From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Sun Nov 23 2003 - 05:05:57 GMT
David R,
You don't seem to grasp that my point in saying that truth by correspondence
only works when the statement is about sense-perceptible particulars was to
point out that it does NOT work with statements about generalities, or about
particulars that are not public, like thoughts and feelings. Here is my
original statement (to Platt):
"Thus you miss the point when you give examples that are true by
correspondence. Truth by correspondence only works when the example
consists of sense-perceptible particulars, as is the case in your examples.
But
as soon as generalities are involved, truth by correspondence doesn't work."
So the only thing I care about is if someone disputes this by claiming that
truth by correspondence DOES work with generalities. I don't care -- in this
context -- whether there are philosophical difficulties with saying that it
actually does work with sense-perceptible particulars. I am aware that there
are such difficulties, as there always are with questions about perception,
but don't want to bother with them in this context because they do not
concern my point. My main concern -- that it does not work when generalities
are involved -- holds even if there were no difference between physical
sight and insight, since those are both particulars. I would not be
concerned if the notion of "truth by correspondence" should be shown to be
unworkable in all cases.
Since your main concern seems to be perception, I can say that I am aware
that there is a heavy cognitive role involved in ordinary perception. It is
also my perhaps crackpot view that sense perception is a kind of language,
and can be thought of as the creation of spatio-temporal forms out of
non-spatio-temporal whatever. If you want to start a separate discussion on
perception then that is where I would chime in, though I'm not inclined to
at this time since I've probably talked about it enough already in past
discussions, and I really ought to stick more closely to discussions more
relevant to the MOQ. See the archives if you're interested.
- Scott
----- Original Message -----
From: "David R" < >
To: < >
Sent: Saturday, November 22, 2003 1:02 PM
Subject: Re: MD matt said scott said
> Scott,
>
> Thanks for your first answer to the puma question. You preface it by
> complaining once again that you can't see why anyone would think that it
is
> in the least bit important, so I will deal with that.
>
> Look, this is really simple.
>
> If you explain what 'correspondence' means by reference to something
called
> 'sense perceptible particulars' ("correspondence works for sense
perceptible
> pariculars") then, obviously, in order to understand what you are saying
> about correspondence (whatever it is you are saying about correspondence),
> we will have to understand what you mean by 'sense perceptible
particulars'.
>
> Clear?
>
> Now, you offer an explanation of 'sense perceptible' as 'physical sight',
as
> contrasted with 'insight or understanding'. Ok. Fine. So tell me how
this
> applies to actual cases of seeing things, and I will know what you mean by
> the contrast between 'physical sight' and 'insight'.
>
> That's all I want to do, understand what you are saying. My request for
> application of your distinction to actual cases is a reasonable one. The
> physical sight/ insight distinction is what your explanation of
> 'correspondence' has come down to, and it it turns out that you can't
apply
> the 'insight'/'physical sight' distinction in practice we will have to
start
> over.
>
> You may think (you seem to suggest this) that it is so increadibly simple
to
> clarify this fantastically easy point that it's not worth even raising it
> unless one is preternaturally stupid.
>
> Ok, in that case, there's nothing to be lost by *showing* me how simple it
> is to clarify the point, namely, by actually clarifying it. Wouldn't that
> be the simplest way of dealling with me?
>
> So let's come to the answer which you now reluctantly give to my question.
> Here was the question again:
>
> David R (previously):
> Scott has offered the following outstanding clarification of 'sense
> perceptible':
>
> > Sense-perceptible particulars are the objects and events we see, hear,
> > touch, smell, and taste. By "see" (to refer to your later post) I mean
> > physical sight, not insight or understanding.
>
> [...]
>
> What makes something a case of "physical" sight as opposed to "insight"?
>
> Try some actual cases of 'I see'.
>
> I'm walking home about 5pm in the deepening winter gloom in the dark eyes
of
> the forest, and I look up into the branches. I'm startled. I *see* the
> silouette of a long catty tail hanging down, and the mass of a couched
> animal. Immediately, without any pause for thought, I find myself stopped
> and looking up, expecting a growl to emminate - Oh no, that myth about the
> puma on the prowl: no myth.
>
> But no low growl comes. And no flash of eyes. And the movement in the
> coiling 'tail' is the same for all the trees, just wind. And now I *see*
> that it's just a knarled branch in a welsh forest, not a hungry killer.
>
> Ok, help me out. Is this a case of "physical sight", or of "insight"?
>
> > Scott answers:
> > It was a hallucination. Call it neither, or call it a case of physical
sight
> > that got corrected. What difference does it make?
>
> David R:
> (1) if the two cases of seeing in the example are *neither* physical sight
> nor insight/understanding, then your theoretical contrast between
'physical
> sight' and 'insight' doesn't apply to seeing in the real world.
>
> That's a difference it makes.
>
> (2) if we treat the seeing of the puma as a case of hallucination (an
> erroneous understanding) and the seeing of the branch as 'corrected'
> physical sight, then it appears that we will have no way of explaining the
> fact that factors of *insight and understanding* are involved in realising
> that it's a branch (we recall the wind, we get no growl).
>
> That's a difference it makes.
>
> (3) if neither case is in fact a case of 'physical sight', then it will
seem
> that we can get by perfectly well without the concept of 'physical sight',
> and the distinction upon which you base your explanation of
'correspondence'
> will have to be abandoned.
>
> That's a difference it makes.
>
>
> More generally, my motivating concern is that you may (for all I know) be
> unable to disentangle 'physical sight' from 'insight', and that being
> incapable of this, you will turn out not to have meant anything in
> particular by either 'sense perceptible' or 'correspondence'.
>
> Thus, there is no call for you to ask *me* whether I deny the existence of
> 'sense perceptible particulars', since I have no clear idea of what you
mean
> by the term, and rather good reasons for thinking that you mean nothing at
> all by it.
>
> Prove me wrong by successfully applying your 'insight and understanding'
v.
> 'physical sight' contrast to some actual examples of seeing.
>
>
> David R
>
>
>
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