From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Sun Dec 01 2002 - 22:06:27 GMT
Dear David B.,
Another 'try' (in spite of Yoda):
Pirsig answers the question 'Does Lila have Quality?' in several seemingly
contradictory ways.
In chapter 11 of 'Lila' he wrote:
'It isn't Lila that has quality; it's Quality that has Lila. Nothing can
have Quality. To have something is to possess it, and to possess something
is to dominate it. Nothing dominates Quality. If there's domination and
possession involved, it's Quality that dominates and possesses Lila. She's
created by it. She's a cohesion of changing static patterns of this Quality.
There isn't any more to her than that. The words Lila uses, the thoughts she
thinks, the values she holds, are the end product of three and a half
billion years of the history of the entire world. She's a kind of jungle of
evolutionary patterns of value. She doesn't know how they all got there any
more than any jungle knows how it came to be. 'And yet there in the middle
of this "Lila Jungle" are ancient prehistoric ruins of past civilizations.
You could dig into those ruins like an archaeologist layer by layer, through
regressive centuries of civilization, measuring by the distance down in the
soil, the distance back in time.
...
Lila is composed of static patterns of value and these patterns are evolving
toward a Dynamic Quality. That's the theory, anyway. She's on her way
somewhere, just like everybody else. And you can't say where that somewhere
is.'
In spite of 'Nothing can have Quality' Pirsig answers the same question
'Does Lila have Quality?' in chapter 13 with:
'Biologically she does, socially she doesn't. Obviously! Evolutionary
morality just splits that whole question open like a watermelon. Since
biological and social patterns have almost nothing to do with each other,
Lila does and Lila does not have quality at the same time. That's exactly
the feeling she gave too-a sort of mixed feeling of quality and no quality
at the same time. That was the reason.
How simple it was. That's the mark of a high-quality theory. It doesn't just
answer the question in some complex round-about way. It dissolves the
question, so you wonder why you ever: asked it.
Biologically she's fine, socially she's pretty far down the scale,
intellectually she's nowhere.'
To what extent is Lila (any human like this fictitional character) created
by biological, social and intellectual patterns of value then? Could we
say -using the second quote- that she is created mainly by biological
patterns of value, not (as 'socially she doesn't' have Quality) or to a
small extent (being 'pretty far down the scale') by social patterns of value
and not at all by intellectual patterns of values?
'Since biological and social [and intellectual] patterns have almost nothing
to do with each other' I doubt if comparing the extent to which a person
(understood as a 'cohesion of changing static patterns' of value) is created
by patterns of each level is very useful. I'd say that a person 'is part of
patterns of value on different levels' instead of 'is composed of static
patterns of value on different levels'.
Painting a portrait of Lila on the intellectual level as being part of
specific intellectual patterns of value would indeed be quite difficult.
Given the role of this character in Pirsig's novel, he gives us very little
information to base ourselves on.
If I and other contributors to this discussion tend to say that Lila (and
real life persons comparable to her) must also be part of intellectual
patterns of value, it is probably partly because of egalitarian sentiments,
the feeling that stating that anyone could NOT have access to intellectual
quality (whereas others have) would justify unequal rights. (If we can
distinguish between -mainly- biological, social and intellectual people, why
not give for instance voting rights exclusively to the intellectual people?
Wouldn't that make for better political decisions?)
I feel Pirsig to be on my side on this issue. Why else would he state (in
the same chapter 13, a few paragraphs before the 'intellectually she's
nowhere' quote) that even criminals should be treated as a 'source of
thought'?
('What makes killing [a criminal] immoral is that a criminal is not just a
biological organism. He is not even just a defective unit of society.
Whenever you kill a human being you are killing a source of thought too. A
human being is a collection of ideas, and these ideas take moral precedence
over a society. Ideas are patterns of value. They are at a higher level of
evolution than social patterns of value.')
I don't think that "intellectually she's nowhere" is 'merely' a rhetorical
statement, either. (Even if probably it was ALSO designed for effect.)
Pirsig also tried to convey some sort of truth.
I have trouble squaring it with 'It isn't Lila that has quality; it's
Quality that has Lila.', however. Pirsig's ways of conveying his truth not
always paint a clear picture of what he means for me. So I try to clarify
things by painting my own picture. Lila (or anyone) not participating at all
in intellectual patterns of value (whereas others do) would be difficult to
square with other parts of my picture (my intellectual reality). Given the
egalitarian sentiments you also expressed before, how do you resolve this?
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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