From: David Morey (us@divadeus.freeserve.co.uk)
Date: Sun May 02 2004 - 10:51:22 BST
DMB: I think the idea that inorganic level patterns have preferences implies
that
some kind of consciousness goes all the way down. Its hard to imagine what
sort of limited awareness there must be for something like an atom or a
star, but that is the implication. In that sense, we might say that no
patterns are independent of perception. In that sense, the word perception
would refer not to our intellectual descriptions, but to the perception by
the inorganic patterns themselves. In this way we can think of inorganic
patterns as the lowest level of consciousness, far below the deepest
subconscious processes of human beings. But that is just a side note,
really. The point is simply that inorganic patterns of quality prefer to do
what they do independently of our intellectual descriptions of those
preferences.
DM: I agree with this, as it is certainly one road for investigation that
the MOQ
opens up. Rupert Sheldrake has made speculations in this direction too.
I wonder about the links between the collapse of the wave function, events,
consciousness, light, energy, perception, distance, etc. We think of light
as making perception possible but perhaps it is linked to consciousness in
an
even more intimate way. Via light we can be aware of a distant star, the
moon, the
table in front of us, how is light able to create a centre that connects all
these
events?
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Buchanan" <DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Saturday, May 01, 2004 10:15 PM
Subject: RE: MD The Individual Level
> Platt asked:
> The question is do the patterns exist independently of perception?
>
> Steve answered:
> No. I think the word pattern presupposes perception.
>
> dmb says:
> Patterns do NOT exist independently of perception!? Oh. Now I see where
> you've has gone wrong, Steve. You're suffering from a misconception that
has
> far reaching implications. There's more to the problem than this single
> mistake, but I think it might be useful to focus on it exclusively. I
think
> you've taken a pretty radical turn away from Pirsig's MOQ in making that
> assertion.
>
> I think we can get at the issue most directly and explicitly by looking at
> chapter 8 of Lila...
>
> "It may sound a little awkward, (to change from SOM's "A causes B" to the
> MOQ's "B values precondition A") but that's a matter of linguistic custom,
> not science. The language used to describe the data is changed but the
> scientific data itself is unchanged. The same is true for every other
> scientific observation Phaedrus could think of. You can always substitute
"B
> values precondition A" for "A causes B" without changing any facts of
> science at all. The term "cause" can be struck out completely from a
> scientific description of the universe without any loss of accuracy or
> completeness." Lila, page 104
>
> Please notice that the facts and data do not change as we make the switch
> from SOM's "causation" to the MOQ's "preference". These two alternatives
are
> both intellectual descriptions of those same facts and data. In other
words,
> SOM and MOQ are both working with the same observations and only the
> intellectual descriptions them has changed. The data are independent of
> these descriptions. In other words, the inorganic patterns that produce
the
> data is independent of any descriptions of it. So the switch from SOM to
the
> MOQ does NOT imply that these facts and data are unreal or in any way
> reduced to human perception. The dials move all the same. Inorganic
patterns
> such as water, glass, rocks are no longer described in terms of substance,
> but they can still be photographed, weighed, measured, or otherwise
> subjected to scientific scrutiny. Glasses of water can still quench our
> thirst and rocks can still be used to kill giants.
>
> What keeps a glass of water together if not substance? Or as Pirsig puts
> it,..
>
> "If you pick up a glass of water why don't the properties of that glass go
> flying off in different directions? What is it that keeps these properties
> uniform if it is not something called substance? That is the question that
> created the concept of substance in the first place. The answer provided
by
> the MOQ is similar to that given to the "causation" platypus. Strike out
the
> word "substance" wherever it appears and substitute the expression "stable
> inorganic patterns of value". Again, the difference is linguistic. It
> doesn't make a whit of difference in the laboratory which term is used. No
> dials change their readings. The observed laboratory data are exactly the
> same. ...Phaedrus saw that the "value" which directed subatomic particles
is
> not identical with the "value" a human being gives to a painting. But he
saw
> that the two are cousins, and that the exact relationship between them can
> be defined with great precision." Lila, page 105
>
> I think you can see here that something like a glass of water has an
> independent existence of its own. Something holds it together. There is
also
> something that holds together the intellectual descriptions we assign to
it
> and they are both held together by patterns of quality, but they are held
> together by quality of distinctly different kinds. In this way, objects
and
> subjects remain within the MOQ, but they are redescribed in such a way
that
> gives a greatly enhanced ontological status to the subjective side of
> things. The MOQ does not reduce all objects to subjects, it does not deny
> that objects exist in and of themselves, it only says that subjects and
> objects are better concieved as differing species of value.
>
> I think the idea that inorganic level patterns have preferences implies
that
> some kind of consciousness goes all the way down. Its hard to imagine what
> sort of limited awareness there must be for something like an atom or a
> star, but that is the implication. In that sense, we might say that no
> patterns are independent of perception. In that sense, the word perception
> would refer not to our intellectual descriptions, but to the perception by
> the inorganic patterns themselves. In this way we can think of inorganic
> patterns as the lowest level of consciousness, far below the deepest
> subconscious processes of human beings. But that is just a side note,
> really. The point is simply that inorganic patterns of quality prefer to
do
> what they do independently of our intellectual descriptions of those
> preferences.
>
> Thanks,
> dmb
>
>
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