From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Tue Nov 18 2003 - 02:36:31 GMT
Platt,
> > No. I see Aristotelian logic as a good logic to use when the subject
> > under discussion isn't deformed by it, but when it is, then some other
> > logic is required.
>
> You choose when it's OK to be rational and when it's not?
If you're going to insist that "being rational" is all and only Aristotelian
logic, then there isn't much more to say. One cannot come up with the idea
that Quality is prior to subject and object through Aristotelian logic. That
act is one of creating a hypothesis, while Aristotelian logic only
determines what one can deduce from a set of assumptions. Therefore,
according to you, Pirsig is irrational.
> It would be
> nice to know when you use logic and when you find it "deforming,"
> whatever that means.
I use Aristotelian logic when it is useful, I use other logic when I do not.
To treat the self in such a way that it can be used in propositions amenable
to Aristotelian logic is to deform (our experience of) self. It is not a
simple identity. Nor is it a set of many identities.
>
> > Science (except quantum physics, for which there is
> > something called quantum logic) works well with Aristotelian logic, but
> > metaphysical questions in general do not.
>
> Pirsig has no problem in appealing to "logical consistency" when
> addressing metaphysical questions.
Until he mischaracterizes intellect, due to thinking that, since
Aristotelian logic only offers an either/or choice, he needs to
characterize it as either DQ or SQ.
>
> >For example, when the issue
> > under discussion is "identity" or the "self", then the Principle of
> > Identity fails.
>
> How so? The Principle of Identity merely asserts that things cannot be
> and not be at the same time in the same respect. Is "self" both true
> and false simultaneously?
Yes. (More accurately: to say it is an identity is false, and to say it is
not an identity is false).
>
> > Nor is the use of logic, of any kind, tantamount to foundationalism.
>
> "Foundationalism--A term used in epistemology for theories of knowledge
> in which our knowledge of the "external" world is founded upon evidence
> provided by our senses." (Google glossary)
Hmm. That's not what I meant by it. I would have thought one would use the
word "empiricism" for that and not foundationalism.
>
> "The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to what is call empiricism. It
> claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the senses or by
> thinking about what the senses provide." (Lila, chp 8)
>
> Putting two and two together, "logical consistency" and "evidence of
> the senses," the connection between foundationalism and logic is
> undeniable, at least as far as Pirsig is concerned.
Where did "logical" get added in here? One can be just as logical if one
considers the only valid source of knowledge to be non-empirical.
>
> >We
> > find certain patterns of thought to be reasonable (how? no further
> > reason, just recognition of high quality intellectual value), and call
> > the abstract forms of those patterns logic, in those cases where we can
> > abstract the forms.
>
> I do not find irrational thought reasonable under any circumstances
> (quantum theory excepted.). Nor does Pirsig. ".... logic is a set of
> rules (i.e. an intellectual pattern) that helps produce high quality in
> other intellectual patterns."
But not all high quality intellectual patterns are produced by patterns of
Aristotelian logic. You would throw out most of the MOQ if you tried to
stick to that criterion. For example, one cannot, through Aristotelian
logic, deduce that what gets you off the hot stove is DQ (which I consider a
low-quality idea, but nevermind). One cannot deduce that the "best" initial
split is into DQ and SQ. Etc.
- Scott
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