From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Sat Nov 08 2003 - 03:57:00 GMT
Matt,
> Scott said:
> To me, intellectual patterns are things like "E=mc[squared]", or "the self
is (or is not) an illusion". To call the self an intellectual pattern is in
the same mold as materialists like Rorty and Dennett, who look on the self
as a figure in a narrative. Such claims simply do not fit my experience. In
my experience, the self is that which thinks intellectual patterns, which
feels, etc., that it is different from all that is thought, or felt, or
perceived. In short, it is not SQ alone.
>
> Matt:
> I'm not feeling very creative right now, so I won't take up your claim
that Rorty and Dennett's idea of a self is simply SQ.
Well, obviously they don't use MOQ terminology, but since I doubt that they
recognize something so vaporous as DQ, I would say that their world only
consists of what MOQ-ists would call SQ.
>[Matt:] But, I was a tad confused by the claim that an "intellectual
pattern in the same mold as ... the self as a figure in a narrative."
First, let me say that I think you are right, what you describe as the self,
roughly, that which holds static patterns, is distinct from the way Rorty
and Dennett view the self, i.e. the sum total of static patterns. That the
self is a figure in a narrative does not immediately strike me as different
from how you would describe the self. The reason is that a figure in a
narrative is distinct from the narrative: you have the figure and you have
the narrative. Rorty wants to say that the figure does not have any
_special_ distinctiveness from the narrative. He says that we can ascribe
anything with 'narrative gravity,' a phrase he pulls from Dennett.
The difference is that I do not consider the self as something which "hold
static patterns". That too would be a static pattern, like space being that
which holds physical objects. My notion of the self is that it is a pole in
a polarity, a contradictory identity. Its un-static-pattern-ness lies in the
fact that it is aware of static patterns, and by being aware of them creates
them *as* static patterns. The contradictory identity of self and non-self
shows itself in that in the same act that the self creates static patterns
by being aware of them, the static patterns, by being cognized, create the
self.
>[Matt:] Rorty's picture of the self is a web of beliefs and desires, which
I see as essentially the same as the picture of the self as a set of static
patterns. What we call the "self" is a pragmatic as
> cription of narrative gravity, saying that it helps to hold Bob as
distinct from Bobbette, despite that fact that their webs or static patterns
overlap to a very large degree, if we want to cope with Bob (which includes
things like predicting his behavior, understanding him, or loving him).
>
> I just wanted to point out that I think you are right, that Rorty and
Dennett do hold a view contrary to yours, but I thought the reason for this
was obfuscated.
I don't think so -- see above.
I would say that "a web of beliefs and desires" amounts to "all SQ", which
is to say, I don't see any significant difference between Pirsig's view and
Rorty's (other than that Pirsig would say the web can be transcended). Would
you agree?
- Scott
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