From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sun Apr 04 2004 - 00:02:47 BST
Wim, Steve, Platt and all:
Wim said:
It's not your use of the term 'junk' that bothers me. It's polarization on
this list. 'Offensiveness' of the words used is not a good measure of
polarization. If you're abusing everyone at times (and see the value in what
the same person writes at other times) there's no polarization. If you're
abusing selectively those people you suspect of other political preferences,
there is.
dmb replies:
OK. Fair enough. By that standard I believe there is ample evidence that I
have leveled even the harshest criticism upon even the most liberal posters.
Rorty and his resident disciple are exhibit A. Then there is the attack on
Bodvar's SOLAQI, which has almost nothing to do with politics. That's
exhibit B. There is also Sam's version of the MOQ. My attack there is
predicated on what I see as a misconception of mysticism, not politics.
That's exhibit C. And so it is when I attack conservative "ideas". Its not
because they are conservative, but because I think they are bad ideas.
Whether my problem is with the superficiality and nihilism of Matt's
postmodernism, the narrowing effect of SOLAQI upon intellect, Sam's
theological interpretations, Platt's defense of social values over
intellectual values or anything else. In spite of my agressive style and
so-called "abuse" of what is posted here, I think you'll find that I don't
attack the source. I go after the idea. Whenever a post is criticized as
flawed in some way, there is always the possible implication that the poster
has not done a good job or even that the poster is not such a great thinker.
But this is not the same as saying we should discount the idea BECAUSE the
author is flawed. I realize that nobody likes to have an error exposed. But
how can a genuine philosophical discussion be conducted without the freedom
to criticize the ideas presented? I think that's what its all about. Each of
us employ a knife. That's just how it goes.
Wim wrote:
You see a war between social and intellectual patterns of value almost
everywhere, also in the criticisms of some scientists of the Bush
administration. My point was not whether that is justified. You can indeed
quote Pirsig in your defense. My point was whether we have to re-enact that
war in this list. Can't we try to limit what we express here to intellectual
patterns of value?
dmb replies:
Re-enact that war on the list? I see the war everywhere? Limit our
expressions to intellectual values? Jeez, I'm hurt. I think that a more
generous and sympathetic reader could just as easily say that I have
provided many topical examples of the conflict Pirsig has described. That's
what why I presented the battle between science and politics in the context
of Pirsig's quotes about the various forms of anti-intllectualism. That same
reader might also say that I have been defending intellectual values with an
intellectual arguement that is perfectly consistent with those quotes. He
might even say that the ability to site a concrete current example of the
attitude described in those quotes fairly well demonstrates that I
understand what Pirsig is talking about. I only wish there was such a
reader. ;-)
Wim said:
I take what Pirsig wrote in 'Lila' on the subject to be metaphorical. So:
'different and opposed' only in the very limited sense of 'definition'
versus 'metaphor'. Metaphors have limited applicability and I do think that
Pirsig overextended this one in 'Lila'. You run into problems when you use
any metaphor for a relation to determine what belongs to the categories
being related.
dmb replies:
Wim, dude, that's just not true. When discussing the conflict between the
social and intellectual levels, a discussion that covers about 20 chapters,
Pirsig sites dozens of specific and concrete historical examples. (Some of
them appeared in the afore mentioned quotes.) Since each of use has a copy
of the book, nobody has to take my word for it. I'd especially recommend
chapters 21, 22, and 24. I wouldn't be surprized if the number of specific
examples exceeded 100. Wim, sir, you are factually incorrect.
Wim continued:
................And that's what you seem to be discussing with Platt: do
conservatives (or their reasoning) belong to the 'social' category and
liberals (or their reasoning) to the 'intellectual' one, or vice versa. I
would have preferred Pirsig to stick closer to his hardware/software
metaphor for the relations between the levels, but even that would not have
helped in this discussion.
dmb replies:
Right. The computer analogy doesn't help here. I think we'd all agree that
one would be going too far to say that conservatives are ALWAYS defending
social level values or to say that liberal are ALWAYS defending intellectual
values. Nothing is as clear cut as that. But as a orienting generalization,
it is true enough to say that we can see that conservatives and liberals
have taken sides in the conflict between social and intellectual values. As
Platt mentioned, conservatives tend to glorify patriotism, assert
traditional morality, family values, they tend to be religious. Clearly, we
can see that these are social level values. Liberals, on the other hand,
tend to assert rights rather than traditional values, they tend to glorigy
criticism and dissent and view the patriotism of conservatives with great
suspicion, as a kind of blind obedience to myth and authority. They also
fear the extreme nationalism that such patriotism can lead toward and prefer
the kind of international law that puts the breaks the ambitions of nations.
