From: Steve Peterson (speterson@fast.net)
Date: Tue Nov 26 2002 - 17:42:00 GMT
> On Sunday, November 24, 2002, at 02:43 PM, Valence wrote:
>
>> Hey all,
>> In various threads that are active right now, the following two quotes
>> from the LILA'S CHILD annotations have been thrown around quite a bit:
>>
>> PIRSIG 1
>> For purposes of MOQ precision, let's say the intellectual level is the
>> same as mind. It is the collection and manipulation of symbols,
>> created in the brain, that stand for patterns of experience.
>>
>> PIRSIG 2
>> In the MOQ all organisms are objective. The exist in the material
>> world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the mental world.
>> Again the distinction is very sharp.
>>
>>
>> RICK
>> Quote #1 clearly states that "the intellectual level is the same as
>> mind". Yet, quote #2 states that "All societies... exist in the
>> mental world." Unless there is some meaningful difference between
>> "mind" and "the mental world" then these two quotes taken together
>> would add up to saying that all societies exist in the intellectual
>> level. Yet, that obviously can't be right given the very design of
>> the static levels. The most frustrating part of this is that in both
>> of the quotes Pirsig claims he is acting in the interest of precision
>> (a sharp distinction).
>>
>> Anybody care to try and reconcile these quotes?
>>
Steve says:
In the first quote, Pirsig is explaining moq levels in moq terms. In the
second quote Pirsig is comparing SOM and Moq, isn't he? He draws the same
comparison in Subjects, Objects, Data, and Values. He is trying to explain
MOQ in SOM terms.
(I'm trying to understand what SOM thinking is so I can understand how MOQ
is different. Let me know if this makes sense.)
Pirsig says that both the inorganic and biological levels fall under
objective reality in SOM, while societies and ideas fall under subjective
reality in SOM. MOQ avoids distinguishing these two realities because the
distinction so often produces Platypi.
To say that both societies and ideas exist only in the mind is to say that
they are both subjective, but what is the subject in each case? Would it
make sense that an SOM interpretation of the moq would hold a society as a
subject for social patterns of values and an individual as the subject for
intellectual patterns of value? Would this help explain why it is so
tempting to think of the intellectual level as the individual level? Of
course Pirsig is trying to get us out of the subject/object dichotomy, but
in the second quote he is relying on our subject-object "knowledge" to help
us understand the differences between the levels in the moq.
Steve
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