From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Sun Nov 16 2003 - 15:24:03 GMT
Scott,
> Platt,
> > I'll admit to having presuppositions because everyone does. I'll also
> > admit to having a presupposition that philosophy and discussions about
> > philosophy should be based on reason and logic, following Pirsig's
> > definition of logic as "... a set of rules (i.e. an intellectual
> > pattern) that helps produce high quality in other intellectual
> > patterns." You on the other hand see logical rules, at least the
> > Principle of Identity, as something that gets in the way of
> > understanding, evidenced by your repeated appeal to the "logic of
> > contradictory identity." Likewise, Matt is predisposed to ignore logic
> > when it suits him because to argue on a strictly logical basis would
> > admit to foundationalism.
>
> No. I see Aristotelian logic as a good logic to use when the subject
> under discussion isn't deformed by it, but when it is, then some other
> logic is required.
You choose when it's OK to be rational and when it's not? It would be
nice to know when you use logic and when you find it "deforming,"
whatever that means.
> Science (except quantum physics, for which there is
> something called quantum logic) works well with Aristotelian logic, but
> metaphysical questions in general do not.
Pirsig has no problem in appealing to "logical consistency" when
addressing metaphysical questions.
>For example, when the issue
> under discussion is "identity" or the "self", then the Principle of
> Identity fails.
How so? The Principle of Identity merely asserts that things cannot be
and not be at the same time in the same respect. Is "self" both true
and false simultaneously?
> Nor is the use of logic, of any kind, tantamount to foundationalism.
"Foundationalism--A term used in epistemology for theories of knowledge
in which our knowledge of the "external" world is founded upon evidence
provided by our senses." (Google glossary)
"The Metaphysics of Quality subscribes to what is call empiricism. It
claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the senses or by
thinking about what the senses provide." (Lila, chp 8)
Putting two and two together, "logical consistency" and "evidence of
the senses," the connection between foundationalism and logic is
undeniable, at least as far as Pirsig is concerned.
>We
> find certain patterns of thought to be reasonable (how? no further
> reason, just recognition of high quality intellectual value), and call
> the abstract forms of those patterns logic, in those cases where we can
> abstract the forms.
I do not find irrational thought reasonable under any circumstances
(quantum theory excepted.). Nor does Pirsig. ".... logic is a set of
rules (i.e. an intellectual pattern) that helps produce high quality in
other intellectual patterns."
Platt
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