They tend to be secular, scientific and rational rather than religious.
Surely we can see that these attitude are informed by intellectual values.
So, as a generalization, I think it is accurate enough to say that
conservatives tend to represent social level values and liberal tend to
represent intellectual values. Its accurate enough to be a useful idea. In
fact, a discussion of the exceptions would only help to clarify these
issues. BUT - AGAIN - My debate with Platt was about a much more specific
example. It was not just about conservatism in the abstract, it was about a
particular conservative and his very specific actions and policies. And,
again, I think that specific example strikes a strong resemblence to the
anti-intellectual attitudes described in Pirsig's quotes, supporting
material than no one has yet bothered to address.
dmb had said:
'It hardly matters if one clings to intellectual justifications for it, if
one is defending social patterns then one is defending social patterns.'
Wim replied:
I agree. From the meaning 'conservative' and 'liberal' have to me,
conservatives seem to defend social patterns of value and liberals want to
liberate themselves (or others) from them. Liberation from social patterns
of value doesn't automatically imply promoting intellectual patterns of
value or promoting social progress. It can also mean degeneration. Platt is
right that if you choose the wrong methods, even promoting social progress
may cause degeneration and other undesirable results.)
dmb says:
OK. That's true, but it condtradicts nothing I have said in this debate.
Again, you are forgetting the case I brought where the (commerical and
political) social level values of the current administration is at odds with
(Scientific journals and scientists within the government) intellectual
values. If I had been making a case for free love instead of traditional
sexual morals, you might have a good point. But I wasn't, so you don't.
Wim said:
The 'political compass' you once alerted us to had an economic left/right
scale and a libertarian/authoritarian scale. In the Netherlands 'liberalen'
can be found in the lower right quadrant (right, libertarian). In the USA
'liberals' are blamed for being left and authoritarian. In the Netherlands
typical 'defense of social patterns of value' issues, like defending family
life and heterosexual marriage, are championed by the Christian Democrats
who operate somewhere in the middle of both scales.
dmb says:
Platt has confused you. Perhpas the prime example of left-wing
authoritarianism is Joseph Stalin. American Liberals like myself are
anti-authoritarian, the lower left quandrant. In fact, the political compass
was designed to overcome such a misconception. As it says on the site, both
Ghandi and Stalin were on the left, but their stark difference shows how
much the vertical axis is needed in order to sort out the distinction
between such political ideologies.
Wim continued:
In short: It is not as easy as you suggest it is to link defense of social
patterns of value and promoting intellectual patterns of value to political
positions, neither in the USA, nor in the Netherlands/Europe.
dmb says:
Some cases are more complicated than others, I'll give you that much. If
we're taking about the fine gradations of ideological postions found within
Western Europe's liberal democracies it will require the skill of a surgeon.
But other cases are far more clear with respect to the values in conflict.
Hopefully the specific case I presented here was one of the latter. But
even if it might take some serious effort to describe the differences
between Christian democrats and social democrats, that doesn't mean it
wouldn't be valuable to sort it out. Until then, there are plenty of
examples from more extreme movements in history. These make the
social/intellectual distinction easier to see. There are also specific cases
where the choice is stark, such as Georgia's attempt to ban the word
"evolution" from biologiy classes. We can work toward more complicated and
subtle examples from there. So, its not that I think its ALWAYS easy, its
just that I think there are PLENTY of easy cases.
dmb had said:
...it seems clear that Pirsig's descriptions of the social level have pretty
much nothing to do with "unconscious copying of behavior". For Pirsig it is
myth, ritual, language, the giant, the values that hold a society together,
it is blue ribbons and saving face, it is that which controls and dominates
biological values, it is the parent of the intellectual level. It is many
things, but it is certainly not the "unconscious copying of behavior".
