From: David MOREY (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sat Jan 31 2004 - 15:36:30 GMT
Paul:
You are talking about subjective and objective in an epistemological*
sense. In that sense I think the MOQ agrees - the difference is between
high and low quality intellectual patterns. In an ontological sense, the
MOQ draws a line between inorganic-biological and social-intellectual
patterns without awarding the title of Reality exclusively to either
side of the line.
David: I agree with this: that the value of the MOQ is in its ontology,
i.e. a stratified ontology that rejects the idea of undervaluing either
subject or object as idealism and materialism do. Experience/quality/freedom
is primary/ontological and questions of epistemology begin when you start
your
analytical dissection of this reality.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Paul Turner" <paulj.turner@ntlworld.com>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2004 9:40 AM
Subject: RE: MD Objectivity, Truth and the MOQ
> Matt
>
> Paul previously said:
> Yes, "little more than" is a conclusion arrived at when the only
> alternative to objective is subjective. When value enters the picture as
> a third category, there is a further reason to accept realism - it's the
> *best* intellectual pattern for investigating nature. From this starting
> point we can say that intersubjective agreement is created by Quality
> and objectivity is then created by intersubjective agreement. I think
> this is an important MOQ contribution to pragmatism. Matt, I'm sure,
> doesn't think it necessary and puts it down to common sense.
>
> Matt said:
> I'm not sure what the "common sense" bit means in your ascription of my
> views
>
> Paul:
> In previous discussions I asked how a pragmatist comes to have beliefs
> about a physical world that collectively become intersubjective
> agreement. You explained that it was the "believed-in" physical reality
> that causes a pragmatist to hold such beliefs. When I pointed out the
> circularity of this you said pragmatism is not concerned with
> metaphysical explanations and is just supposed to be facile common sense
> - e.g. it was *obviously* a tiger that caused me to believe in a tiger.
> Pragmatism offers no general explanation for the arrival at this common
> sense, except the linear historical progression of ideas. I think the
> MOQ does.
>
> Matt said:
> ....but I think that saying that there are three categories, objective,
> subjective, and value, misses the point of what Pirsig was doing.
>
> Paul:
> I was taking the pragmatist position as stated by David - objectivity is
> little more than intersubjectivity - and expanding it by adding value,
> which is neither subjective nor objective. (To be clear, I'm using
> subjective and objective in an ontological sense here). This is the
> "trinity" stage Phaedrus reaches in ZMM. The MOQ then describes this
> value as unpatterned value (Dynamic Quality) and redescribes subjective
> and objective as patterned value (static quality).
>
> Matt said:
> Pirsig posited value behind objective and subjective. I take this to
> mean that he's dissolving the contrast between them.
>
> Paul:
> Epistemologically, yes, it is dissolved into high and low quality social
> and intellectual patterns. Ontologically, the contrast remains within
> static quality in an evolutionary relationship.
>
> Matt said:
> This, I think, is his move towards intersubjective agreement. Value, as
> the dissolving category (if you will), is a continuum of intersubjective
> agreement.
>
> Paul:
> Again I think intersubjective agreement, in the MOQ, translates into
> varying degrees of social and intellectual quality.
>
> Matt said:
> Put this way, you are moreorless right, "intersubjective agreement is
> created by Quality and objectivity is then created by intersubjective
> agreement." Pragmatists just don't take the "objectivity" to mean
> anything more than "lots of intersubjective agreement." As long as we
> have Quality in place, there isn't really a good line to be drawn
> between merely intersubjective and objective.
>
> Paul:
> You are talking about subjective and objective in an epistemological*
> sense. In that sense I think the MOQ agrees - the difference is between
> high and low quality intellectual patterns. In an ontological sense, the
> MOQ draws a line between inorganic-biological and social-intellectual
> patterns without awarding the title of Reality exclusively to either
> side of the line.
>
> *Correct me if I'm wrong but, because you don't do metaphysics, in
> neo-pragmatism ontology is collapsed into epistemology and reduced to
> the continuum of more or less useful knowledge? The MOQ grounds both
> ontology and epistemology in value. I think this is why we sometimes
> talk past each other a little.
>
> Regards
>
> Paul
>
>
>
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