From: Steve Peterson (speterson@fast.net)
Date: Wed Nov 06 2002 - 16:47:48 GMT
> Hi Steve, Platt,
>
> STEVE
>> What are we talking about when we discuss the levels?
>>
>> They are levels of ______. Can you fill in the blank or explain?
>>
>>
>> Levels of awareness?
>>
>> Types of patterns?
>>
>> Ways of valuing?
Jonathan interjects:
> To say level X is "better" than level Y means that "The Theory of
> Relativity" (of even Phlogiston theory) is somehow better than the
> Carbon atom. This sounds like nonsense to me. I don't think they can be
> compared on a simple one-dimensional scale of betterness. I think that
> Steve's offerings make more sense.
Steve says:
I agree that these comparisons sound like nonsense.
As far as my offerings, I personally don't like the types of patterns idea.
Wim says:
> According to me the simplest way to see things (and to correct the
> carelessness of Pirsig and the internal contridications of 'Lila') is thus:
> The levels are a way of distinguishing the different types of static quality
> by their different amounts of Dynamic Quality.
Magnus says:
To confuse things even more for poor Steve, my way of distinguishing the
levels is quite opposite from Wim's. The first split is always the DQ/SQ
remember? So, there is no DQ *in* a static level. Sometimes they can be
hard to distinguish from eachother, but try and you will be rewarded
with a better understanding.
Steve says:
I agree with Magnus' critique of Wim's way of distinguishing the levels.
Steve wrote:
> Would you then agree that the levels do not not represent types of
> things, ie types of patterns of value?
Magnus says:
I agree to the former but not the latter.
Patterns are not things. Things are *composed* of patterns. All things
you can see and touch are at least composed of inorganic patterns. And
if the are eatable, the are also composed of biological patterns, and so
on. These are the dimensions Jonathan mentioned, correct me if I'm wrong.
Steve says:
Let me clarify. I'm not sure we disagree. I use the word "thing" to
represent patterns of value only to make a point because I think there is
consensus that material objects are not to be categorized in the levels. My
point is that no pattern of value can be classified. There are types of
value, but not types of patterns of value.
As you say an eatable thing must be composed of both biological and
inorganic value. A particular pattern of biological value and inorganic
value might form a hamburger, for example. So the hamburger can then not be
classified as only biological or only inorganic. It is a pattern of value,
period. A person must be composed of all four types of value. (Even a
hamburger has all four types in a way.) A particular person is a particular
pattern of value. (But I would rather say that a person has a capacity to
value in all four ways.)
Since the moq considers thoughts and ideas to be real, I have attempted to
work with an extended definition of "thing" to be "any pattern of value."
I did this because people were discussing whether "democracy" is a social or
intellectual value. IMO categorizing "democracy" is just as inappropriate
as categorizing a material object since a material object and democracy are
both patterns of value and so just as "thingish" in moq terms. (But I would
rather say that democracy can be valued in a social way and in an
intellectual way.)
Perhaps some "things" actually are just one type of value. Is a rock only
inorganic value? But if a particular rock is where the chief in the tribe
traditionally sits, then does it not also have social value? (In Platt's
terms it does not have social awareness and is therefore inferior to the
chief. I agree that it is on a lower level of awareness but it still has
all four types of quality to some degree even if it is a really really low
degree.)
The idea of democracy (or any idea) may be thought of as pure intellectual
value while democracy as it is played out in society is pure social value.
Perhaps, democracy has all four types of value as well. It has low
inorganic value for its lack of physical form, but this low value is not a
lack of value (or perhaps really high inorganic value since it is free of
the laws of nature). It has social value in its ability to preserve society
and it has biological value in that it preserves the society that helps
protect life from the forces that seek to destroy life. As an idea it has
intellectual value by definition.
Am I making any sense?
Steve
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Wed Nov 06 2002 - 16:38:44 GMT