From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sun Nov 16 2003 - 17:20:55 GMT
Matt:The pragmatist is making the claim that words only hook up to other
words, that the only thing that gives a word cognitive meaning are other
words. This leaves physical reality right where it was--about to devour me
unless I run away from it.
DM: So Matt, what are scientists doing when they do experiments and falsify
their theories?
Matt:as long as they keep their claims out of ontology
DM: Yeah, keeping guard over ontology, that's what pragmatism does, it works
for me, until
I start thinking about the nature of this capacity to keep the conversation
going, what sort of
cosmos this the is, and taht an empty ontological box is a great wonder of
ontology!
regards
David M
----- Original Message -----
From: "MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT" <mpkundert@students.wisc.edu>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Sunday, November 16, 2003 1:04 AM
Subject: Re: MD When is an interpretation not an interpretation?
> Paul, Johnny, Scott,
>
> Paul said:
> Even during our discussion, there is a difference between making a
distinction between e.g. "fish" and "not-fish" and making a causal
relationship out of the distinction between "the world" and "belief." I
would suggest that there is nothing "useful" about identifying that the
world causes me to have beliefs, the beliefs are useful or not on their own.
If pragmatists don't want to play metaphysics, perhaps they should stop
making general statements about fundamental causal relationships ;-)
>
> Matt:
> Fundamental causal relationships. I don't get it. The pragmatist's
"general statements about fundamental causal relationships" aren't really
philosophical in the way that metaphysicians want our general statements to
be. They are supposed to look like facile common sense for a reason.
Pragmatists think that the tiger is real. We have no problem with saying
that a real tiger caused us to have a belief in the tiger. No metaphysics
within a mile for the reasons I've stated.
>
> Paul said:
> What if a metaphysics states that the evaluation of "handiness" that
selects your assumptions is primary empirical reality?
>
> Matt:
> I'd say that the metaphysics is still brokering on the appearance/reality
distinction for some sort of philosophical legitimacy and that it should
just drop the notion of a "primary empirical reality," and therefore of
metaphysics, so that it would no longer have what is common to both Plato
and Kant.
>
> Paul said:
> Where does this leave physical reality, is there only "talk of physical
reality"?
>
> and
>
> What I'm saying is that you seem to be making the assumption that words
are only ever about more words, including the world that you are claiming
causes you to create words and beliefs.
>
> Matt:
> The pragmatist is making the claim that words only hook up to other words,
that the only thing that gives a word cognitive meaning are other words.
This leaves physical reality right where it was--about to devour me unless I
run away from it.
>
> You are still trying to fit me as an idealist, but the difference between
the idealist and the pragmatist is that idealist is still hanging onto the
Kantian idea of language-as-representative. And because of Kant, we no
longer think that our language will ever be able to represent the
world-as-it-is-in-itself, therefore all we know that exists are
representations or language. That's silly, says the pragmatist. I'm quite
sure that the tiger exists. What the pragmatist does is clear away the
conceptual debris that would lead us to such an absurd view. He suggests
that we think of language as a tool with which to cope with things like the
tiger. With this image, its no problem to think that language only hooks up
with language, just as our arm only hooks up with us.
>
> Paul said:
> So you're saying that language alters perception about as much as limbs
do?
>
> Matt:
> That's a good question. No, the pragmatist agrees with the
representationalist that our language changes the way we perceive the world.
But because of the metaphor the reprsentationalist is using, he gets the
idea that we can peel off our language and see the way the world really is.
Instead, pragmatists insist that there is no way to peel off the human from
the inhuman. The representationalist says that the language we use is like
a pair of tinted glasses--what we see changes depending on what tint we use.
Well, the pragmatist says the same thing, except that the metaphor becomes
the language we use is like a tool we use to eat our steak--what we do
changes depending on what tool we use.
>
> Paul said:
> The MOQ says that Quality creates beliefs about a pre-existing physical
world. Pragmatists seem to be saying that a pre-existing *physical* world
causes pragmatic beliefs, of which the pragmatic belief about a pre-existing
world is one such belief and round and round it goes until the pragmatist
says "but we're only having a discussion, I don't do metaphysics..." and
continues to successfully dodge tigers :-)
>
> My suggestion to Matt is that if "the world" is understood as value (which
is fundamentally prior to and neither physical nor mental) the circularity
is avoided. Both the physical (objective) world and (subjective) beliefs are
encompassed in a larger framework of value which still retains the pragmatic
assumption of a pre-existing physical world. But to assert this is a
metaphysical claim which pragmatists avoid like the plague.
>
> Matt:
> Ah, I see. You think I'm making an ontological claim, as if I'm a
metaphysical materialist. Pace Scott, pragmatists see a difference between
metaphysical materialism (which is included under Scott's 'nominalist'
epithet) and their own non-reductive physicalism (which is not). It doesn't
matter to the pragmatist whether "'the world' is understood as value" or
"the world" is understood as material. We see both things as means to an
end. Science has found it useful to investigate things as material. We say
let them, as long as they keep their claims out of ontology (which would
include residual reductionism). Politics after Marx has found it useful to
think of everything as made up of differing values. We say let them, as
long as they keep their claims out of ontology (which is the same thing we
say to Pirsig).
>
> Paul said:
> My point was more that pragmatists say they only hold beliefs that are
useful and don't see the point in purely metaphysical claims. I was
suggesting that as beliefs can be considered useful or not regardless of how
they are "caused," pragmatists need not make such claims as "the world
causes us to have certain beliefs" and thus leave metaphysicians to it.
>
> If you have demonstrated a practical use for such beliefs then my argument
is a poor one.
>
> Matt:
> This is where it is helpful to think of the pragmatist as espousing facile
common sense, rather than a sophisticated analysis of "causal pressure".
Because it is sometimes helpful to know what caused your belief in the
existence of the tiger in front of you--was it a tiger, or was it the acid
you ingested?
>
> Matt
>
>
>
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