Wim replied:
I'm sorry, I had a fit of real philosophy and forgot that the thing we are
supposed to do in this discussion group is philosophologizing about Pirsig's
ideas. (-;
dmb says:
Philosophologizing? That's not even close to what I'm doing, nor am I
suggesting that practice for anyone else. I just happen to hold the crazy
belief that one must understand an idea before one can discuss it. And it
seemed that the distance between your description of the social level and
Pirsig's was too great. I'm not putting Pirsig's ideas into categories here,
I'm just saying yours don't match his. In fact, they defy and contradict
Pirsig in several important ways. Like Matt, Bo, Sam and others, I think you
are trying to solve a problem that doesn't really exist. And like them, I
think your solution causes problems rather than fixes them.
Wim asks permission:
...According to you 'a metaphysics in which the levels do not conflict is
something other than the MOQ'. I'll ask you the same as I did Platt: Am I
allowed to call my ideas 'a version of the MoQ' that admittedly deviates
from some of Pirsig's ideas? Should I go somewhere else to present them and
compare their quality with those of Pirsig and those of other contributors
to this list?
dmb says:
The question is not whether or not you have or even need permission. The
question should be whether or not such a practice is a good thing to do. And
its not a matter of pitting your ideas against Pirsig's. The problem is that
you're using Pirsig's terms to refer to your own ideas. Intellectually this
is confusing and thereby destructive of the quality of conversation here.
Socially, it is disrepectful to Pirsig and to the people who came here to
discuss his work. But this is easily fixed, as Platt suggested. Its just a
simple matter of making a distinction between your ideas and his. Finding
your own terms for your own ideas would be an excellent place to start. But
I should also add that I did not come here to discuss your ideas, or Rorty's
or anyone else's. Not that I have anything against mixing it up or comparing
ideas. Its just that moq.org is about Pirsig's MOQ. And I think the best
thing to do in terms of comparing the ideas of others is to present ideas
that help to explain or expand upon Pirsig's ideas and the issues he treats.
But I don't see much of that. Sadly, a great deal of the alternative
author's presented seem to be working at cross purposes with Pirsig and only
have the effect of cluttering things up rather than clearing things up. Its
not personal. Its not that I think Pirsig is beyond criticism or
improvement. Its just that, so far, such most criticisms have been off and
the improvements have been distortions. Its not that I'm against creative
thinking, its just that, so far, I don't see any "deviations" that really
work.
Wim wrote:
One of the ideas that started my philosophical fit was, that defining the
levels in a comparable way, with only a few variables, might clarify
matters. Another (hopefully) inspired idea was to use 'pattern of value' as
core concept in all those definitions and to avoid using 'value' or 'values'
separately. That might prevent contamination with Subject-Object thinking,
in which a 'value' is a characteristic of either a subject or an object. A
pattern is something that repeats or shows a recognizable structure. In my
understanding a 'pattern' is a 'pattern of value' because we value its
stability and versatility (and possibly the harmony with higher level
patterns of value). The comparability of my definitions derives from
concentrating on the way these patterns are maintained/replicated/latched.
In three of the four definitions I use the word 'copy': copying DNA (and
consequently hard-wired 'mechanisms' that guide behaviour), copying
behaviour and copying motivations/rationales for behaviour/actions. I do not
always include unconscious and conscious in the definitions of the social
and intellectual levels. That distinction is not essential for my
understanding of them even though it can help to understand the copying
'mechanisms'.
dmb says:
This is a pretty good example of what I mean when I say "it doesn't work". I
read this paragraph over and over and its still confusing as hell. Why do we
neeed to define the levels in a "comparable way, with only a few variables"?
And what matters are clarified by such definitions? Doesn't your attempt to
"prevent contamination with Subject-Object thinking" severely undermine
Pirsig's assertion that all subjects and objects can be described in terms
of static patterns of quality? And I'm afraid that while you are
"concentrating on the way these patterns are maintained/replicated/latched"
you have taken your eye off the ball. And, as I said before, that's why you
don't see the conflict under discusssion. Since you are talking about your
own ideas of the social and intellectual levels, and I am talking about the
conflict betweeen those levels as Pirsig describes them, we are literally
talking two different things. We are NOT even on the same page. When two
completely different and/or conflicting ideas are refer to by the same term,
great confusion is created and the coherence of the conversaton is
destroyed. So you can call it whatever you want. There nothing anyone can do
about it. I'm just trying to persuade you, and who ever is reading this
post, that its a very bad idea to engage in such practices.
Thanks.
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