Re: MD Empiricism

From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Sat Nov 20 2004 - 22:11:56 GMT

  • Next message: Scott Roberts: "Re: MD Empiricism"

    Ham Priday to Scott Roberts
    Sent: Saturday, November 20, 2004 5:10 PM
    Subject: RE: MD Empiricism

    Pardon my interjection, Scott, but I can't let this latest round on
    empiricism pass without noting that you are arguing yourself into a
    cul-de-sac because of MOQ's confusion between sensibility with reason. All
    the observations you are making are valid ones, such as what you said to
    Simon:

    > So now my question is: what is not phenomenal? What I am getting at is
    > that what SOM divided, Pirsig is reuniting by ignoring one side of the
    > division, as materialists do, by relabelling, rather than finding common
    ground.
    >
    Reason applies to empirical phenomena; it is something you can pin a label
    to; sensibility is what you feel and is therefore subjective. These are two
    kinds of experience. You had this almost right when you said:

    > I sense trees, the smell of coffee, etc. I do
    > not sense something I label value. All these things I sense have value,
    but
    > I do not sense it in the way I sense things and events. This puts value in
    > a category like space or time. Nothing that I sense is space or time, but
    I
    > know space and time as properties of what I do sense. As Kant pointed out,
    > space and time are the conditions for our sensing things and events, and I
    > would argue that value should be treated similarly.

    That you enjoy the smell of coffee, the beauty of music, the joys of Nature,
    etc., demonstrates that you DO sense Value. But you don't sense it as you
    sense things and events. Those are empirical experiences made sensible, as
    Kant correctly observed, by the dimensions of space and time. But the
    "essence" of those objective experiences is subjectively sensed as Value.

    What remains a mystery to MOQers, and what Pirsig failed to explain, is that
    all rational cognizance is divided, and everything we experience
    objectively, and label accordingly, is a differentiated aspect of the
    primary (uncreated) essence. Value permeates it all; it is the underlying
    essence of our reality. The dimensions of time and space, as well as your
    own individuality, are conditions secondary to Essence but which manifest
    the Value of Essence. It is an axiom of Essentialism that the split between
    Essence and empirical reality be rationally immutable -- this ensures man's
    autonomy as a free creature. At whatever point or "level" you break out an
    "other" and label it, that other is a relational (empirical) entity.
    (Morality and ethics are also relational in that they apply to individuals
    in a society. But that's a subject for another ongoing debate.) Only
    Essence is undivided and incapable of labeling. Use the word "Quality" if
    you must; but I think Value in its common meaning best expresses this
    concept.

    This is my epistemology, anyway. It may not agree with Pirsig, but it's a
    concept I'm comfortable with and don't have to battle with every day. I
    hope this has helped clear up the confusion.

    Essentially yours,
    Ham

    >

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