From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Sat Jan 22 2005 - 17:28:26 GMT
Hi Matt, Paul, anyone following this.
Matt said:
> In his essay,
> Sam largely spent his time suggesting that Pirsig has inheirited Kantian
> baggage and laying out the (very suggestive) apparatus that should look very
> familiar to people who have read and absorbed ZMM and Lila. What Sam didn't
> do is provide much argumentation for his suggestion. Sam was more providing
> a "prolegomena to a future critique."
I think this is right, although I'd never have dreamt of writing a 'prolegomena' (I've thought about
a Tractatus though... ;-) I think the original essay was very rough and ready - I was just wanting
to share some of the Schleiermacher quotes, which hadn't struck me so forcefully before - probably
because the last time I properly looked at Jantzen was before I joined moq.org, so I was less
'sensitised' to the language. But now I've had a chance to explore it properly I'm more and more
convinced of the conceptual overlap between Pirsig and the Jamesian/Schleiermacherian strand. I do
have to back that up properly, though, so I'll do more work.
> To me, this all reminds me of a far off
> debate I was engaged in with DMB.... Mysticism has nothing to do with
> epistemology, so it has nothing to do with Descartes or Kant or anything
> else like it in the West. At the time of my debate with DMB, Sam rejoined
> to DMB that, though mysticism may not be epistemology, it may have
> epistemological consequences, i.e., the _claims_ made on behalf of mysticism
> may have epistemological status.
<snip>
> As Sam said, this all revolves around the notion of "pure experience."
> "Pure experience," or "unmediated experience," is unintelligible without its
> counterpart "unpure experience," or "mediated experience."
OK, I'll pause here. I agree with Matt that pure experience is doing epistemological work in the
MoQ, but let me 'back up' and give some background. If I get a chance to revise the essay, it'll go
through the following steps (and forgive the sketchy framework again - but this is an MD post,
therefore a work in progress):
1. Descartes' search for certainty as a theological task, reacting to the breakdown of the
theological worldview after the Reformation. This begins the process of "foundationalism", that is,
the search for something on which the structures of thought can be grounded (or, put differently,
the search for a rationally defensible framework *within which* to resolve disagreements). This is
commonly described as 'the turn to epistemology', ie how do we know.
2a. John Locke's development of this foundationalist project in an empiricist direction; that is,
Locke takes "experience" to play the foundational role within his system.
2b. John Locke's argument that we are ethically accountable for our beliefs, so we are only
'allowed' to believe what is rationally provable.
3. Kant's system of phenomena/noumena, and the further restriction of 'experience' to what is
structured by our intelligence.
4. Schleiermacher's spin on Kant, intermingling with the general Romantic/German Idealist 19th
Century currents of thought, which emphasises feeling as a means of accessing information (and which
therefore plays the rhetorical role of safeguarding religious belief from the Kantian/ Enlightenment
criticisms, flowing from an acceptance of 2b)
5. William James' crystallisation of that German tradition, and his development of
pragmatism/radical empiricism, whereby 'pure experience' plays the foundational role, and also - in
a very reduced sense - "safeguards" a religious point of view.
5b. In passing, I want to sketch the way in which this Jamesian framework governs the vast majority
of popular writing on mysticism in the 20th Century (in the West).
6. Pirsig as a further development of this tradition, whereby DQ functions as the foundation for the
metaphysical system, the ground of knowledge and - crucially - "safeguards" value from
Enlightenment-style reductionist critique. I'll have to touch on here the question of Zen and
'no-mind', and how far Pirsig's use of pure experience comes from there or from James via Northrop.
7. The wider critique of empiricist foundationalism (ie all post-Locke) found in Rorty and
Wittgenstein, and how that cuts into some elements of the MoQ.
I want to then think about what's left of the MoQ if the case I'm arguing for is made, ie, if DQ
actually is being employed in this Lockean/Schleiermacherian/ Jamesian fashion, can it be
rehabilitated? I think that it can, and Scott Roberts' 'logic of contradictory identity' is one way.
Martin Buber's contrast between 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' mysticisms is relevant, ie one says pure
experience is the be-all and end-all (that's the exclusive mysticism), while the other says that the
experience is always engaged with the various static structures and experiences which shape its
interpretation (that's the inclusive mysticism). I'll link this in with the metaphysical debate
we've touched on about the relationship and priority of DQ/SQ. I'll also want to talk about the
'rhetoric of Quality' as opposed to the 'metaphysics of Quality', and end up coming back to my hobby
horse of eudaimonia.
But this is very sketchy, and I probably won't get a chance to do much on it for a while. There's a
lot of work to be done....
~~~
I think the main thing that I want to explore here in MD is point 6 above, because most of the rest
can stand independently of Pirsig (and would not be all that contentious). Does DQ *function* in a
Jamesian way? Or is Pirsig a thorough-going Zen practitioner in the MoQ? I think these points are
raised in later posts.
Sam
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