From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sat Nov 08 2003 - 21:37:47 GMT
DMB said:
Rorty's truth is an adjective, Pirsig's is a noun.
Matt replied:
...this is a specific criticism and a
significant point of departure between Rorty and
Pirsig that I have adressed and discussed in the
past. Pirsig, at the end of Lila, says that Good is
a noun, not an adjective as we in the West have
treated it (actually, most philosophers in the West,
following Plato's footsteps, have treated Good as a
noun, too, its just the logical positivists and
laypeople who consider Good to be an adjective).
dmb says:
Whew! Finally. Thank you. I think this might be the first time you've ever
provided me with a direct response. (It would have been nice of you to
address it to me instead of Andy, however.) Here I would interject a further
point. can blame it on laypeople and the positivists, but as Pirsig tells
it, SOM is the problem here. It is SOM and that construes "Good" as an
adjective. The very notion is contained in the language, in dictionary
definitions, and reflects the dominant world view. Rorty's description of
his theory of truth goes along with this insofar as truth, a particular kind
of good, is viewed as a property, an attribute, an adjective that modifies
statements.
Matt continued:
Vicariously, this can be construed to mean that
Truth is also a noun. Afterall, since "the Good" is
basically the same thing as Pirsig's central term,
Quality, Pirsig is saying that Quality is a noun.
Since Quality is everything, that means everything
is a noun. This is how Pirsig gives the same
"concrete" existence to everything, from emotions to
rocks (what concrete pans out to mean is different,
depending on the levels and such).
dmb says:
Yes. We agree almost entirely here. I'd only point out that we should be
more specific with the use of the word "Quality". Are we talking DQ or one
of the 4 levels of static quality? As I keep trying to point out, Pirsig's
idea of truth is specifically intellectual static quality. So another point
of departure between the two theories hinged on the fact that Rorty's
examples of true statements included both social and intellectual assertions
and he seems to be saying there is no distinction between them. Not that we
should expect him to adopt it. It wouldn't really work even if he tried. My
only point here is that Rorty and Pirsig are different beyond the
distinction between truths as adjectives and truths as nouns.
Matt continued:
This is one of those places where I agree with DMB,
where he has actually pointed out a point of
divergence, but reply that this has continually been
a point of criticism for me: I've never denied that
it was a point of divergence. The criticism comes
from the fact that Rorty suggests that if we think
of morality and knowledge (and their operative terms
"good" and "truth") as nouns, we will be much more
likely to think that they should be objects of
inquiry. To do that is to think that we be more
moral and more truthful we need to inquire into "the
Good" and "the Truth". This leads to a
correspodence theory of truth.
dmb says:
Never denied this point of divergence? But, but, but, I've made this same
point many times in recent weeks and you denied it almost every time.
Perhaps you didn't see my point and thought you were denying something else.
In any case, I'm glad you see what I'm saying this time. Further, I don't
see how Pirsig's truth as a noun leads to a correspondence theory of truth,
which is also SOM. I can see how Rorty's rejection of "objective" truth
might lead one to believe that he has rejected SOM, but I submit that he has
only rejected objectivity in favor of intersubjectivity, which puts him back
on the same side with SOM again. They both view truth as an adjective. I
mean, Rorty agrees with SOM on at least this single point. When we add his
theory of truth to his professed physicalism and atheism, we get an even
closer match between Rorty and SOM. We can agree to disagree about who's
theory is better. I'm just happy to finally see somebody aknowledge and
address my point, let alone agree with it.
Thanks,
dmb
P.S. I wonder how long it'll be before you take it back.
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