From: Paul Turner (paulj.turner@ntlworld.com)
Date: Fri Nov 14 2003 - 10:59:47 GMT
Hi Matt
Paul said:
Okay, we can split reality up in millions of ways for the duration of a
discussion, but when you say things like "the world causes us to have
beliefs" you are making a metaphysical distinction between "the world"
and "beliefs" by postulating a fundamental causal relationship.
Matt:
No--I'm making a pragmatic distinction for the duration of our
discussion. Its only if you think that all distinctions made about
reality (which would be all distinctions) are metaphysical that you
would say that, and that would beg the question because pragmatists
don't think you have to play metaphysics.
Paul:
Even during our discussion, there is a difference between making a
distinction between e.g. "fish" and "not-fish" and making a causal
relationship out of the distinction between "the world" and "belief." I
would suggest that there is nothing "useful" about identifying that the
world causes me to have beliefs, the beliefs are useful or not on their
own. If pragmatists don't want to play metaphysics, perhaps they should
stop making general statements about fundamental causal relationships
;-)
Paul said:
The assertion that "the world causes us to have certain beliefs" assumes
a pre-existing world, a world of causal pressures at least. I think that
making this assumption lands you in metaphysics, whether you want to
call it something else or not - or to put it another way, by making such
claims you have started a conversation with metaphysicians whether you
walk away or not :-)
Matt:
The only reason an assumption would land you in metaphysics is if you
thought your assumption got at "the Way the World Really Is, In and of
Itself, as Such". Pragmatists just think its a handy assumption to have
around, helps you deal with tigers and stuff.
Paul:
What if a metaphysics states that the evaluation of "handiness" that
selects your assumptions is primary empirical reality?
Paul said:
Furthermore, by engaging in the conversation and then ducking
metaphysical questions about the nature of this "causal pressure," I
think you run into the same problem as Niels Bohr when he refused to
comment on what went into experiments. You deny objectivity, as did
Bohr, but as with Bohr, objectivity is replaced by intersubjectivity
which effectively collapses object into subject (or more specific to
neo-pragmatism, collapses objects into language). I say this because,
unless you make it a further metaphysical category, even your "causal
pressure" has to be taken as a linguistically constructed notion.
Pragmatists might object to this with talk of belief in an external
world of stubborn physical reality but then they are quick to deny they
are making an ontological claim. This is why I suggest that Rortyan
pragmatism is linguistic idealism in denial.
Matt:
I think Bohr was right. The reason objects aren't collapsed into
subjects is because only "talk of objects" are collapsed into subjects.
Paul:
Where does this leave physical reality, is there only "talk of physical
reality"?
Matt:
"Causal pressure" is a linguistically constructed notion because
"causal" and "pressure" are words.
Paul:
The sentence should have read - "...even your 'causal pressure' has to
be taken as [no more than] a linguistically constructed notion."
What I'm saying is that you seem to be making the assumption that words
are only ever about more words, including the world that you are
claiming causes you to create words and beliefs.
Matt:
The reason pragmatists think they can get away with this and still deny
making an ontological claim is because of a piece of the puzzle I forgot
to add last time: pragmatists switch from thinking of
language-as-representational to language-as-a-coping-tool. Part of the
switch away from metaphysics is that we stop thinking that language
represents objects that are "out there". Part of the train of thought
from Kant to Russell and the early Wittgenstein to Quine and Sellars is
the thought that we can't seem to make anything out of "out there" in
terms of representation. Pragmatists think that instead of thinking of
language as analogized to a glass that we look through, like a tinted
lens that colors and helps constitute what we see, we think of language
as analogized to an arm or leg--language is just a helpful tool we use
to get through the world.
Paul:
So you're saying that language alters perception about as much as limbs
do?
Still trying to get to the bottom of this intellectual pattern of yours!
Cheers
Paul
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