these terms, Rorty treats truth as if it only had an
> abstract existence, as a property of sentences, as a matter of
> intersubjective agreement. Pirsig, on the other hand, treats truth as if
it
> were as real as...
>
> Andy Responds to DMB (today): Sorry, but Pirsig is talking about quality
here and not truth. Two different discussions. I am probably a little
dense for not recognizing that quality has a concrete and material
existence, but Pirsig never says this about truth. In the Mcwatt thesis, he
makes the point that Pirsig subscribes to a pragmatic theory of truth. This
is what I meant when I said that you wish to make truth a primary reality
with quality. I think this is a mistake.
>
>
> Andy said earlier:
> "From here it seems there is just a small step to saying truth is a
propety
> of language. I am not disagreeing here I am just noting for others the
> "linguistic turn" that Pirsig has taken. To DMB, in particular, it seems
> Pirsig notes the imporatance of language to truth."
>
> dmb says:
> I think you've misread here. I don't see the small step to Rorty's theory
of
> truth and I don't think he's talking about the "linguistic turn" here.
(I'd
> bet a buck that you got this idea from Matt.)
>
> Andy: You owe me a buck. I just happen to be reading a collection of
essays edited by Rorty called "The Linguistic Turn." Rorty borrowed this
term from Gustav Bergman who coined the phrase in 1964. But I never read
any Rorty until I read Matt's confession essay, so we may have to bring in
an arbitrator here. One might say that Matt gave me this idea second or
thirdhand, but this would not be very honest would it?
>
> DMB: It seems pretty clear to me that he is talking about the way in which
ideas (intellectual static quality) are situated in that matter-of-fact
evolutionary relationship. He's pointing out the necessary relationship
between the social level, where language was born, and the realm of ideas,
where we use this inheritance to paint our ideas.
>
> Andy: Yes, and since truth is a property of language (something you agreed
a while back is so obvious it is trivial), one, such as Pirsig, can hold a
pragmatic theory of truth and still develop a MOQ.
>
> DMB: "It seems that there are lots of specific differences between Rorty
and
> Pirsig, and I've pressed the distinction between their two theories of
truth
> because is one of those specific cases that seems to be central to their
> overall differences. In the broader view they seem just as incompatable."
>
> Andy: You still have convinced no one here that I am aware of at this
site. All of your distinctions have been adequately answered by someone,
and not just Matt or I.
>
> DMB: While Rorty's intersubjective agreement might bare some similarities
to what Pirsig describes as sanity, that is about as far as it goes. Rorty's
truth
> is such a flimsy and arbitrary kind of truth, but Pirsig insists there is
> something that holds it all together, just as there is something that
holds
> the glass together and lets you drink. There is a rightness that holds
> "sanity" together, and its the same force that holds everything together.
He
> even asserts that this is the oldest idea known to man. (Mythology
expressed
> it before there were such things as ideas.)
>
> Andy: Right, I think. Rorty says that intersubjective agreement holds
truth together. Pirsig points toward quality holding truth together. But,
this quality is not always so easily seen. As in the broad questions like
"what makes an idea dangerous?" or "What morals should we all live by in an
increasingly global society?" THe "rightness" in answers to questions as
these might be what aligns with quality as defined by Pirsig. Or rather,
Quality might determine what answer is right. But the "matter of fact
evolutionary relationship" between qualtiy and truth will be subverted if we
don't allow a democratic process for determining which "truths" in the
marketplace of ideas are "better" to live by at each moment in time. This
democratic process is what Rorty means when he talks of intersubective
agreement. And this is why truth is secondary to quality.
>
> DMB: "He paints a picture of reality such that excellence in human life is
> achieved when one is somehow in harmony with this cosmic rightness. The
> static patterns are variously mastered, extinquished, or otherwise put to
> sleep. When one is no longer fighting against or otherwise tangled up in
> these static forms, genuine freedom and creativity may be achived. In
> religious circles this might be refered to as "getting right with God" or
> "obedience to God's will". Its what Campbell calls "following your bliss".
> There's no good reason to avoid this spiritual aspect of Pirsig's work.
He's
> always been looking for the Buddha in one way or another and so the MOQ is
> much, MUCH more comparable to Eastern Philosophy and mysticism than it is
to
> anything like neo-pragmatism."
>
> Andy: You might be right when talking about quality and the MOQ. But
truth is another matter. David M. is correct in calling the MOQ a positive
philosophy and Rorty really does not have much to say on this. He says we
don't need this. The Onus is on you to persuade us why we do need it. I am
not ignoring the spiritual aspect of Pirsigs work any more than I ignore
this aspect in my own life. However, this spiritual pursuit described by
the Buddha and Campbell is an individual pursuit. Campbell went through
some pains to explain that the western world does not necessarily need more
of this spirituality. Our individualistic culture has a much greater need
for emphasis upon cooperative ideals that are needed to hold a society
together. Rorty addresses these needs and doesn't think a metaphysics is
going to help us acheive these societal goals. In other words the MOQ is
not going to save the world from ourselves, only we can.
>
> DMB: "the MOQ has the unfolding of an evolutionary universe in which
> all static forms are tranparent to the divine, are shown to be children of
> the creator. A neo-pragmatic atheist and physicalist is just naturally
gonna
> be lightyears away from all that."
>
> Andy: Again, not going to help us. Whether or not there is a divine
creator is irrelevant to the pragmatist. The fact that the MOQist, the
Buddhist, the Eastern Mystic, the athiest, the Pragmatist, the
neopragmatist, the conservative, the liberal, the fundamentalist Christian,
the taoist, the Protestant, the Catholic, the islamist, the physicalist, the
pagan, the native American, the communist, and the capitalist are light
years apart on agreeing on the nature of the unfolding of an evolutinary
universe and on the existence of a divine creator cannot get in the way of
all these groups of individuals sitting down together to decide what we are
going to do about world peace, global warming, soil depletion, water
shortage, the Aids crisis, etc. These questions and the "rightness" of the
answers to them can only be determined through intersubjective agreement.
The best answers will come from democratic processes, experimentation, and
will change through time and place. In t!
> his sense truth is not as real as tree and rocks if we associate it with
the answers to these questions.
>
> Regards,
> Andy
>
>
> MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
> Mail Archives:
> Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
> Nov '02 Onward -
http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
> MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
>
> To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
> http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
>
>
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon Nov 03 2003 - 00:04:26 GMT