RE: MD Plotinus, Pirsig and Wilber

From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Thu Aug 19 2004 - 09:47:04 BST

  • Next message: Platt Holden: "Re: MD Fox News and Logical Analysis"

    Hi Scott

    Scott said:
    As I see it, my argument is an out-and-out quarrel with Darwinism, while
    the MOQ just ignores this issue, and hence has no basis for a philosophy
    of mind.

    Paul:
    I think there is a basis for a philosophy of mind in the MOQ. First, the
    evolution described in the MOQ is an evolution of value patterns, not
    substance. Substance is a description that may be applied to the bottom
    two levels but the levels are not continuous. This resolves the
    metaphysical obstacle of how mental reality may evolve from physical
    reality by grounding both in value. In other words, there is no
    metaphysical imperative to explain mind in terms of matter.

    Second, the MOQ points towards an historic emergence of mind from a
    certain sophistication of social patterns e.g. symbolic language. I
    think Jaynes (although he points towards biological factors as well) is
    an example of how this idea can be a sound basis for a philosophy of
    mind.

    Scott said:
    In my view, one should not only just not assume that spatio-temporal
    events are all that is real, but actually show the necessity of the
    non-spatio-temporal, which the MOQ does not do, as far as I am aware.

    Paul:
    It certainly shows the necessity of Dynamic Quality, which is
    non-spatio-temporal, but I agree that it doesn't make that a significant
    characteristic.

    Paul previously said:
    > Why do sense perceptions *require* continuity? For some reason, I am
    > thinking about the arguments of the ancient Greeks about this, Zeno's
    > paradox and such, although I forget the detail.

    Scott said:
    Because sense perceptions are extended and have parts, but are perceived
    as wholes.

    Paul:
    Or, sense perceptions are whole but are perceived as parts?

    Scott said:
    One perceives a melody, one doesn't perceive a note, then another note,
    and then in a separate act put them together.

    Paul:
    If they are already whole there is no need for a separate act to put
    them together, rather the "separate act" is to take them apart. Another
    explanation is that I think the MOQ argues that the perception of
    "harmony," in its broadest sense, is the fundamental nature of
    perception which constructs our static reality in the first place. We
    are, in a way, predisposed to perceive harmony. This is the basis of
    unity between Poincare's epistemology and Phaedrus' metaphysics in ZMM.

    Scott said:
    Or one can focus on a note, but it extends through time also. This
    putting together happens subconsciously, if it can be said to "happen"
    at all.

    Paul:
    I think this "putting together subconsciously" corresponds to Pirsig's
    pre-intellectual value. If it is, it not only happens, it is what
    happens prior to anything else.

    Scott said:
    There is a strong relation to Zeno's paradoxes, which are basically
    pointing out the problem of the one and the many. Zeno's solution is to
    drop the many. The materialist's is to drop the one. But as I see it if
    you
    drop either, you can't have sense perception (where the one is
    continuity
    and the many is change). The MOQ does not address the problem, even in
    Chapter 8, where other platypi are supposedly resolved.

    Paul:
    Yes, I remembered what it was that brought Zeno to mind. The ancient
    Greeks argued about whether "change" was real and "changeless" was
    apparent (Heraclitus) or vice-versa (Zeno, Parmenides, Plato?). I think
    Pirsig is probably Heraclitean in the sense of Dynamic Quality but
    without stating that static quality is merely apparent.

    Scott said:
    (By the way, not that it is really germaine, but it is often said that
    modern mathematics, in particular the mathematics of limits, has
    resolved
    Zeno's paradoxes. First, it only applies to some (like Achilles and the
    Tortoise), but actually the resolution depends on mathematical
    constructs
    (the infnitesimal) that would not apply if quantum mechanics is valid.
    In
    QM there is, so to speak, a shortest length and shortest time, where for
    anything less than that. the laws of spacetime, and these mathematical
    constructs, don't work.)

    Paul:
    Yes, I read that somewhere.

    Regards

    Paul

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Thu Aug 19 2004 - 09:48:40 BST